* Jim Seymour via Postfix-users: > Most servers I've administered over the years, both personally and > professionally, ran Postfix and hosted end-user accounts.
Strange. My own experience is very different. The servers I encounter or plan myself in a professional setting typically do not allow any end users to login. Access is usually strictly limited to persons who need to maintain Postfix itself and services around it (e.g. a local caching DNS). I definitely don't want Joe Random User traipsing around on critical infrastructure, and neither do most of my customers. > I once-upon-a-time subscribed to "Don't put all your eggs in one > basket." I soon realized that meant more work and a greater attack > surface. So I switched to "Put as many eggs as necessary in one > basket—just make sure it's a damn good basket." Why do you consider a greater number of isolated servers "a greater attack surface"? I think the opposite is true. Local users are a much bigger threat than remote attackers who can only interact with the services exposed over the network. Are you sure that all sockets have the correct permissions? That nobody can screw with the lo network interface? I don't want to risk mouseholing of that sort. As for the "more work" argument: In terms of required effort, it makes little difference to me if I spend time on separate machines/VMs or on securing mixed-use machines against malicious or careless local users. In terms of security, however, there is a significant difference. -Ralph _______________________________________________ Postfix-users mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
