On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 07:51:36PM -0400, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > Bruce Momjian wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 07:27:55PM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote: > > > I expect the same would happen with the shell-command approach suggested > > > up-thread and the prompt-on-stdin approach too, they aren't great but I > > > expect users would still use the feature. As Robert and I have > > > mentioned, there is a good bit of value to having this feature simply > > > because it avoids the need to get someone with root privileges to set up > > > an encrypted volume and I don't think having to use a shell command or > > > providing the password on stdin at startup really changes that very > > > much. > > > > Understood, but now you are promoting a feature with an admittedly-poor > > API, duplication of an OS feature, and perhaps an invasive change to the > > code. Those are high hurdles. > > I thought we called it "incremental development". From the opposite > point of view, would you say we should ban use of passphrase-protected > SSL key files because the current user interface for them is bad? > > I have no use for data-at-rest encryption myself, but I wouldn't stop > development just because the initial design proposal doesn't include > top-notch key management.
Yes, but we have to have a plan on how to improve it. Why add a feature that is hard to maintain, and hard to use. -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription + -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers