Ini saya forward kan QA yang menarik mengenai
Indonesia-US-Timtim.
==========================================
>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fri Sep 17 15:29:07 1999
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1999 12:57:04 -0400
From: Agung <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [balinet] QA ttg Timtim
Saya rasa ada perlunya mem-forward wawancara ttg Timtim deng Noam
Chomsky (ahli linguistik dari MIT).
agung
New Jersey
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East Timor
Questions And Answers
Stephen R. Shalom,
Noam Chomsky, and Michael Albert
1. What was U.S. policy toward Indonesia before 1975?
In the aftermath of World War II, U.S. policy toward the Asian colonies
of the European powers followed a simple rule: where the nationalists in
a territory were leftist (as in Vietnam), Washington would support the
re-imposition of European colonial rule, while in those places where the
nationalist movement was safely non-leftist (India, for example),
Washington would support their independence as a way to remove them from
the exclusive jurisdiction of a rival power. At first, Indonesian
nationalists were not deemed sufficiently pliable, so U.S.-armed British
troops (assisted by Japanese soldiers) went into action against the
Indonesians to pave the way for the return of Dutch troops, also armed
by the United States. In 1948, however, moderate Indonesian nationalists
under Sukarno crushed a left-wing coup attempt, and Washington then
decided that the Dutch should be encouraged to settle with Sukarno,
accepting Indonesian independence.
It wasn't long, however, before the United States concluded that Sukarno
was a dangerous neutralist, and under the Eisenhower administration
Washington attempted to subvert Indonesia's fragile democratic
government. These efforts-the largest U.S. covert operation since World
War II * were unsuccessful, so the United States shifted its strategy
to building up the Indonesian military as a counter-weight to the
mass-based Indonesian Communist Party. In 1965, this approach bore fruit
when a military coup, accompanied by the slaughter of somewhere between
half a million and a million communists, suspected leftists, and
ordinary peasants, deposed Sukarno and installed General Suharto in his
place. Washington cheered the coup, rushed weapons to Jakarta, and even
provided a list of Communist Party members to the army which then
rounded up and slaughtered them. According to a CIA study, "in terms of
numbers killed" the 1965-66 massacres in Indonesia "rank as one of the
worst mass murders of the 20th century." The United States established
close military, economic, and political ties with the Suharto regime.
2. What was East Timor before Indonesia invaded?
>From the 17th century, the Netherlands and Portuguese fought over
Timor, a small Southeast Asian island slightly larger than the state of
Maryland located a thousand miles south of the Philippines and about 400
miles northwest of Australia. Ultimately the two colonial powers divided
the island, with the western half going to the Netherlands and becoming
part of the Dutch East Indies and the eastern half going to Portugal.
When the Dutch East Indies became independent following World War II,
under the name Indonesia, west Timor was part of the new nation. East
Timor, however, remained under Portuguese rule until the mid-1970s, when
Portugal finally moved to dismantle its colonial empire. East Timor
differs from Indonesia in terms of religion, language, and several
hundred years of colonial history.
3. How did Indonesia become involved in East Timor?
As long as Portugal controlled East Timor, Indonesia did not consider
attacking it, but once Lisbon declared its intention to withdraw, the
Suharto regime saw an opportunity to add to its territory and resources.
East Timor seemed like an easy target, given that in 1975 Indonesia had
a population of 136 million compared to East Timor's 700,000 people.
Indonesia first tried to block Timorese independence by backing a coup
in the territory, but when this failed it launched a full-scale invasion
of East Timor in December 1975, using the pretext that it was
maintaining order.
A standard propaganda line out of Jakarta-often repeated by the western
media-is that the fighting in East Timor represents a "civil war." In
fact, there had been a very brief civil war before the Indonesians
invaded. For the last 25 years, however, it has been as much a civil war
as the
Nazi conquests in Europe.
4. What was the United States role regarding Indonesia's December
1975 invasion?
On the eve of the invasion, U.S. President Gerald Ford and his Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger, were in Jakarta meeting with Suharto.
Kissinger later claimed that East Timor wasn't even discussed, but this
claim has been exposed as a lie. In fact, Washington gave Suharto a
green light to invade. Ninety percent of the weaponry used by the
Indonesian forces in their invasion was from the United States (despite
a U.S. law that bans the use of its military aid for offensive purposes)
and the flow of arms, including counterinsurgency equipment, was
secretly increased (a point that should be borne in mind in interpreting
what is going on today). The United States also lent diplomatic support
to the invaders. In the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Daniel Patrick
Moynihan successfully worked, as he boasted in his memoirs, to make sure
that the international organization was ineffectual in challenging
Jakarta's aggression. Under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the
self-proclaimed champion of human rights, there was a further increase
in U.S. military aid to Indonesia. Since 1975, the United States has
sold Jakarta over $1 billion worth of military
equipment.
