Dear Friends,
"OPM-OIIO forwarding information
below please read it, may it is good
for all of us in all or how?"
And very warmest greetings from
Malmö.
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 15:31:52 -0600To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Geopolitical Intelligence Report - A Glimmer of Hope at Annapolis
GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
11.26.2007
Read on the Web
Get your own copy
Stratfor 2.0 is on its way. Click here for details.
Manage your e-mail flow.
Find intelligence more easily with geographic and topical navigation.
Get the entire context with Special Topic Pages.
A Glimmer of Hope at AnnapolisBy George FriedmanU.S. President George W. Bush
will host a meeting Nov. 27 between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Annapolis, Md. This is fairly banal news,
as the gathering seems intended to give the impression that the United States
cares what happens between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The last such
meeting, the Camp David summit between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, sponsored
by then-President Bill Clinton, was followed by massive violence. Therefore,
the most we have learned to hope for from such meetings is nothing. This one
will either be meaningless or catastrophic.There is an interesting twist to
this meeting, however. The Arab League voted to encourage Arab foreign
ministers to attend. The Saudis have announced they will be present, along with
the Egyptians and Jordanians who were expected there. Even the Syrians said
they will attend, as long as the future of the Golan Heights is on the table.
We would expect the Israelis to agree to that demand because, with more
bilateral issues on the table, less time will need to be devoted to Palestinian
issues. And that might suit many of the Arab states that are ambivalent, to say
the least, about the Palestinians.We have written of the complex relations
between the Palestinians and the Arabs, although the current situation is even
more complex. Abbas is from the Palestinian group Fatah, Arafat's political
vehicle. Fatah was historically a secular, socialist group with close ties to
Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt and the Soviet Union. It also was regarded as a
threat to the survival of the Arab monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. When
Syria invaded Lebanon in 1975, it was not to fight the Israelis or the Lebanese
Christians, but to drive out Fatah. Given this history, it is ironic that the
Arab League has decided to sanction attendance at the Annapolis Conference. The
Saudis and the Syrians are particularly hostile to Fatah, while the Jordanians
and the Egyptians have their own problems with the group.Behind this strange
move are the complexities of Palestinian politics. As PNA president, Abbas is
charged with upholding its charter and executing PNA foreign policy. But
another group, Hamas, won the last parliamentary elections and therefore
controlled the selection of the prime minister. Such splits are not uncommon in
political systems in which there is a strong president and a parliamentary
system, as in France.But in this case the split ripped the Palestinians apart.
The problem was not simply institutional, but geographic. The Palestinian
territories are divided into two very different parts -- the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. The former was dominated by Jordan between 1948 and 1967, the
latter by Egypt. They have very different social and economic outlooks and
political perspectives. In June, Hamas rose up and took control of Gaza, while
Abbas and Fatah retained control of the PNA and the West Bank.This created an
historic transformation. Palestinian nationalism in the context of Israel can
be divided into three eras. In the first era, 1948-1967, Palestinian
nationalism was a subset of Arab nationalism. Palestine was claimed in whole or
in part by Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In the second era, 1967 to mid-2007,
Palestinian nationalism came into its own, with an identity and territorial
demands distinct from other Arab powers. An umbrella organization, the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), consisting of diverse and frequently
divided Palestinian movements, presided over the Palestinian national cause,
and eventually evolved into the Palestinian National Authority.Recently,
however, a dramatic shift has taken place. This was not simply the Hamas
victory in the January 2006 elections, although the emergence of an Islamist
movement among the Palestinians represented a substantial shift among a people
who were historically secularist. It was not even the fact that by 2007 Hamas
stood in general opposition to the tradition of the PLO, meaning not only Fatah
but other Palestinian secular groups. The redefinition of the Palestinian issue
into one between Islamists and secularists had been going on for a
while.Rather, it was the rising in Gaza that dramatically redefined the
Palestinians by creating two Palestinian entities, geographically distinct and
profoundly different in outlook and needs. The idea of a Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza, divided by Israel, was reminiscent of Pakistan in its
first quarter-century of existence -- when what is today Pakistan and
Bangladesh, divided by India's thousands of miles, were treated as one country.
It was a reach.Suddenly in June, a new reality emerged. Whatever the
Palestinian charter said, whatever the U.N. resolutions said, whatever anyone
said, there were now two Palestinian entities -- "states" is a good word for
them, though it upsets everyone, including the Palestinians. Hamas controlled
Gaza and Fatah controlled the West Bank, although neither saw this situation as
final. The PNA constantly threatened to reassert itself in Gaza, while Hamas
threatened to extend its revolution to the West Bank. Either might happen, but
for now, the Palestinians have split along geopolitical lines.From Israel's
point of view, this situation poses both a problem and an opportunity. The
problem is that Hamas, more charismatic than the tired Fatah, opposes any
settlement with Israel that accepts the Jewish state's existence. The
opportunity is, of course, that the Palestinians are now split and that Hamas
controls the much poorer and weaker area of Gaza. If Hamas can be kept from
taking control of the West Bank, and if Fatah is unable to reassert its control
in Gaza, the Israelis face an enemy that not only is weakened, but also is
engaged in a long-term civil war that will weaken it further.To bring this
about, it is clear what Israel's goal should be at Annapolis. That is, to do
everything it can to strengthen the position of Abbas, Fatah and the PNA. It is
ironic, of course, that Israel should now view Fatah as an asset that needs to
be strengthened, but history is filled with such ironies. Israel's goal at
Annapolis is to cede as much as possible to Abbas, both territorially and
economically, to intensify the split in the Palestinian community and try to
strengthen the hand of the secularists. Israel, however, has two
problems.First, Israeli politics is in gridlock. Olmert remains as prime
minister even after the disaster in Lebanon in 2006, because no real successor
has emerged. The operant concept of the Israelis is that the Palestinians are
unstable and unpredictable. Any territorial concession made to the Palestinians
-- regardless of current interest or ideology -- could ultimately be used
against Israel. So, creating a Palestinian state in the West Bank would turn
what is a good idea now into a geopolitical disaster later, should Abbas be
succeeded by some of the more radical members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade --
a group that carried out suicide bombings during the intifada. Israel's
obsession with the unpredictability of the Palestinians and its belief in
territorial buffers cannot be overcome by a weak government. Thirty years ago,
it took Menachem Begin, heading a strong government from the right, to make
peace with the Egyptians.At the same time, the Israelis are terrified at the
idea that Hamas will topple Fatah and take control of the Palestinian community
as a whole. As Olmert was quoted as saying Nov. 23, "We cannot maintain the
status quo between us and the Palestinians ... it will lead to results that are
much worse that those of a failed conference. It will result in Hamas taking
over Judea and Samaria, to a weakening or even the disappearance of the
moderate Palestinians. Unless a political horizon can be found, the results
will be deadly." Olmert clearly understands the stakes, but with Benjamin
Netanyahu to his right, it is unclear whether he has the political weight to
act on his perception.For Olmert to make the kind of concessions that are
needed in order to take advantage of the geopolitical situation, he needs one
thing: guarantees and controls over the evolution of Hamas. We have seen Fatah
go from what the Israelis consider the devil incarnate to a moderating force.
Things change. If Hamas can be brought into the political process -- and the
split between Gaza and the West Bank maintained -- Israel will be in a superb
position. But who can moderate Hamas, and why would Hamas moderate?Enter the
Saudis. The Arab League resolution gave them cover for attending the Annapolis
talks -- which is the reason they engineered it. And the Saudis are the one
force that has serious leverage with Hamas, because they underwrite much of
Hamas' operations. Hamas is a Sunni Islamist group and as such has a
sympathetic audience in Riyadh. Indeed, in many ways, Hamas is the Saudi answer
to the secular Fatah. Therefore, if anyone can ultimately deliver Hamas, it
would be the Saudis. But why would they?On the surface, the Saudis should
celebrate a radical, Islamist Palestinian movement, and on the surface they do.
