Stephen Frost wrote:
* Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
This seems to me to be exactly parallel to deciding that SELinux should
control only table/column permissions within SQL; an approach that would
be enormously less controversial, less expensive, and more reliable than
what SEPostgres tries to do.
While also ignoring a feature that is available, and used by these same
security communities, in other enterprise RDBMSs...
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1743
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/sql/2005/multisec.mspx
It's not codified in the SQL spec (yet..) that I saw, and maybe we could
seperate out the SE bits from the row-level bits, but I'm really not
sure I see the value in doing that..
They are separate. If you look at the patches you'll see a pgace part, this is
where the core interfaces to the security backends, and you'll see a rowacl
backend and an sepgsql backend.
Personally I'd like to see all of the access control moved out to use pgace,
including the standard DAC permissions but I doubt that would never happen.
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