In RA 9369, source code review is part of Section 9, It's only one of the sections out of 47 sections
In that Section 9, again source code review provision is only one of the many other provisions amongst the many, and Souce Code Review is not even prominent. And I list as follows, "Sec 9, ........ .............. .............. etc. 1. Recommend the most appropriate, secure, applicable and cost-effective technology to be applied in the AES, in whole or in part, at that specific form in time. 2. Participate as nonvoting members of the Bids and Awards Committee in the conduct of the bidding process for the AES. Members of the Advisory Council representing the ICT Professionals organizations are hereby excluded from participating in any manner in the Bids and Awards Committee. 3. Participate as nonvoting members of the steering committee tasked with the implementation of the AES, Members of the Advisory Council representing the ICT professional organization are hereby excluded from participating in any manner in the steering committee. 4. Provide advice and assistance in the review of the systems planning, inception, development, testing, operationalization, and evaluation stages. 5. Provided advice and/or assistance in the identification, assessment and resolution of systems problems or inadequacies as may surface or resurface in the course of the bidding, acquisition, testing, operationalization, re-use, storage or disposition of the AES equipment and/or resources as the case may be. 6. Provided advice and/or assistance in the risk management of the AES especially when a contingency or disaster situation arises. 7. Prepare and submit a written report, which shall be submitted within six months from the date of the election to the oversight committee, evaluating the use of the AES." So, by examining RA 9369, there are so many other considerations included there to assure the integrity and security of the AES. I am sure the SC will hear all arguments and examine all evidence and make their judgments. Of course, what's at stake are the Integrity of the Election results as well as other practical considerations like, what's the implication of annulling the AES for the May 2010 election in terms of cost, the common interest, and the Constitution. The onus is on the Source Code proponents to convince the SC that Source Code Review is the only ( which is not) way to ensure the Integrity and Security of the AES system. The way it appears to me and others, the Source Code Review proponents have their work cut out for them. On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 1:10 PM, Robert Locke <[email protected]> wrote: > > Even if Mr. Plameras was right (which he's not), it's irrelevant. The > source code review is required by law according to Mr. Manalastas, so > what's there to argue? This is a legal issue, not a technical one. > > > > > > On 10 14, 09, at 9:57 AM, Paolo Alexis Falcone wrote: > >> Sure we know the dictionary definition, done that in practice, coded >> measures to prevent such. >> >> A buffer overrun need not terminate the system. The C and C++ >> standards mention that handling of such is undefined. It may crash >> the system, or be exploited once certain input has been placed. >> >> While it is possible that you can craft a test that will do buffer >> overruns over certain inputs, you will have to craft multiple tests >> (therefore consuming time and resources) to know all possible >> combinations (as the buffer overrun may not be in your code, but >> together with a current bug in one of the libraries, and together an >> exploit can occur) while a simple source code check will get there >> faster. >> >> Given undefined behavior, your program may have the semblance of >> working properly (which satisfies the tests), but over the course of >> time make a sudden crash (had this at work just last weekend), or at >> this time be exploited (seen this happen a couple of times). You >> cannot simply test against what you dont expect, since software >> testing demands that you know your expectations in order to have a >> successful UAT. >> >> I do understand the tests are measured against a thousand samples >> (as you can only fit so much inside a voting precinct), but your >> concept of tests being sufficient is already murky given the >> arguments and how we poked a hole in your testing methodology re >> buffer overruns. >> >> A source code review + very good and extensive tests will be most >> beneficial and the fastest way to find exploitable code and fix >> them. It makes testing easier as you have the expectations (the >> source + the tests) absolutely in front of you - if there are still >> exploits those are already either in the libraries used. >> >> >> Sent from my Nokia phone >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Oscar Plameras >> Sent: 2009-10-14 09:23:45 >> Subject: Re: [plug] COMELEC SUED (Was: The Death of Election >> 2010SourceCodeReview) >> >> For the benefit of everybody so we know what we >> are talking about, I will quote this short article >> about buffer overruns, >> >> "Buffer overrun is s an anomaly where a process >> stores data in a buffer outside the memory the >> programmer set aside for it. In computer security >> and programming, a buffer overflow, or buffer overrun, >> is an anomaly where a process stores data in a buffer >> outside the memory the programmer set aside for it. >> The extra data overwrites adjacent memory, which >> may contain other data, including program variables >> and program flow control data. This may result in erratic >> program behavior, including memory access errors, >> incorrect results, program termination (a crash), or a >> breach of system security. >> >> Buffer overflows can be triggered by inputs that are >> designed to execute code, or alter the way the program >> operates. They are thus the basis of many software >> vulnerabilities and can be maliciously exploited. >> Bounds checking can prevent buffer overflows. >> >> Programming languages commonly associated >> with buffer overflows include C and C++, which provide >> no built-in protection against accessing or overwriting >> data in any part of memory and do not automatically >> check that data written to an array (the built-in buffer >> type) is within the boundaries of that array." as quoted >> from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffer_overflow >> >> We are interested in, >> >> 1. "This may result in erratic program behavior, >> including memory access errors..." in which case the >> program will abruptly terminate. This will be caught by >> the Outcome test. >> >> 2. "incorrect results..", This will be caught also by the >> Outcome test >> >> 3. Program termination (a crash),..", which will be caught >> by the Outcome test because the program crashes. >> >> 4. " or a breach of system security" meaning absurd or >> corrupt results will be generated. The Outcome test >> will again check the Actual Outputs against the Expected >> Outputs. And since the two do not agree the system is >> rejected. >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 11:47 AM, Gideon Guillen >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 7:38 AM, Oscar Plameras <[email protected] >>> > wrote: >>>> I'm as bored as you are with arguments going around in >>>> circles. It's like watching dogs chasing their tails. >>> >>> You still haven't addressed the issue about your output based method >>> not addressing security issues. Remember the part of the thread >>> wherein actual voting machines used in a major industrialized country >>> shipping with real and exploitable buffer overrun security >>> vulnerabilities. And, contrary to you last post about it, you don't >>> need to overload a system to exploit it. Just one seemingly valid >>> malformed input is all it takes to explot it. You can use >>> vulnerabilities to make the machine do things outside the scope of >>> your output based testing, such as inserting and executing >>> "dagdag-bawas" code. >>> >>>> As a matter of interest there was a previous court decision >>>> on a similar matter which was ruled by SC in favor of the >>>> Comelec. >>> >>> The previous ruling has nothing to do with the source code auditing, >>> though. It has to do with the validity of the bid. >>> _________________________________________________ >>> Philippine Linux Users' Group (PLUG) Mailing List >>> http://lists.linux.org.ph/mailman/listinfo/plug >>> Searchable Archives: http://archives.free.net.ph >>> >> _________________________________________________ >> Philippine Linux Users' Group (PLUG) Mailing List >> http://lists.linux.org.ph/mailman/listinfo/plug >> Searchable Archives: http://archives.free.net.ph >> >> _________________________________________________ >> Philippine Linux Users' Group (PLUG) Mailing List >> http://lists.linux.org.ph/mailman/listinfo/plug >> Searchable Archives: http://archives.free.net.ph > > _________________________________________________ > Philippine Linux Users' Group (PLUG) Mailing List > http://lists.linux.org.ph/mailman/listinfo/plug > Searchable Archives: http://archives.free.net.ph > _________________________________________________ Philippine Linux Users' Group (PLUG) Mailing List http://lists.linux.org.ph/mailman/listinfo/plug Searchable Archives: http://archives.free.net.ph
