On 6/12/16 3:13 AM, Ants Aasma wrote:
5. Instead of providing passphrase through environmental variable,
> better to provide some options to pg_ctl etc.
That looks like it would be worse from a security perspective.
Integrating a passphrase prompt would be an option, but a way for
scripts to provide passphrases would still be needed.
Environment variables and command-line options are visible to other
processes on the machine, so neither of these approaches is really going
to work. We would need some kind of integration with secure
password-entry mechanisms, such as pinentry.
Also note that all tools that work directly on the data directory would
need password-entry and encryption/decryption support, including
pg_basebackup, pg_controldata, pg_ctl, pg_receivexlog, pg_resetxlog,
pg_rewind, pg_upgrade, pg_xlogdump.
It seems that your implementation doesn't encrypt pg_control, thus
avoiding some of that. But that doesn't seem right.
Peter Eisentraut http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
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