On 20/11/2025 23:59, Jacob Champion wrote:
On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 1:52 PM Heikki Linnakangas <[email protected]> wrote:
PostgreSQL does support channel binding, with tls-server-end-point. I
believe that sufficient to prevent an attack like that.
No, IIRC unique bindings (-unique and -exporter) prevent MITM even if
the attacker has the server's private key, as long as they do not also
possess the SCRAM verifiers. tls-server-end-point does not prevent
against that (so you can terminate TLS on a different node from the
verifiers).
If I understood the incident correctly, the attacker managed to somehow
obtain a valid TLS certificate for the victim domain. They used that to
perform a MITM attack. They did not have the server's private key. (Or
if they did, they did not use that for the attack).
That's an advantage in general though, even if it wouldn't have made a
difference in this instance. So fair point.
- Heikki
