http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FK03Ae04.html
Ba'asyir trial and the future of the Jemaah Islamiah By Eric Koo Last Thursday Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was brought to trial in an Indonesian court. Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) group, is being charged with inciting terror attacks on the state, including the Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, and the Marriott Hotel bombing on August 5, 2003. Ba'asyir's trial is not only of interest to the intelligence and security community, but to the public as well. The JI group, which Ba'asyir allegedly heads, was once and still is, a menace to public security in the nations of Southeast Asia. The rise of the JI Jemaah Islamiah, which means Islamic community, is a group that arose in Indonesia from humble beginnings. In 1971 two Islamic preachers, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar (who died in 1999 of natural causes), co-founded the al-Mukmin Koranic Studies boarding school in Ngruki village east of Surakarta, Solo province. Both men aspired to the ideology of Darul Islam, which advocates establishing an Islamic state ruled by sharia, or Islamic law, in Java as its ultimate goal, and started teaching and spreading such ideas among the students who came to study at the school. Then-ruling Indonesian president Suharto ordered a ban on the movement, arresting both men. Ba'asyir and Abdullah were imprisoned from 1978 to 1982, for trying to start an Islamic militia, Komando Jihad. Soon after their release, they fled to Malaysia in 1985 to escape another prison term and returned to Indonesia only after president Suharto stepped down in 1998. While in Malaysia, the two men gathered like-minded Muslim followers from neighboring states who shared their vision for a regional Islamic state and formed the JI. One of these men was Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, who later became the JI operations chief. Hambali, an Indonesian, went to Afghanistan in the 1980s and supposedly fought the Soviets as a mujahideen, or Islamic fighter. During that time he became associated with Osama bin Laden, leader of the al-Qaeda network. The JI gained prominence in Indonesia in the period 1999-2001, after the fall of president Suharto in 1998, when a number of violent incidents occurred between religious and ethnic groups amid the social chaos in the absence of a strong and stable government. At that time, Ba'asyir was a well-known figure and respected among the Indonesian Muslim community. His friendship with then-Indonesian vice president Hamzah Haz was also well known; hence the Indonesian government did not move against him until after the Bali bombing incident. A White Paper released by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Singapore on the Jemaah Islamiah arrests in January 2003 described clearly that the JI were organized at the local level into fiah or cells, which consisted of members who lead normal lives as covers for their secret identities until called upon by the organization to act. The White Paper also illustrated in detail the interlinked relationships between the JI and other Islamic militant groups such as the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Malaysian Militant Group, or KMM), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) based in the southern Philippines, and al-Qaeda. If Ba'asyir was the spiritual leader and ideologue of the JI, Hambali was the planner and organizer for bomb operations that propelled the group to regional and later, world attention. He was also known to have held leadership positions in both the JI and al-Qaeda sharia councils, the highest decision-making body in the groups. Hambali was once regarded as being even more dangerous than Ba'asyir. He was finally arrested in Thailand in August 2003 and is now in US custody. His arrest has since led to even more vital information on links between the JI network and al-Qaeda. Why the JI stays a threat Since 1998, the JI had been active in Indonesia, covertly striking religious, political or economic symbols of popular discontent from Indonesia's Muslim majority, including churches, shopping malls, or the Philippine ambassador's residence. Later, after the attacks on September 11, 2001, it was discovered that the JI had secretly built up an alarmingly huge clandestine network and was in collaboration with the global terrorist network, al-Qaeda. The JI was discovered to have branches, or mantiqis, in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Australia. These countries have openly outlawed this group and JI members, suspects or known associates had been arrested periodically through police investigations or shared intelligence. Training camps that had been discovered in Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia were also neutralized. Thus far, the JI has been directly responsible for at least 257 deaths through bomb attacks, a modest figure compared to other insurgent or terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, or the rest of the world for that matter. Certainly, other regional groups such as the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or Hamas have killed many more people than that. However, many JI plans were disrupted by timely crackdowns and arrests by various Southeast Asian state governments, which accounts for its low attack frequency and success rate. The Bali bombing, which claimed 202 victims, remains its most intense and serious assault on the Indonesian state thus far. The dormant threat JI poses to the region lies in the depth of its infiltration into Southeast Asian societies, its organization of secretive cells modeled on al-Qaeda and its known links to this much larger and feared Islamic group. The JI's last successful bomb attack was on September 9 this year when a vehicle driven by a suicide bomber blew up in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 