On 2013-12-30 16:42, Stephen Kent wrote: > Watson, >> One obvious solution for end-to-end email encryption is to use >> ID-based cryptography: a new record type would be defined in the DNS >> containing the system key for an ID-based system, and the username >> (everything before the '@') would be the identity used. This would not >> obscure addresses or the fact of communication right now, but would >> prevent interception at intermediate nodes. It would be webmail >> compatible. > IBE requires an infrastructure in which we trust CAs not only to > correctly identify subjects, but also to not snoop on traffic, > since the CAs intrinsically have access to the private keys. It also > requires an infrastructure in which the CAs are directly tied to e-mail > names, and then into some bigger hierarchy, else we wind up with tens of > thousands of TAs. It would be much simpler, and more secure, to use DANE.
+1 - we already have that hierarchy lying about... >> Are there any issues beyond the merely cryptographic that I need to >> consider here? Can this be shoehorned into S/MIME, or do we need to do >> something new? In the next few days I will try to make a >> draft/implementation for this. > IBE for S/MINE was defined in RFC 5408, in 2008. But, the issues > I noted above, plus IPR issues, have diminished enthusiasm for its > deployment. > > Steve > _______________________________________________ > perpass mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