But they have become extremely wary of radical Islamism. Al Qaeda had a great
deal of sympathy in the kingdom, but the evolution of events in the Islamic
world since 9/11 is far from what the Saudis wanted to see. Islamist movements
have created chaos from Pakistan to Lebanon, and this has created opportunities
for a dangerous growth in Shiite power, not to mention that it has introduced
U.S. forces into the region in the most destabilizing way possible.At the end
of the day, the Saudis and the other royal families in the Persian Gulf are
profoundly conservative. They are wealthy -- and become wildly wealthier every
day, what with oil at more than $90 a barrel -- and they have experienced
dangerous instability inside the kingdom from al Qaeda and other radical
Islamist movements. The Saudis have learned how difficult it is for the state
to manage radical Islamism, and the way in which moral (and other) support for
radicals can destabilize not only the region, but Saudi Arabia as well. Support
in parts of the royal family for radical Islamist movements seems dicier to
everyone now. These are movements that are difficult to control.Most important,
these are movements that fail. Persistently, these radical movements have not
taken control of states and moved them in directions that align with Saudi
interests. Rather, these movements have destabilized states, creating vacuums
into which other movements can enter. The rise of Iranian power is particularly
disturbing to the Saudis, though so is the persistent presence of U.S. forces.
A general calming of the situation is now in the Saudi interest.That means that
the Saudi view of Hamas is somewhat different today than it was 10 years ago,
when Riyadh was encouraging the group. A civil war among the Palestinians would
achieve nothing. Nor, from the Saudi perspective, would another intifada, which
would give the Americans more reason to act aggressively in the region. The
Saudis have moved closer to the Americans and do not want them to withdraw from
Iraq, for example, though they do wish the Americans would be less noisy. A
Hamas grab for power in the West Bank is not something the Saudis want to see
now.Simply by participating in the Annapolis conference, the Saudis have
signaled Hamas that they want a change of direction -- although Hamas will
resist. "The period that will follow the Annapolis conference will witness an
increase of the resistance against the Zionist occupation in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip," said Mussa Abu Marzuq, top aide to Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal.
Perhaps, but a confrontation with the Saudis is not something that Hamas can
afford now or in the future.The Saudis want to stabilize the situation without
destroying Hamas (which is very different from al Qaeda, given that it stems
from the Muslim Brotherhood tradition). The Israelis want to maintain the split
between Hamas and Fatah and limit Hamas' power without eliminating it -- they
like Fatah looking toward the Israelis for protection. Fatah badly needs to
deliver concessions from Israel to strengthen its hand. The Americans can use a
success and a change of atmospherics in the region.Here is the delicate
balance: Abbas has to receive more than he gives. Otherwise his credibility is
shot. The Israelis find it difficult to make concessions, particularly
disproportionate ones, with a weak government. But there are different kinds of
strengths. Begin could make disproportionate concessions to the Egyptians
because of his decisive political strength. Olmert is powerful only by default,
though that is a kind of power.It is interesting to think of how Ariel Sharon
would have handled this situation. In a way he created it. By insisting that
Israel withdraw from Gaza, he set in motion the split in the Palestinian
community and the current dynamic. Had he not had his stroke, he would have
tried to make Annapolis as defining a moment as the Begin-Sadat summit. It
would be a risky move, but it should be recalled that few besides Begin
believed that the Camp David Accords on the Sinai would have lasted 30 years.
But that is merely editorializing. The facts on the ground indicate an
opportunity to redefine the politics of the region. There are many factors
lining up for it, the concessions Olmert would need to make in order to box
Hamas in might simply be beyond his ability.So long as no one mentions the
status of Jerusalem, which blew up the Camp David meetings under Clinton, there
is, nevertheless, a chance here -- one we take more seriously than others.Tell
George what you thinkGet your own copy
Distribution and Reprints
This report may be distributed or republished with attribution to Strategic
Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com. For media requests, partnership
opportunities, or commercial distribution or republication, please contact
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Newsletter Subscription
To unsubscribe from receiving this free intelligence report, please click here.
© Copyright 2007 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
_________________________________________________________________
Explore the seven wonders of the world
http://search.msn.com/results.aspx?q=7+wonders+world&mkt=en-US&form=QBRE
