On Fri, Nov 21, 2025 at 9:28 AM Nico Williams <[email protected]> wrote: > The main benefit of "end-point"-style CB data is that it's easier to > deal with server-side ("reverse") proxies. That's primarily a benefit > for HTTP applications, and almost certainly not relevant to PG (unless > there _are_ reverse proxies for PG -- are there?).
There is some newer/in-progress work that's beginning to converge on that, yes (direct-mode SSL+ALPN, server-side SNI, others?). On Fri, Nov 21, 2025 at 9:38 AM Nico Williams <[email protected]> wrote: > If the attacker has the server's private keys then presumably also have > the credentials needed to also terminate the SASL/GSS-API mechanism's > server/acceptor side, so channel binding will not protect you. Why does that follow? I would think that the avenues for leaking a key in today's containerized world are much different from the avenues for leaking database credentials. Or do I misunderstand what you mean...? I want to make sure I haven't misled people on our SCRAM guarantees... (But I agree with you that most people probably want unique bindings for the default use case, not end-point bindings.) Thanks, --Jacob
