Dear all,
Firstly, a reminder that (in a change to the planned program) the last
Serious Metaphysics session of this term will feature Professor Rae Langton
(MIT), speaking on 'Humility and Co-existence in Kant and Lewis: Two Modal
Themes, with Variations' - abstract below. We'll meet at 12pm on Monday
(Mar 5th) in the Philosophy Faculty Board Room, and the session will run
for one hour. We'll also go for an informal lunch afterwards, all welcome.
Secondly, the SM Easter term card is now full (we'll even be having five
sessions, rather than four). SM will be returning to Wednesday afternoons,
and the talks will be extended to 90 minutes: 45 for presentation, and 45
for questions. The program is as follows:
* Wed Apr 25 - Prof. John Marenbon
* Wed May 2 - Prof. Richard Holton
* Wed May 9 - Kyle Mitchell
* Wed May 16 - Prof. Justin Broackes
* Wed May 30 - Prof. Hugh Mellor
I hope to see many of you there.
Best,
Emily Thomas
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ABSTRACT
Rae Langton - 'Humility and Co-existence in Kant and Lewis: Two Modal
Themes, with Variations'
What could Immanuel Kant and David Lewis have in common? At first sight,
little enough, given that Kant did more than most to chasten the ambitions
of metaphysics, and Lewis did more than most to indulge them. Nevertheless
I want to pursue here two common themes: first, an argument about ignorance
of things in themselves, viewed as a kind of epistemic humility, having its
source in the metaphysically contingent relation between certain classes of
properties; and second, an argument-perhaps even a 'transcendental'
argument-about the conditions of co-existence, the relation that
world-mates bear to each other. Kant thinks we are ignorant of things 'in
themselves': much is known to us, but things 'in themselves'-the intrinsic
properties of things-remain hidden. Lewis agrees ('Ramseyan Humility'). The
second theme of co-existence was an enduring topic of interest for Kant. In
early work, he explored the metaphysically necessary conditions of
co-existence, and later, the 'transcendentally' necessary conditions of our
experience of co-existence. It provides the occasion for a further,
surprising, commonality with Lewis. It is not too far-fetched to interpret
Lewis as offering an argument comparable to Kant's-perhaps even a
'transcendental' argument-about the necessity of certain conditions for
co-existence.What emerges is a Lewis who is more like Kant than you might
have thought: a Lewis who is interested in the necessary, perhaps
'transcendentally' necessary, conditions for co-existence; who denies
knowledge of things in themselves; and who lays this ignorance at the door
of a contingent connection between intrinsic and relational facts, somehow
conceived.
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