On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Kohei KaiGai <kai...@kaigai.gr.jp> wrote: > It is a practical reason. In case when httpd open the connection to PG and > set a suitable security label according to the given credential prior to > launch > of user application, then keep this connection for upcoming request, it is > worthwhile to reset security label of the client.
But wait a minute - how is that any good? That allows the client to pretty trivially circumvent the security restriction that we were trying to impose by doing sepgsql_setcon() in the first place. It doesn't matter how convenient it is if it's flagrantly insecure. Am I missing something here? -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
