Ben,
How's this?
[1] A cryptographically verifiable log is an append-only log of hashes
of more-or-less anything that can prove its own correctness
cryptographically.
For example, from RFC 6962: “The append-only property of each log is
technically achieved using Merkle Trees, which can be used to show
that any particular version of the log is a superset of any particular
previous version. Likewise, Merkle Trees avoid the need to blindly
trust logs: if a log attempts to show different things to different
people, this can be efficiently detected by comparing tree roots and
consistency proofs. Similarly, other misbehaviours of any log (e.g.,
issuing signed timestamps for certificates they then don't log) can be
efficiently detected and proved to the world at large.”
See RFC 6962, http://www.links.org/files/CertificateTransparencyVersion2.1a.pdf
and http://www.links.org/files/RevocationTransparency.pdf for
background.
Sorry to be so late in responding; holidays ...
The text describing how 6962 uses Merkle trees is good. I think the
phrase "prove its own correctness" is way too broad. The example
you cite shows how to demonstrate internal consistency for a log,
and to enable third parties to verify certain lob properties. That
is much narrower than what the term "correctness" implies.
Steve
_______________________________________________
perpass mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
