On Tue, Oct 5, 2010 at 12:27 PM, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: >> Option #1: Remove all mention from the documentation of using views >> for security purposes. Don't allow views to have explicit permissions >> attached to them; they are merely shorthand for a SELECT, for which >> you either do or do not have privileges. > > The SQL standard requires us to attach permissions to views. The > standard makes no claims whatsoever about how leak-proof views should > be; it only says that you can't call a view without the appropriate > permissions. > > I do think it's reasonable for the docs to point out that views that do > row-filtering should not be presumed to be absolutely bulletproof. > That doesn't make permissions on them useless, so you're attacking a > straw man.
Really? I'm confused. What is the use case for the status quo? -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise Postgres Company -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