5. What was the effect of Indonesia's invasion?
The Indonesian invasion and subsequent ruthless pacification campaign
led to the deaths-by massacre, forced starvation, and disease-of some
200,000 East Timorese, more than a quarter of the territory's people,
making it one of the greatest bloodlettings in modern history compared
to total population. In addition, Indonesian forces have engaged in
torture, rape, and forced relocation on a massive scale.
6. How did the international community respond to the 1975
Indonesian invasion?
On the one hand, the Indonesian aggression so clearly violated
international law and the right of self-determination that the United
Nations Security Council condemned the invasion, calling upon Indonesia
to withdraw its armed forces from East Timor, and the General Assembly
rejected Indonesia's annexation of East Timor as its 27th province,
demanding that the people of East Timor be allowed to determine their
own fate. With a single exception, Australia, no country has legally
recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. On the other hand,
for many countries considerations of morality and decency were
outweighed by the profits to be had from close economic ties with
Indonesia and its huge population ("When I think of Indonesia-a country
on the equator with 180 million people, a median age of 18, and a Muslim
ban on alcohol-I feel like I know what heaven looks like," gushed the
president of Coca-Cola in 1992), by the prospects of selling arms to the
Indonesian armed forces, and by the geopolitical advantages of allying
with the largest nation in Southeast Asia, instead of one of the
smallest. Washington's support for Jakarta has already been noted.
Australia has provided military aid to Indonesia and formally recognized
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, the only country to do so,
hoping to divide up East Timor's off-shore oil resources. Britain
recently was Indonesia's largest arms supplier, and Japan its largest
source of economic aid and foreign investment. Canada has provided
Jakarta with both economic and military aid, while the Netherlands and
Germany have also been major weapons suppliers.
7. How have the Timorese resisted over the years?
The people of East Timor have waged a truly inspiring and courageous
struggle. They have undertaken guerrilla warfare against overwhelming
odds, organized non-violent protests, and carried out passive
resistance. Students, the Catholic church, and many others have been
involved in the struggle in one way or another: whether taking up arms,
providing food for guerrillas, participating in demonstrations, or
hiding organizers. Remarkably, despite the horrendous repression, and
despite Jakarta's importation of large numbers of Indonesian settlers
into the territory, the East Timorese have retained their passionate
commitment to self-determination and freedom.
8. What solidarity has there been outside East Timor, over the
years?
For a while, only a few lone voices spoke up. Arnold Kohen, for example,
has been at the center of East Timor activism since the beginning. There
were small groups in Australia and in England trying to draw attention
to the issue. Through the 1980s, the numbers and activism increased.
There was a considerable upsurge following the Dili massacre in 1991 --
when Indonesian troops attacked a peaceful funeral procession,
slaughtering more than 270 * the massacre was publicized by U.S.
free-lance journalists Amy Goodman and Alan Nairn (who were nearly
killed by Indonesian troops) and a British TV photojournalist who
secretly filmed the atrocities. Church and human rights groups became
active, and the East Timor Action Network was formed by Charlie
Scheiner. By the mid-1990s there were substantial organizations in many
countries, and they were beginning to have an impact. The issue was
finally being covered in the mainstream media, if not always accurately.
Intensely lobbied by East Timor activists, the U.S. Congress was
increasingly placing restrictions on U.S. military aid to Indonesia,
often evaded, however, by the administration. In 1996, Jose Ramos Horta,
East Timor's chief foreign representative, and Bishop Carlos Filipe
Ximenes Belo, East Timor's spiritual leader, were awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize, focusing further attention on the situation.
9. How did the recent referendum come about and what were its
results?
