Dear all, Thanks to some eagle eyed recipients of this email circular, I have been alerted to the fact I included the wrong abstract for Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s talk. My apologies. The correct title/abstract is below:
On a certain conception of metaphysical necessity Abstract: Are the laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full answer to this question in this paper. But I shall give a partial answer to it. In particular, Gideon Rosen (2006) has argued that there is a certain conception of metaphysical necessity, which he calls the Non-Standard conception, according to which the laws of ontology, or at least some of them, are metaphysically contingent. I shall argue that the Non-Standard conception is incoherent and, therefore, that the contingency of (any of) the laws of ontology cannot be secured through such a conception of metaphysical necessity. Regards, Nathan Hawkins PhD student in Philosophy Cambridge University _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
