East Timor after Alkatiri: nation or protectorate?

By Tim Anderson

We did not expect that the elected leader of a party
with an overwhelming 
mandate could be forced to stand down in this way in a
democracy[Fretilin 
press release, 26 June]

Backed by a foreign army, and with his countrys own
army confined to 
barracks, the great resistance leader Xanana Gusmao
finally led the charge 
to topple the leadership of Timor Lestes first
post-independence 
government. But the backing of Australia was critical.

If this appears puzzling, we must understand that,
what ever the 
configuration of East Timors new government, there
will be lasting 
bitterness amongst the major players over management
of the recent crisis 
and intervention, and conflict over how to manage the
new relationship with 
Australia. Further, Junes palace coup clearly has
implications not just for 
the personalities involved, but also for the countrys
development strategy.

Talk of the need for an inclusive or a national unity
government rather 
misses the point that all recent political leadership
in East Timor has 
been by coalition. The broadest of these, the CNRT,
was disbanded after the 
UN insisted on multiparty elections. The Fretilin-led
Government, elected 
in 2001, included high profile ex-Fretilin members
Jose Ramos-Horta and the 
separately elected President Xanana Gusmao. After the
coming elections the 
government may not be much different.

The immediate difference is the sidelining of Mari
Alkatiri, Fretilins 
chief strategist, following his forced resignation as
Prime Minister. 
Suggested charges against Alkatiri (for arming
para-militaries, during the 
coup attempt) will go nowhere. The hit
squadaccusations, broadcast by 
Australias ABC, have no credibility. But the
Australian media and military 
intervention which helped topple the leadership of an
elected government 
flags a new political reality for East Timorese
citizens.

The Australian newspaper, leader of the anti-Alkatiri
charge, says his 
removal will be good news for Australian companies
wanting to do business 
in Dili. But Fretilin remains (by a long way) the
major party in 
Parliament. Rupert Murdochs flagship insists the
continuing crisis requires 
a semi-permanent Australian troop presence to block
what the paper calls a 
Marxist revolutionary government and because there is
no other way to keep 
the country from sliding back into chaos.

Other Australian commentators sympathetic to this line
are already 
muttering the need to abolish the countrys army.
Indeed, it seems that 
Xananas authority with a number of army commanders has
been undermined, as 
a result of his perceived sympathy with the
Reinado-led rebels. But 
abolition of the army would lead very quickly to calls
for the 
establishment of a permanent Australian military base
in East Timor, a 
major dilemma for a people who fought so hard for
independence.

Yet the chaos was in large part fostered by Australian
passive support for 
the rebels and hostility to the government; while the
Marxist revolution 
was a rather modest economic nationalism, led by
Alkatiri. I have explained 
in another article (Achievements of a Failed State)
the areas of tension 
with Australia, arising from an independent policy in
East Timor. Xanana 
has not expressed a distinct vision of development,
remaining concerned 
with reconciliation. Ramos Horta has expressed a wish
for closer relations 
with the US and Australia, and a greater privileging
of foreign investment. 
But there is no sign yet that Fretilin will abandon
the more independent 
course set by Alkatiri.

Herein lies the problem. An oligarchy of Australian
business leaders, who 
consistently opposed East Timorese independence,
pre-1999, have openly 
declared themselves hostile to the Fretilin-led
project. The Howard regime 
maintains public political correctness, concerning
East Timorese autonomy, 
but shares the hostility. This is a strategic
hostility, as much as 
opposition to any particular policy. But the
protectoratemindset certainly 
wants easier access to East Timorese resources,
greater privileging of 
foreign investment and a shift in national language
policy from 
Portuguese-Tetum to English-Tetum.

It seems likely that, even with Alkatiri sidelined, a
Fretilin-led 
government will maintain the strategy spelt out in a
National Development 
Plan and sectoral policies, and backed by the
Constitution. Alternatively 
(and if Murdochs scribblers have their way), a new
government might be 
persuaded to abandon its economic nationalist past,
and accept Australian 
protectorate status.

So what is the problem for a small country in taking
loans from the World 
Bank and becoming more western friendly? Isnt this a
legitimate way of 
attracting investment, improving governance and
reducing poverty? Lets 
examine this, in light of experience elsewhere.

The process begins with loans for essential
infrastructure, usually power 
and roads; and everyone has been complaining about
power and roads. The 
World Bank would loan money to the government at low
commercial interest or 
(in view of East Timors low GDP per capita) a very low
IDA loan at only 
0.7% interest over 35 years. This, at first glance,
seems generous. But 
strict conditions would be attached, in the form of a
good governance contract.

An important section of the good governance conditions
would stipulate 
that, while the loan is public, the construction and
service delivery would 
be private - a development partnership. This means
that large foreign 
companies would be contracted to construct the power
grid and roads, while 
others would meter and enforce a user pays power
supply regime. As the good 
governance agreement would also stipulates no price
subsidies, the only way 
poor families could access power would be by direct
fiscal subsidy. But the 
government has no spare cash, which is why it borrowed
in the first place.

