Hi, Back in August was the process of BCP'ing RFC1984. (Subject: Recognising RFC1984 as a BCP).
If this has been completed, it could act as an 'attachment' or compliment in some way the form letter which Brian suggests below. I repeat that I think the reuse of RFC1984 at this time is an excellent strategy as it clearly states "we've been here before, and the arguments still hold". Regards, Hugo Connery -- Head of IT, DTU Environment, http://www.env.dtu.dk ________________________________________ From: perpass [[email protected]] on behalf of Brian Trammell [[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, 22 September 2015 14:04 To: Joseph Lorenzo Hall Cc: perpass; Dan York; Stephen Farrell Subject: Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy - Re: India posed to require cleartext, cleartext retention, cipher and backdoor mandates It seems to me in general that this type of policy remains very attractive; governments in particular tend to prize temporary security over essential freedom. This policy was so obviously silly in its technical detail that it would inevitably need to be withdrawn, though I was impressed by the speed and openness with which that was done here. But in general, playing whack-a-mole takes a lot of energy especially when the policies themselves are largely copypasta. Perhaps we should put together an IAB/program form letter ("So You've Decided to Ban Crypto, Here's Why That Won't Work") that we can quickly tailor to the details in order to be able to make constructive public comments *before* the withdrawal happens next time? :) Cheers, Brian > On 22 Sep 2015, at 13:49, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <[email protected]> wrote: > > I'm not so sure we should take comfort in their withdrawal of the policy as > all reports are that they are revising and reissuing... We'll see what the > next iteration involves! > > On Tuesday, September 22, 2015, Dan York <[email protected]> wrote: > There was a significant amount of public outcry yesterday within India and > the latest news is that the government of India is apparently withdrawing the > draft policy: > > http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Government-withdraws-draft-of-encryption-policy/articleshow/49057232.cms > > Prior to that the government agency involved had already issued an update > saying that the draft policy would NOT apply to TLS in web commerce and > social media, messaging, etc. The update document seems to have been > removed, but is captured here by a news site: > > http://www.medianama.com/2015/09/223-india-draft-encryption-policy/ > > Dan > >> On Sep 21, 2015, at 1:07 PM, Stephen Farrell <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> >> Sheesh, there is so much wrong in that document. And they >> top it off by recommending RC4. >> >> Does anyone know if this is a policy that is likely to be >> enforced or one that'd be more honoured in the breach? >> >> S. >> >> On 21/09/15 17:45, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote: >>> Obviously, of relevance to those that will be at the IAB MARNEW >>> workshop this week (although this isn't in any way specific to radio >>> networks). >>> >>> * Everyone (all individuals and businesses) using encryption must >>> store unencrypted content for 90 days >>> * Government will dictate algorithms and key sizes >>> * Possibility of a legally mandated backdoor >>> >>> Article from Daily Dot: >>> http://www.dailydot.com/politics/india-encryption-backdoors-draft-policy/ >>> >>> Text of the proposal (comments due 16 Oct.): >>> https://info.publicintelligence.net/IN-DraftEncryptionPolicy.pdf >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> perpass mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass > > -- > Dan York > Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society > [email protected] +1-802-735-1624 > Jabber: [email protected] > Skype: danyork http://twitter.com/danyork > > http://www.internetsociety.org/ > > > > > > -- > Joseph Lorenzo Hall > Chief Technologist > Center for Democracy & Technology > 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 > Washington DC 20006-4011 > (p) 202-407-8825 > (f) 202-637-0968 > [email protected] > PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key > fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10 1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871 > > > > _______________________________________________ > perpass mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
