On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 05:04:17PM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: > > Also, there is the sense that security requires > > trust of the root user, while using Postgres doesn't require the root > > user to also use Postgres. > > I don't understand this. It is certainly true that you're running > binaries owned by root, the root user could Trojan the binaries and > break any security you think you have. But that problem is no better > or worse for PostgreSQL than anything else.
I couldn't find a cleaner way to see it --- it is that database use doesn't involve the root user using it, while database security requires the root user to also be security-conscious. > > One serious difference between in-database-encryption and SSH keys is > > that the use of passwords for SSH is well understood and reasonable to > > use, while I think we all admit that use of passwords for database > > objects like SSL keys is murky. Use of keys for OS-level encryption is > > a little better handled, but not as clean as SSH keys. > > Peter pointed out upthread that our handling of SSL passphrases leaves > a lot to be desired, and that maybe we should fix that problem first; > I agree. But I don't think this is any kind of intrinsic limitation > of PostgreSQL vs. encrypted filesystems vs. SSH; it's just a > quality-of-implementation issue. I think there are environmental issues that make password use on SSH easier than the other cases --- it isn't just code quality. However, it would be good to research how SSH handles it to see if we can get any ideas. -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription + -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (email@example.com) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers