On 6/13/17 09:24, Stephen Frost wrote:
> but there are
> use-cases where it'd be really nice to be able to have PG doing the
> encryption instead of the filesystem because then you can do things like
> backup the database, copy it somewhere else directly, and then restore
> it using the regular PG mechanisms, as long as you have access to the
> key.  That's not something you can directly do with filesystem-level
> encryption

Interesting point.

I wonder what the proper extent of "encryption at rest" should be.  If
you encrypt just on a file or block level, then someone looking at the
data directory or a backup can still learn a number of things about the
number of tables, transaction rates, various configuration settings, and
so on.  In the scenario of a sensitive application hosted on a shared
SAN, I don't think that is good enough.

Also, in the use case you describe, if you use pg_basebackup to make a
direct encrypted copy of a data directory, I think that would mean you'd
have to keep using the same key for all copies.

Peter Eisentraut              http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services

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