what are all the strange abbreviations (IC19, C19, etc.?) I think C19 is the 19th century, but what is "IC19" or "eCl9"?
the history of the word "ideology" is interesting, but I don't find it useful. To my mind, the meanings of words are _arbitrary_ and _conventional_. I try to use words the way most people use them currently (because I'm trying to communicate with them, not with people in the past). More importantly, we must always _define_ what we mean by abstract nouns. My definition may deviate from Marx's (who was not big on definitions), but at least it's clear. BTW, I base my vision of ideology on that of Derek Sayer's work (cf. THE VIOLENCE OF ABSTRACTION). On 11/1/07, Charles Brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > IDEOLOGY > > by Raymond Williams > > Ideology first appeared in English in 1796, as a direct translation of the > new French word ideologie which had been proposed in that year by the > rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy. Taylor (1796): 'Tracy read a paper > and proposed to call the philosophy of mind, ideology'. Taylor (1797): '… > ideology, or the science of ideas, in order to distinguish it from the > ancient metaphysics'. In this scientific sense, ideology was used in > epistemology and linguistic theory until lC19. > > A different sense, initiating the main modern meaning, was popularized by > Napoleon Bonaparte. In an attack on the proponents of democracy - 'who misled > the people by elevating them to a sovereignty which they were incapable of > exercising' - he attacked the principles of the Enlightenment as 'ideology'. > > It is to the doctrine of the ideologues - to this diffuse metaphysics, which > in a contrived manner seeks to find the primary causes and on this foundation > would erect the legislation of peoples, instead of adapting the laws to a > knowledge of the human heart and of the lessons of history - to which one > must attribute all the misfortunes which have befallen our beautiful France. > > This use reverberated throughout C19. It is still very common in conservative > criticism of any social policy which is in part or in whole derived from > social theory in a conscious way. It is especially used of democratic or > socialist policies, and indeed, following Napoleon's use, ideologist was > often in C19 generally equivalent to revolutionary. But ideology and > ideologist and ideological also acquired, by a process of broadening from > Napoleon's attack, a sense of abstract, impractical or fanatical theory. It > is interesting in view of the later history of the word to read Scott > (Napoleon, vi, 251): 'ideology, by which nickname the French ruler used to > distinguish every species of theory, which, resting in no respect upon the > basis of self-interest, could, he thought, prevail with none save hot-brained > boys and crazed enthusiasts' (1827). Carlyle, aware of this use, tried to > counter it: 'does the British reader ... call this unpleasant doctrine of > ours ideology?' (Chartism, vi, 148; 1839). > > There is then some direct continuity between the pejorative sense of > ideology, as it had been used in eCl9 by conservative thinkers, and the > pejorative sense popularized by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology > (1845-7) and subsequently. Scott had distinguished ideology as theory > 'resting in no respect upon the basis of self-interest', though Napoleon's > alternative had actually been the (suitably vague) 'knowledge of the human > heart and of the lessons of history'. Marx and Engels, in their critique of > the thought of their radical German contemporaries, concentrated on its > abstraction from the real processes of history. Ideas, as they said > specifically of the ruling ideas of an epoch, 'are nothing more than the > ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant > material relationships grasped as ideas'. Failure to realize this produced > ideology: an upside-down version of reality. > > If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a > camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical > life process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their > physical life process. (German Ideology, 47) > > Or as Engels put it later: > > Every ideology ... once it has arisen develops in connection with the given > concept-material, and develops this material further; otherwise it would > cease to be ideology, that is, occupation with thoughts as with independent > entities, developing independently and subject only to their own laws. That > the material life-conditions of the persons inside whose heads this thought > process goes on in the last resort determine the course of this process > remains of necessity unknown to these persons, for otherwise there would be > an end to all ideology. (Feuerbach, 65-6) > > Or again: > > Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously > indeed but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain > unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. > Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of > thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either > his own or his predecessors'. (Letter to Mehring, 1893) > > Ideology is then abstract and false thought, in a sense directly related to > the original conservative use but with the alternative - knowledge of real > material conditions and relationships - differently stated. Marx and Engels > then used this idea critically. The 'thinkers' of a ruling class were 'its > active conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the > class about itself their chief source of livelihood' (German Ideology, 65). > Or again: 'the official representatives of French democracy were steeped in > republican ideology to such an extent that it was only some weeks later that > they began to have an inkling of the significance of the June fighting' > (Class Struggles in France, 1850). This sense of ideology as illusion, false > consciousness, unreality, upside-down reality, is predominant in their work. > Engels believed that the 'higher ideologies' - philosophy and religion - were > more removed from material interests than the direct ideologies of politics > and law, but the connection, though complicated, was still decisive > (Feuerbach, 277). They were 'realms of ideology which soar still higher in > the air . . . various false conceptions of nature, of man's own being, of > spirits, magic forces, etc. ... (Letter to Schmidt, 1890). This sense has > persisted. > > Yet there is another, apparently more neutral sense of ideology in some parts > of Marx's writing, notable in the well-known passage in the Contribution to > the Critique of Political Philosophy (1859): > > The distinction should always be made between the material transformation of > the economic conditions of production ... and the legal, political, > religious, aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological - forms in which > men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.* > > This is clearly related to part of the earlier sense: the ideological forms > are expressions of (changes in) economic conditions of production. But they > are seen here as the forms in which men become conscious of the conflict > arising from conditions and changes of condition in economic production. This > sense is very difficult to reconcile with the sense of ideology as mere > illusion. > > In fact, in the last century, this sense of ideology as the set of ideas > which arise from a given set of material interests or, more broadly, from a > definite class or group, has been at least as widely used as the sense of > ideology as illusion. Moreover, each sense has been used, at times very > confusingly, within the Marxist tradition. There is clearly no sense of > illusion or false consciousness in a passage such as this from Lenin: > > Socialism, insofar as it is the ideology of struggle of the proletarian > class, undergoes the general conditions of birth, development and > consolidation of an ideology, that is to say it is founded on all the > material of human knowledge, it presupposes a high level of science, demands > scientific work, etc. … In the class struggle of the proletariat which > develops spontaneously, as an elemental force, on the basis of capitalist > relations, socialism is introduced by the ideologists. (Letter to the > Federation of the North) > > Thus there is now 'proletarian ideology' or 'bourgeois ideology', and so on, > and ideology in each case is the system of ideas appropriate to that class. > One ideology can be claimed as correct and progressive as against another > ideology. It is of course possible to add that the other ideology, > representing the class enemy, is, while a true expression of their interests, > false to any general human interest, and something of the earlier sense of > illusion or false consciousness can then be loosely associated with what is > primarily a description of the class character of certain ideas. But this > relatively neutral sense of ideology, which usually needs to be qualified by > an adjective describing the class or social group which it represents or > serves, has in fact become common in many kinds of argument. At the same > time, within Marxism but also elsewhere, there has been a standard > distinction between ideology and SCIENCE (q.v.), in order to retain the sense > of illusory or merely abstract thought. This develops the distinction > suggested by Engels, in which ideology would end when men realized their real > life-conditions and therefore their real motives, after which their > consciousness would become genuinely scientific because they would then be in > contact with reality (cf. Suvin). This attempted distinction between Marxism > as science and other social thought as ideology has of course been > controversial, not least among Marxists. In a very much broader area of the > 'social sciences', comparable distinctions between ideology (speculative > systems) and science (demonstrated facts) are commonplace. > > Meanwhile, in popular argument, ideology is still mainly used in the sense > given by Napoleon. Sensible people rely on EXPERIENCE (q.v.), or have a > philosophy; silly people rely on ideology. In this sense ideology, now as in > Napoleon, is mainly a term of abuse. > > See DOCTRINAIRE, EXPERIENCE, IDEALISM, PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE > > *Marx's German reads: ... kurz, ideologischen Formen, worin sich die Menschen > diesen Konflikts bewusst werden … > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > SOURCE: Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. > Revised edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. 153-157. > -- Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
