There was a significant amount of public outcry yesterday within India and the 
latest news is that the government of India is apparently withdrawing the draft 
policy:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Government-withdraws-draft-of-encryption-policy/articleshow/49057232.cms

Prior to that the government agency involved had already issued an update 
saying that the draft policy would NOT apply to TLS in web commerce and social 
media, messaging, etc.  The update document seems to have been removed, but is 
captured here by a news site:

http://www.medianama.com/2015/09/223-india-draft-encryption-policy/

Dan

On Sep 21, 2015, at 1:07 PM, Stephen Farrell 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:


Sheesh, there is so much wrong in that document. And they
top it off by recommending RC4.

Does anyone know if this is a policy that is likely to be
enforced or one that'd be more honoured in the breach?

S.

On 21/09/15 17:45, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
Obviously, of relevance to those that will be at the IAB MARNEW
workshop this week (although this isn't in any way specific to radio
networks).

* Everyone (all individuals and businesses) using encryption must
store unencrypted content for 90 days
* Government will dictate algorithms and key sizes
* Possibility of a legally mandated backdoor

Article from Daily Dot:
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/india-encryption-backdoors-draft-policy/

Text of the proposal (comments due 16 Oct.):
https://info.publicintelligence.net/IN-DraftEncryptionPolicy.pdf



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