Greetings, * Bruce Momjian (br...@momjian.us) wrote: > On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 12:42:55PM -0400, Joe Conway wrote: > > On 6/16/19 9:45 AM, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > > On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 07:07:20AM -0400, Joe Conway wrote: > > >> In any case it doesn't address my first point, which is limiting the > > >> volume encrypted with the same key. Another valid reason is you might > > >> have data at varying sensitivity levels and prefer different keys be > > >> used for each level. > > > > > > That seems quite complex. > > > > How? It is no more complex than encrypting at the tablespace level > > already gives you - in that case you get this property for free if you > > care to use it. > > All keys used to encrypt WAL data must be unlocked at all times or crash > recovery, PITR, and replication will not stop when it hits a locked key. > Given that, how much value is there in allowing a key per tablespace?
There's a few different things to discuss here, admittedly, but I don't think it means that there's no value in having a key per tablespace. Ideally, a given backend would only need, and only have access to, the keys for the tablespaces that it is allowed to operate on. I realize that's a bit farther than what we're talking about today, but hopefully not too much to be able to consider. Thanks, Stephen
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