11 and wounding 180. The suspected perpetrators, Malaysian JI member Azahari bin Husin and other new key figures in the JI network such as Noordin Mohammed Top and Zulkarnaen, are still on the loose. Security officials speculate that it's possible that Azahari and his followers are breaking off from the JI network to go their own way as smaller, splinter groups. If so, they would be even harder for the security community to track. Will Ba'asyir go free? The Bali bombing radically changed Indonesia's state strategy against Islamic militancy. Time magazine reported that then-president Megawati Sukarnoputri acted with uncharacteristic decisiveness and passed an anti-terrorism presidential decree giving special powers to the police to fight terrorism. Six days later, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was arrested. The culprits involved in the Bali bombing operation were also arrested over the subsequent months. Other suspected militants involved in less well-known bombing incidents - for example, an attack on a McDonald's restaurant in Makassar, South Sulawesi, on December 5, 2002 - were also rounded up. Secret training camps allegedly used by the JI for explosives and other types of training were also destroyed when discovered. Whether Ba'asyir will go free depends principally on how the Indonesian court handles his case - as a legal case involving violent crime, or as an anti-government terrorist activity. Indonesia's unique handling of terrorism cases is heavily influenced by legal procedures and precedents. For example, the Bali bombings' key suspects, Imam Samudra, Amrozi and Mukhlas, were sentenced to death for direct participation in the bomb plot. But Ba'asyir, who inspired others to commit terrorist acts through his militant and extremist teachings, initially received only a four-year sentence on charges of plotting treason. These facts are well documented and cannot be disputed. Ba'asyir's lawyers, no doubt, have capitalized on the legal aspect of Indonesia's criminal code by pointing out that Ba'asyir, though linked and known to the JI militants and convicted terrorists, nevertheless, was not directly involved in either the planning or execution phases of the bomb attacks. They also cite Ba'asyir's role in stepping forth to give a public statement demanding that Iraqi kidnappers release Indonesian women kidnapped in Iraq last month, ostensibly for the purpose of demanding Ba'asyir's release from prison. For whatever reasons, the kidnappers released the two Indonesian women three days later. Ba'asyir's role in diffusing the Iraqi kidnapping incident will no doubt be considered in his favor when the Indonesian court reviews his legal case of appeal. Still, terrorism experts and politicians generally agree that radical teachings are much more dangerous than the operational aspects of terrorism. This could work against Ba'asyir. For example, Singapore's minister mentor Lee Kuan Yew likened Ba'asyir to that of a queen bee, but said Amrozi and others were just worker bees. Singapore's Home Minister Wong Kan Seng also pointed out that Ba'asyir's Al-Mukmin religious school was still in operation. The affect on US-Indonesia relations The United States has previously applied diplomatic pressure to coax the Indonesian government toward more efficient and effective action against terrorism and Islamic radicalism within Indonesia. That the JI's key leaders are mostly Indonesian by nationality, and that nearly all the group's successful bomb attacks occurred within that country, certainly cannot be denied. The Indonesian government naturally is the best entity to deal with the JI problem. Nevertheless, legal proceedings aside, Indonesia's security forces have contributed the lion's share to breaking up the JI network, arresting its members and associates, destroying its infrastructure such as training camps, and confiscating its weapon cache. But greater events are in motion that may overshadow Ba'asyir's trial. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was sworn in recently as Indonesia's sixth president and has stated that his first 100 days in office will be committed to addressing security issues. Based on the outcome of the US presidential elections, new opportunities to build cooperation and better interstate relations would be presented for the taking, as long as both US and Indonesian leaders remain open to diplomatic discourse and committed to the campaign against terror and Islamic radicalism. Conclusion With the JI incapacitated, many of its high- and mid-level leaders, bomb operatives and cell members arrested, dead or on the run, the JI's threat to regional security has been reduced to containable levels. Still, security is a concern that should never be taken lightly. The history of JI has shown that it has a capacity of resilience, metamorphosing into other organizational forms, adopting other names, and forming links with other groups, to suit the tides and times. Its radical goals, however, remained consistent, and that is something to worry about. Eric Koo is a freelance writer who holds a master of science degree in strategic studies from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS). (Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] for information on our sales and syndication policies.) ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> $9.95 domain names from Yahoo!. Register anything. http://us.click.yahoo.com/J8kdrA/y20IAA/yQLSAA/BRUplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> *************************************************************************** Berdikusi dg Santun & Elegan, dg Semangat Persahabatan. Menuju Indonesia yg Lebih Baik, in Commonality & Shared Destiny. www.ppi-india.uni.cc *************************************************************************** __________________________________________________________________________ Mohon Perhatian: 1. 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