>Gassler Robert wrote:
>> This is riminescent of the nonsense over altruism from a couple of decades
>> back: whatever nice thing you do, it is really selfish underneath. Two
>> references come to mind that counter this nonsense. David Collard's Altruism
>> and economy showed the neoclassicals that altruism is rational after all.
>> Mark Lutz and Kenneth Lux in their book The Challenge of Humanistic
>> Economics turned the usual argument on its head in a section that showed
>> selfishness is really altruism in disguise.
>>
>
>The Levitt and List argument? I agree, that is nonsense. But the
>behaviorists are saying something different. One reason that they are
>interesting is that they open the door to the role of historically
>evolved institutions.
>
>"a player does not care about the other's welfare per se, but desires
>some kind of equity in the context of this particular interaction. We
>conclude that the outcomes of ultimatum, dictatorship and many other
>bargaining games have more to do with manners than altruism."
>
>Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, "Ultimatums, Dictators and
>Manners," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Spring,
>1995).
>http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/richard.thaler/research/articles/2-Anomalies_Ultimatums_Dictators_Manners.pdf
>
>The experimental data may have other interesting things to say: Consider
>page 10, the Schotter results could be interpreted as suggesting that
>capitalist relations are the cause of selfishness.
>
Shades of Schumpeter, only turned sideways.
>And consider the ultimatum study with children. Isn't it interesting
>that kindergartners (5 year-olds in the USA) are the group closest to
>the neoclassical expectation. As Marx once observed, "vulgar economy
>feels particularly at home in the estranged outward appearances of
>economic relations." Capitalism fosters infantile attributes, it turns
>the population into thumb suckers, and the neoclassicals capture
>perfectly that gain of truth about capitalism.
>
>
>
Susan Feiner has a wonderful article on how economic man is just a Freudian
infant. The child wants everything in sight ("unlimited wants") and mother(the
"free market") nurses him whenever he wants.
Feiner, Susan. 1999. A Portrait of Homo Economicus as a Young Man,
Woodmansee, Martha and Mark Osteen, eds. 1999. The New Economic Criticism:
Studies in the Intersection of Literature and Economics. London and New York:
Routledge. Chapter 9, pp.193-209.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> Jim Devine wrote:
>>>>> For e.g., in a lecture at Princeton he referred to research
>>>>> by John List on the "Dictator Game", and went on to argue how it is
>>>>> entirely consistent with the self-interested individuals hypothesis.
>>>>>
>>>>> In this game, one subject (the dictator) is given $10.00, and is then
>>>>> given a choice - to either give part of the $10.00 to another subject,
>>>>> or to give nothing, or even to steal some or all of $10.00 from the
>>>>> other. Levitt says that apparently altruistic behavior found in this
>>>>> experiment is merely an artifact of the subjects trying to win the
>>>>> approval of the experimenter.
>>>> I didn't know that he's the one who made that argument. Behaviorists
>>>> have responded to that. It'd be nice if there were an expert in the
>>>> house...
>>>>
>>> I am not such an expert, but I have read a bit of this literature.
>>>
>>> 1) The dictator game is a variation of the "ultimatum game." In these
>>> games, the player who makes the offer is the "Allocator" and the other
>>> player is the "Recipient." In the Dictator version the Recipient must
>>> accept whatever unilateral offer the Allocator makes. In the ultimatum
>>> game the Recipient has the option to reject or accept the offer.
>>>
>>> 2) My guess about the behaviorist response to Levitt and List is
>>> something like this: Although one might interpret the "Allocator's"
>>> action as trying to win the approval of the experimenter, it is less
>>> reasonable, in the ultimatum version, to interpret the "Recipient's"
>>> action in the same way. The Recipient in the experiment is given the
>>> ability to accept or reject the Allocator's offer. If the offer is
>>> rejected neither player gets any payoff. It is common for recipients to
>>> reject offers that are positive but unfair allocations. For a $10 stake,
>>> $1 and $3 offers have been rejected. In general, offers less than 20% of
>>> the stake are frequently rejected. The Recipient sacrifices a positive
>>> payoff and punishes the other player for acting unfairly.
>>>
>>> 3) The behaviorists interpret the experiment as the players exercising a
>>> sense of fairness, not altruistic behavior. Here is what Richard
>>> Thaler wrote some time ago:
>>>
>>> "One conclusion which emerges clearly from this research is that notions
>>> of fairness can play a significant role in determining the outcomes of
>>> negotiations. However, a concern for fairness does not preclude other
>>> factors, even greed, from affecting behavior."
>>>
>>> I'm reminded of a comment by RH Tawney:
>>>
>>> "It is obvious, indeed, that no change of system or machinery can avert
>>> those causes of social malaise which consist in the egotism, greed, or
>>> quarrelsomeness of human nature. What it can do is to create an
>>> environment in which those are not the qualities which are encouraged.
>>> It cannot secure that men live up to their principles. What it can do is
>>> establish their social order upon principles to which, if they please,
>>> they can live up and not live down."
>>>
>>> 4) The relevant Chicago boys articles appear to be:
>>>
>>> Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List, What do Laboratory Experiments
>>> Measuring Social Preferences tell us about the Real World, Journal of
>>> Economic Perspectives, (Spring 2007).
>>>
>>> List, John A. On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games,
>>> Journal of Political Economy, (June 2007).
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
