On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 10:08 PM, Watson Ladd <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 6:24 PM, Richard Barnes <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear PERPASS, > > > > Stephen asked me to take a stab at a problem statement for PERPASS. With > > some help from Bruce, Cullen, and Ted, the results have just been > published > > as draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00. > > > > In general, this draft tries to outline at a technical level what we > mean by > > pervasive attack, and what the high level mitigations are. > > > > Comments welcome! > > Minor quibble: > Intermediate nodes can also be active attackers, e.g. an ISP could > insert fake email for its customers. > Clearly, anyone on-path can be an active attacker. And, as some of the TOR-related revelations show, some off-path entities as well. > At a higher level this draft feels overly removed from the real > problem: users assumptions about what is > public on the Internet have frequently been violated, even when > technical measures to address these issues > exist. This gets mentioned in passing, but should be front and centre. > That seems like it might be a better topic for draft-farrell-perpass-attack. We're trying to stick to technical things in this draft, so "user assumptions" are kind of out of scope. > The NSA is not the only organisation doing this: Saudi Arabia, the UK, > China, Ethiopia, France all have major monitoring > systems in place that can only work because of how weak the core > protocols of the internet are against manipulation. (And let's not > forget the > Pakistani ISP that accidentally knocked Youtube offline) > Indeed. We cite the Great Firewall as an example. (And technically, that Pakistani ISP didn't accidentally knock YouTube offline; the only accident was knocking YouTube offline *outside* *of* *Pakistan*.) > Also, BGP tricks mean that anyone can be local. > s/local/on-path/ > The point should be very simple: no more cleartext, authenticate > everything, limit authority, and produce an audit trail for when > things go wrong. > That seems like a concise statement of the mitigations discussed in Section 5. <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00#section-5> We can try to make that message clearer in future versions, though. Thanks, --Richard > Now let's see if we can do more about it than the CRYPTO '13 rump > session accomplished.[1] > Sincerely, > Watson Ladd > [1] For those who are unfamiliar: > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVUIk6nXVcw is the best statement of > the issue and the solution. > > > > Thanks, > > --Richard > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > From: <[email protected]> > > Date: Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 9:17 PM > > Subject: New Version Notification for > draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00.txt > > To: Cullen Jennings <[email protected]>, Ted Hardie <[email protected]>, > > Bruce Schneier <[email protected]>, Richard Barnes <[email protected]> > > > > > > > > A new version of I-D, draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00.txt > > has been successfully submitted by Richard Barnes and posted to the > > IETF repository. > > > > Name: draft-barnes-pervasive-problem > > Revision: 00 > > Title: Pervasive Attack: A Threat Model and Problem Statement > > Document date: 2014-01-06 > > Group: Individual Submission > > Pages: 23 > > URL: > > > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00.txt > > Status: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-pervasive-problem/ > > Htmlized: > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00 > > > > > > Abstract: > > Documents published in 2013 have revealed several classes of > > "pervasive" attack on Internet communications. In this document, we > > review the main attacks that have been published, and develop a > > threat model that describes these pervasive attacks. Based on this > > threat model, we discuss the techniques that can be employed in > > Internet protocol design to increase the protocols robustness to > > pervasive attacks. > > > > > > > > > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of > submission > > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > > > > The IETF Secretariat > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > perpass mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass > > > > > > -- > "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little > Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." > -- Benjamin Franklin >
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