Mass demonstrations in Indonesia, financial crisis, and massive
corruption combined in 1998 to force Suharto from office. His successor,
B. J. Habibie agreed to call elections for Indonesia and to hold a
referendum on the future of East Timor. The Indonesian election was won
by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the main opposition leader, but even if she is
allowed to become president in November it is doubtful that she will
move to dismantle the national security apparatus which dominates the
state. In the negotiations over the terms of the referendum on the
future of East Timor, the international community essentially accepted
Indonesia's ground rules. The referendum would be run by Indonesia, the
occupying power. The UN was permitted to send a few hundred unarmed
monitors, but they had no means of stopping the paramilitary forces
("militias") that had been organized by the Indonesian army and were
carrying out large-scale terror under its direction and with its direct
involvement, particularly by its special forces (Kopassus), trained by
the United States and Australia, and noted for their extreme violence
and brutality. Rather than pressing for a more substantial UN presence,
the Clinton Administration actually delayed the dispatch of the
monitors. The referendum was postponed several times by the UN because
of the ongoing terror, which was clearly intended by the army to
intimidate the population into voting for incorporation within
Indonesia. On Aug. 30, 1999, in an astonishing display of courage,
virtually the entire population of East Timor went to the polls, about
four out of five voting for independence. Having failed to cow the
Timorese people into accepting Indonesian rule, the army and its
militias then proceeded to unleash a ferocious attack on the civilian
population, displacing hundreds of thousands, killing an unknown number,
but certainly thousands, burning, and looting.
10. What are the likely motives of Indonesia and the militias now,
after the referendum?
For the Indonesian army the motives are probably to demonstrate to
people within Indonesia who may raise their heads that the cost will be
extremely severe. The army demonstrated this same point during the
massacres of 1965-66 when Suharto came to power, intimidating the
country for years, and many times subsequently-and always with
enthusiastic support from the United States and the West generally.
There are now secessionist movements in several parts of Indonesia
(though of course while the East Timorese independence movement is
commonly called "separatist," that makes as much sense as calling the
French resistance to the Nazi occupation "separatist"), and the army
presumably fears that independence for East Timor may encourage other
break-away movements. Other motives probably include undermining
civilian authority in Jakarta and placing the military in the dominant
position in the post-Suharto succession. Pure revenge is also a likely
motive: the East Timorese have resisted with enormous courage and
integrity for 25 years and so they are being punished by massacre and
destruction. It is also worth bearing in mind that the military, and the
Suharto family, have taken over most of the resources of East Timor, and
do not want to relinquish them. And in the background is the important
question of the oil wealth of the Timor Gap, and who will control it.
11. What is the role of the United Nations?
It is a little misleading to speak of the role of the UN. The UN is
nearly powerless as an abstract entity or even as a representative of
the world's nations. It can act, instead, only insofar as it is given
authorization by the great powers, which means primarily the United
States. The UN has no standing peacekeeping force and thus is dependent
on finding countries willing to contribute troops for any particular
mission. The organization suffers as well from an extreme shortage of
funds because of the continual U.S. refusal to pay its dues. Any
peacekeepers sent to East Timor will probably not be a UN force because
the U.S. Congress has required that there be a 15-day delay before the
U.S. government can approve any UN peacekeeping operation and has
forbidden Washington from paying its authorized share of the costs of
any such operation. U.S. influence is greatest in the Security Council,
but some organs of the UN, such as the General Assembly or bodies
dealing with economic and social issues have had a Third World majority
ever since the era of decolonization. Accordingly, U.S. policy has been
to undermine and marginalize the UN. The United Nations should have an
important role in world affairs, but U.S. policy and the policies of
other leading states, severely limit the international organization.
>From the point of view of U.S. policymakers, however, there is one
crucial role played by the UN: it serves as a convenient scapegoat when
something goes wrong. For example, the current catastrophe in East Timor
is directly attributable to the refusal of the United States and other
Western powers to deter the atrocities there over a period of a quarter
century, yet the UN will probably take the blame.
12. What are the likely motives of the United States now, after the
referendum?
U.S. motives now are the same as always: to pursue those policies that
will enhance the power and economic returns of U.S. corporate and
political elites with as few dangers of disrupting existing relations of
power as possible, and especially as few disturbing effects in the form
of enlarging public awareness and dissidence. The United States has a
long history of cozying up to ruthless dictators, being indifferent to
if not enthusiastic about their atrocities, and disengaging only when
Washington concludes that the dictator has provoked so much instability
and dissidence that U.S. interests are threatened. Thus, President Jimmy
Carter backed the Shah of Iran until it seemed as if the army would fall
apart in trying to suppress mass demonstrations; President Reagan
embraced Marcos in the Philippines until splits in the armed forces and
huge numbers of people in the streets put U.S. interests at risk. So in
Indonesia, the United States supported Suharto until a popular explosion
seemed like it might imperil U.S. economic and geopolitical interests.
And the United States supported Indonesian policy in East Timor- with
weapons, training, and diplomatic support-as long as doing so seemed to
further U.S. interests. As long as East Timor could be kept off the
front page, Washington was happy to give Jakarta a free hand. But news
of the latest atrocities could not be suppressed. Some courageous
journalists and independent observers, some UN workers who refused to
abandon the Timorese, and networks of activists have all spread the
word. This has raised the costs to the U.S. Government of continuing to
tolerate Indonesian terrorism in East Timor. Washington still hopes,
however, to protect its economic stake in Indonesia and maintain close
ties with that country's military.
13. What could the United States do that would be positive in East
Timor?
The United States and its major allies have tremendous leverage over the
Indonesian government. Indonesia doesn't have much of a military
industry, and relies heavily on its suppliers: the United States,
Britain, Australia, and others. Indonesian troops receive training and
participate in joint exercises with U.S. troops, the most recent just a
week before the August 30, 1999, referendum. Indonesia's economy is also
totally dependent on financial aid from the United States and other
rich nations and from the International Monetary Fund whose policies are
controlled by these same rich nations. Without funds from these
sources, Indonesia will find foreign investment drying up and domestic
capital flight as well. In short, Indonesia cannot act without the
approval of Washington and the leading Western nations. The same sort of
pressure that seems in the past few days to have forced Jakarta to
accept international peacekeeping troops could have been used-and could
still be used-to compel the Indonesians to call off the slaughter and
destruction in East Timor, something that would have a far more critical
and immediate effect on the lives of East Timorese than the dispatch of
peacekeepers. (It will be a while before peacekeepers arrive and in any
event they are unlikely tobe able to do much for those East Timorese who
have been driven into West Timor where they are still subject to
Indonesian terror.) Peacekeepers can play a useful role in facilitating
the distribution of humanitarian aid (which, however, needs to be flown
in immediately to reach the several hundred thousand people in the
mountains in danger of starvation) and in restraining any of the
militias that refuse an Indonesian order to disband. Of course, the same
pressure that got Jakarta to buckle today could have been employed a
week ago or two weeks ago to stop the atrocities. And it could have been
used six months ago to force Indonesia to disband the militias and call
off its terror forces. And it could have been used at any point over the
past quarter century to get Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. And
it could have been used in December 1975 to forestall the Indonesia
invasion in the first place.
14. Will the United States do something positive in East Timor?
The United States government does not act out of humanitarian concern.
U.S. political and economic elites pursue their own interests and are
willing to tolerate-and even welcome- incredible brutality in the
furtherance of those interests. Sometimes, however, U.S. elites can be
pressured into following a positive course of action if the social costs
of their not doing so can be significantly raised. The U.S. government
didn't wind down the Vietnam War because a burst of humanitarianism
entered the calculation of policymakers. Rather, it ended the war
because the resistance of the Vietnamese and the social disruptions at
home made the costs of continuing the war too high. The U.S. government
will do something positive-more accurately, it will stop doing something
horribly negative-with regard to East Timor only if public pressure
makes it essential to do so by raising the social costs of continuing to
abet the massacre. The strategy, then, for those who wish to change U.S.
policy on East Timor is the same as for those who want to change U.S.
policy more generally. U.S. elites respond not to moral persuasion but,
instead, to a calculus of interests. When one wants to influence their
choices, therefore, it is necessary to create conditions that change the
calculus they confront. The only way to do that is to raise
consciousness of true conditions and organize dissent that threatens
things they hold dear. If pursuing or permitting genocidal activity in
Timor strengthens elite positions and enriches their coffers, and if
there is no offsetting cost to the behavior, it will continue. If
popular activism that is aroused by these policies begins to threaten
on-going calm and business as usual, if it threatens to grow and expand
and not only address Timor, but as time proceeds basic institutions
behind events like these-that is a real and dangerous cost that elites
very well understand. So what does a morally concerned person do? Try to
become knowledgeable, try to educate others, try to facilitate efforts
to make dissent visible- whether financially, via supporting worthy
projects and institutions with donations, or with one's time and labors
given to organizing. It is not complicated. It is the same answer for
Timor as for Kosovo as for the Gulf War as for Nicaragua as for Vietnam.
It is the same answer for foreign policy pursuits as it is for trying to
win strikes against corporations, reverse NAFTA, preserve affirmative
action (or win it in the first place). To impact elites it is necessary
to raise social costs of their actions that you want terminated so high
that the elites have no choice but to relent.
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