* Kevin Grittner ( wrote:
> Robert Haas <> wrote:
> > Even aside from security exposures, how
> > does a non-superuser who runs pg_dump know whether they've got a
> > complete backup or a filtered dump that's missing some rows?
> This seems to me to be a killer objection to the feature as
> proposed, and points out a huge difference between column level
> security and the proposed implementation of row level security. 

I really hate this notion of "killer objection".  It's been discussed
(perhaps not seen by all) at least one suggestion for how to address
this specific issue and there are other ways in which to address it
(having COPY have the same behavior as the GUC being discussed, instead
of having a GUC, though I feel like the GUC is a better approach..).

> (In fact it is a difference between just about any GRANTed
> permission and row level security.)  If you try to SELECT * FROM
> sometable and you don't have rights to all the columns, you get an
> error.  A dump would always either work as expected or generate an
> error.

Provided you know all of the tables and other objects which need to be
included in such a partial dump (as a full dump, today, must be run by a
superuser to be sure you're actually getting everything anyway...).

> The proposed approach would leave the validity of any dump which
> was not run as a superuser in doubt.  The last thing we need, in
> terms of improving security, is another thing you can't do without
> connecting as a superuser.

Any dump not run by a superuser is already in doubt, imv.  That is a
problem we already have which really needs to be addressed, but I view
that as an independent issue.

I agree with avoiding adding another superuser-only capability; see the
other sub-thread about making this a per-user capability.



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