On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 05:04:17PM -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> > Also, there is the sense that security requires
> > trust of the root user, while using Postgres doesn't require the root
> > user to also use Postgres.
> I don't understand this.  It is certainly true that you're running
> binaries owned by root, the root user could Trojan the binaries and
> break any security you think you have.  But that problem is no better
> or worse for PostgreSQL than anything else.

I couldn't find a cleaner way to see it --- it is that database use
doesn't involve the root user using it, while database security requires
the root user to also be security-conscious.

> > One serious difference between in-database-encryption and SSH keys is
> > that the use of passwords for SSH is well understood and reasonable to
> > use, while I think we all admit that use of passwords for database
> > objects like SSL keys is murky.  Use of keys for OS-level encryption is
> > a little better handled, but not as clean as SSH keys.
> Peter pointed out upthread that our handling of SSL passphrases leaves
> a lot to be desired, and that maybe we should fix that problem first;
> I agree.  But I don't think this is any kind of intrinsic limitation
> of PostgreSQL vs. encrypted filesystems vs. SSH; it's just a
> quality-of-implementation issue.

I think there are environmental issues that make password use on SSH
easier than the other cases --- it isn't just code quality.  However, it
would be good to research how SSH handles it to see if we can get any

  Bruce Momjian  <br...@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

+ As you are, so once was I.  As I am, so you will be. +
+                      Ancient Roman grave inscription +

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