Andreas Kuckartz: > SM: >> > I read >> > http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indias-big-brother-the-central-monitoring-system >> > There are likely similar cases in other countries. >> > >> > What could be the effect if (widely deployed) IETF protocols prevented >> > such systems from working? It is possible to design a protocol which >> > does not allow "in the clear" traffic [1]. It is not clear whether such >> > a protocol would be widely deployed. > Jörg Ziercke, the president of the German Federal Criminal Office (BKA) > three weeks ago suggested to restrict the right to use Tor by requiring > the registration of users. >
Herr Ziercke clearly does not understand how Tor or even how IP networks actually function. > Standards can not solve such political and legal attempts to attack the > privacy and security of users. > I agree that standards will not solve political problems in the political sphere. Standards will however limit the political and legal options - as an example - forward secrecy with DHE makes forced key disclosure irrelevant for retroactive decryption - the past traffic cannot be decrypted as the session key is not derived from the identity key. > But that should not prevent the development of standards which disable > mass surveillance when those standards are deployed. I agree. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
