Hi Richard, Bruce, Cullen, and Ted,
Thanks for this draft. I wonder if it would be useful to create an
additional table on what can be classified, and at what point. So for
instance:
Layer Field Risk
=============================================================
L2 | src/dst | correlation of physical device
| | and IP address
| |
IP Layer | src/dst | rough correlation with location
| | and identity, with hints as to
| | services being used
| | (e.g., movies.example.com)
Transport | port# | correlation of activity based on
| | transport service field
| |
============================================================
This makes it clear that it's not just the application data that is
desired. You of course say as much in the draft.
It's good that you talk about aggregation. There is an inherent tension
between use of aggregation to blind or blur, and the risk of the
aggregating device being managed by a witting or unwitting
collaborator. We have at least some evidence that this has happened.
And all of this must be put into the context of other threats against
which it must be balanced (e.g., phishing, spam, etc) where encryption
can defeat the existing remediations.
Finally, several comments about overlay routing, such as TOR. As I
think Bruce you yourself pointed out, if a small subset of people make
use of it, they make themselves targets. Additionally bandwidth isn't
free, and neither is delay. Stretch in the routing system matters. A
fundamental issue here is who can do an effective job of anonymizing IP
addresses at the size and scale of the Internet.
Eliot
On 1/7/14 3:24 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> Dear PERPASS,
>
> Stephen asked me to take a stab at a problem statement for PERPASS.
> With some help from Bruce, Cullen, and Ted, the results have just
> been published as draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00.
>
> In general, this draft tries to outline at a technical level what we
> mean by pervasive attack, and what the high level mitigations are.
>
> Comments welcome!
>
> Thanks,
> --Richard
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
> Date: Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 9:17 PM
> Subject: New Version Notification for
> draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00.txt
> To: Cullen Jennings <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>, Ted
> Hardie <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>, Bruce
> Schneier <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>,
> Richard Barnes <[email protected]>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Richard Barnes and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name: draft-barnes-pervasive-problem
> Revision: 00
> Title: Pervasive Attack: A Threat Model and Problem Statement
> Document date: 2014-01-06
> Group: Individual Submission
> Pages: 23
> URL:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-pervasive-problem/
> Htmlized:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-pervasive-problem-00
>
>
> Abstract:
> Documents published in 2013 have revealed several classes of
> "pervasive" attack on Internet communications. In this document, we
> review the main attacks that have been published, and develop a
> threat model that describes these pervasive attacks. Based on this
> threat model, we discuss the techniques that can be employed in
> Internet protocol design to increase the protocols robustness to
> pervasive attacks.
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org
> <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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