Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Paul Vixie <[email protected]> wrote:
>> the MiTM problem is due to X.509 not TLS per se. DANE stops MiTM for TLS. my
>> comfort level with DTLS, or STARTTLS-over-EDNS, or TLS or SSL, is the same:
>> low with X.509 since most nation-state actors and many criminal actors can
>> feed any endpoint a certificate they will believe no matter what the name
>> is; high once we pitch X.509 into the ash bin of history and get DANE
>> running everywhere.
>
> Unfortunately this isn't in the draft. Furthermore, DANE only links a
> server to a domain name: it doesn't let me know that the DNS resolver
> with the name moescoffee.com is not the resolver for the coffee shop I
> am in. DANE could protect nameservers, but we already put the keys of
> nameservers into DNS, and it's fairly easy to guess what query I am
> sending to dns.ewr1.nytimes.com, so encrypting the query to that
> server doesn't gain much. How does DANE work when we are dealing with
> devices without domain names, like the router in Moe's Coffee?
i expect i'm about to defer to paul hoffman as to the details of DANE.
my coarse-grained understanding is that the distinguished name will come
from the first term of the URI, which means that the key fingerprint
will mostly be in normal ("forward") space but could be in in-addr
("reverse") space. it's a straightforward mapping problem, if moe's
coffee's router is at 192.168.1.1 for you, then moe's router's key
fingerprint had better be at 1.1.168.192.in-addr.arpa for you. exactly
how you bootstrap localized split-view DNS when NAT'd is a hard but
tractible problem. let's assume that moe's router's IP is
2001:200:dff:fff1:216:3eff:fe4b:651c and that his router's key
fingerprint is at
c.1.5.6.b.4.e.f.f.f.e.3.6.1.2.0.1.f.f.f.f.f.d.0.0.0.2.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. not
that i know why you want to contact moe's router but that's the question
you asked.
> > well, yes. if someone wants to look stuff up in DNS without middleboxes
> > knowing what they looked up, they have to use a VPN.
>
> So what does this draft change in that regard? I'm not really seeing
> the gains to privacy that
> were promised, except maybe against other evesdroppers on the same
> segment who aren't using
> active attacks.
TLS gets you privacy if you take X.509 out of the circuit. this proposal
is about adding TLD to DNS. other proposals have been made having the
goal of getting the world out of X.509 hell. it's the two proposals
together that give us privacy.
vixie
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