On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 10:17 PM, Michael Paquier <michael.paqu...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 8:20 AM, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: >> Robbie Harwood <rharw...@redhat.com> writes: >>> Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> writes: >>>> Wait a second. So the initial connection-request packet is necessarily >>>> unencrypted under this scheme? >> >>> Yes, by necessity. The username must be sent in the clear, even if only >>> as part of the GSSAPI handshake (i.e., the GSSAPI username will appear >>> in plantext in the GSSAPI blobs which are otherwise encrypted). GSSAPI >>> performs authentication before it can start encryption. >> >> Ugh. I had thought we were putting work into this because it represented >> something we could recommend as best practice, but now you're telling me >> that it's always going to be inferior to what we have already. > > It does not seem necessary to have an equivalent of > pqsecure_open_client, just some extra handling in fe-connect.c to set > up the initial context with a proper message handling... Not that > direct anyway. So should the patch be marked as returned with feedback > at this stage?
Yeah, I think so. It doesn't seem we have consensus on this, and it's too late to be trying to build one now. -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