Such partnership schemes have seen even water supplies
become unaffordable 
in major cities from The Philippines to Bolivia. The
small middle classes 
who can afford the fees might get a better service,
but the government will 
still have to intervene, to ensure quality and contain
the corruption that 
privatisations generate. Poor familiesaccess to water
or power would depend 
on their capacity to pay.

User pays regimes, urged by the Bank across all
services, damage access to 
education and health services. The evidence on this is
conclusive. 
Neoliberalism in the 1980s redefined the global
consensus on the right to 
education, so that only primary education is regarded
as a full right and 
is therefore subsidised in poor countries. Secondary
education, essential 
for social mobility but subject to user pays
principles, became 
unaffordable for the children of most poor families.
In oil rich but 
neoliberal Venezuela, in the late 1990s, only 20% of
children reached 
senior high school. More than half the children in
todays Bali, flush with 
tourist dollars, do not reach senior high school. This
is the pattern 
across the world. Neoliberal regimes have denied a
whole generation of poor 
children their future. With World Bank good
governance, secondary school 
enrolments in East Timor would go backwards.

Health services are linked to education. With no mass
training of health 
workers, services are scarce and expensive. Despite
three decades of 
Australian aid and World Bank programs, Papua New
Guinea has shocking 
infant and maternal mortality figures. There are
simply no doctors outside 
the provincial capitals. PNG has outstanding export
performance in oil, 
gas, gold, copper, and logs. Exports have remained
over 40% of PNGs GDP for 
two decades. But there has been no trickle down in
health benefits. If 
Australia and the World Bank displace the 100 Cuban
doctors in East Timor, 
and send off that nasty communist system that has
offered 600 free medical 
scholarships to young East Timorese, the countrys
health standards would 
match that of PNG.

Then there is agriculture and land, still at the core
of livelihoods for 
most poor people. The neoliberal preference here is
clear: export oriented 
cash crops and individual, saleable land title. This
is why the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, after the Asian Crisis
and under their 
structural adjustment programs, backed clear fell
logging (disregard their 
claims of sustainable forestry) and oil palm
development over more than 2 
million hectares in Indonesia; an environmental
catastrophe which has 
trampled on the land rights and livelihoods of forest
peoples. Abolition of 
rice and kerosene subsidies led to food riots in
Jakarta.

We can see the results of the neoliberal pattern in
Morocco, where land was 
some years ago rationalised for export crops. People
were driven off the 
land into the cities, and the subsistence sector was
damaged. Then European 
Union barriers to agricultural imports blocked
exports, and the country 
faced food shortages, for the first time.

In Peru under Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s, land
holdings under 10 
hectares were banned as agriculture was rationalised.
Thousands of small 
farmers were pushed into work for larger farmers, or
into coca production. 
Peru's production of cocaine doubled. In Lima, removal
of the subsidy on 
cooking fuel led to a cholera outbreak, causing 2000
deaths in six months 
when poor people could no longer afford to boil water
or food . In 1991 
more than 80% of Perus population were malnourished.

Public institutions, so important in defining the
identity of a new nation, 
are repeatedly blocked by neoliberal forces. Food
security was of deep 
concern to the East Timorese, when they went to the
World Bank in 2000, 
asking for help to rehabilitate their rice fields, to
strengthen their 
subsistence sector and to establish public grain
silos. The World Bank and 
Australia said no. Agricultural aid was only available
for export crops. 
East Timor was advised to import rice. Despite this,
the independent 
government proceeded to develop its rice industry,
without World Bank help.

This ideological commitment to export cash crops
explains sustained World 
Bank, ADB and Australian subsidies to the oil palm
industry in Papua New 
Guinea, even though this industry is dominated by
large foreign companies. 
Small farmers get few benefits from this industry, but
suffer substantial 
environmental costs. Infrastructure development is
also focussed on 
monoculture cash crops.

Often the promise of a transition to a western
friendly regime is 
accompanied by promises of aid and foreign investment,
which can bring 
wider benefits. But here many poor countries face the
Nicaraguan dilemma. 
After getting rid of the Sandinista government in 1990
(with guerilla war 
and economic blockade), the US reneged on its aid
promises and foreign 
investment failed to materialise. Just because
investors are offered 
tax-free access to a countrys resources, does not mean
they will come.

So why do the leaders of developing countries
participate in neoliberal 
programs, when they are so damaging for ordinary poor
people? One reason is 
that they have been obliged to cut political deals,
for independence. 
Maintaining the economic status quo, post-apartheid,
helps explain the 
mostly orthodox policies of South Africas ANC. A
second reason is 
inattentiveness, policy weakness and a desire to
accommodate the big powers 
- some elements of this are now visible in East Timor.
But very often 
leaders (such as Indonesias Suharto and Perus
Fujimori) enter a business 
elite themselves, taking commissions, rents and other
benefits from cashed 
up aid and privatisation programs.

The Australian role in undermining East Timorese
independence is difficult 
to see now, with a media barrage influencing the
desire to see ourselves as 
the little country saviours. We are nothing of the
sort. Australian friends 
of East Timor should recognise the shocking prospects
of neoliberal 
protectorate status, and maintain their support for an
independent nation.

Tim Anderson, pengajar ekonomi politik internasional
di University of Sidney
.

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