The New Yorker Magazine
Issue of 2006-08-21

Washington’s interests in Israel’s war

by SEYMOUR M. HERSH

In the days after Hezbollah crossed from Lebanon into
Israel, on July 12th, to kidnap two soldiers,
triggering an Israeli air attack on Lebanon and a
full-scale war, the Bush Administration seemed
strangely passive. “It’s a moment of clarification,”
President George W. Bush said at the G-8 summit, in
St. Petersburg, on July 16th. “It’s now become clear
why we don’t have peace in the Middle East.” He
described the relationship between Hezbollah and its
supporters in Iran and Syria as one of the “root
causes of instability,” and subsequently said that it
was up to those countries to end the crisis. Two days
later, despite calls from several governments for the
United States to take the lead in negotiations to end
the fighting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said
that a ceasefire should be put off until “the
conditions are conducive.”

The Bush Administration, however, was closely involved
in the planning of Israel’s retaliatory attacks.
President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney were
convinced, current and former intelligence and
diplomatic officials told me, that a successful
Israeli Air Force bombing campaign against Hezbollah’s
heavily fortified underground-missile and
command-and-control complexes in Lebanon could ease
Israel’s security concerns and also serve as a prelude
to a potential American preëmptive attack to destroy
Iran’s nuclear installations, some of which are also
buried deep underground.

Israeli military and intelligence experts I spoke to
emphasized that the country’s immediate security
issues were reason enough to confront Hezbollah,
regardless of what the Bush Administration wanted.
Shabtai Shavit, a national-security adviser to the
Knesset who headed the Mossad, Israel’s
foreign-intelligence service, from 1989 to 1996, told
me, “We do what we think is best for us, and if it
happens to meet America’s requirements, that’s just
part of a relationship between two friends. Hezbollah
is armed to the teeth and trained in the most advanced
technology of guerrilla warfare. It was just a matter
of time. We had to address it.”

Hezbollah is seen by Israelis as a profound threat—a
terrorist organization, operating on their border,
with a military arsenal that, with help from Iran and
Syria, has grown stronger since the Israeli occupation
of southern Lebanon ended, in 2000. Hezbollah’s
leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has said he does not
believe that Israel is a “legal state.” Israeli
intelligence estimated at the outset of the air war
that Hezbollah had roughly five hundred medium-range
Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets and a few dozen long-range
Zelzal rockets; the Zelzals, with a range of about two
hundred kilometres, could reach Tel Aviv. (One rocket
hit Haifa the day after the kidnappings.) It also has
more than twelve thousand shorter-range rockets. Since
the conflict began, more than three thousand of these
have been fired at Israel.

According to a Middle East expert with knowledge of
the current thinking of both the Israeli and the U.S.
governments, Israel had devised a plan for attacking
Hezbollah—and shared it with Bush Administration
officials—well before the July 12th kidnappings. “It’s
not that the Israelis had a trap that Hezbollah walked
into,” he said, “but there was a strong feeling in the
White House that sooner or later the Israelis were
going to do it.”

The Middle East expert said that the Administration
had several reasons for supporting the Israeli bombing
campaign. Within the State Department, it was seen as
a way to strengthen the Lebanese government so that it
could assert its authority over the south of the
country, much of which is controlled by Hezbollah. He
went on, “The White House was more focussed on
stripping Hezbollah of its missiles, because, if there
was to be a military option against Iran’s nuclear
facilities, it had to get rid of the weapons that
Hezbollah could use in a potential retaliation at
Israel. Bush wanted both. Bush was going after Iran,
as part of the Axis of Evil, and its nuclear sites,
and he was interested in going after Hezbollah as part
of his interest in democratization, with Lebanon as
one of the crown jewels of Middle East democracy.”

Administration officials denied that they knew of
Israel’s plan for the air war. The White House did not
respond to a detailed list of questions. In response
to a separate request, a National Security Council
spokesman said, “Prior to Hezbollah’s attack on
Israel, the Israeli government gave no official in
Washington any reason to believe that Israel was
planning to attack. Even after the July 12th attack,
we did not know what the Israeli plans were.” A
Pentagon spokesman said, “The United States government
remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the
problem of Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons
program,” and denied the story, as did a State
Department spokesman.

The United States and Israel have shared intelligence
and enjoyed close military coöperation for decades,
but early this spring, according to a former senior
intelligence official, high-level planners from the
U.S. Air Force—under pressure from the White House to
develop a war plan for a decisive strike against
Iran’s nuclear facilities—began consulting with their
counterparts in the Israeli Air Force.

“The big question for our Air Force was how to hit a
series of hard targets in Iran successfully,” the
former senior intelligence official said. “Who is the
closest ally of the U.S. Air Force in its planning?
It’s not Congo—it’s Israel. Everybody knows that
Iranian engineers have been advising Hezbollah on
tunnels and underground gun emplacements. And so the
Air Force went to the Israelis with some new tactics
and said to them, ‘Let’s concentrate on the bombing
and share what we have on Iran and what you have on
Lebanon.’ ” The discussions reached the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he
said.

“The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war with
many benefits,” a U.S. government consultant with
close ties to Israel said. “Why oppose it? We’ll be
able to hunt down and bomb missiles, tunnels, and
bunkers from the air. It would be a demo for Iran.”

A Pentagon consultant said that the Bush White House
“has been agitating for some time to find a reason for
a preëmptive blow against Hezbollah.” He added, “It
was our intent to have Hezbollah diminished, and now
we have someone else doing it.” (As this article went
to press, the United Nations Security Council passed a
ceasefire resolution, although it was unclear if it
would change the situation on the ground.)

According to Richard Armitage, who served as Deputy
Secretary of State in Bush’s first term—and who, in
2002, said that Hezbollah “may be the A team of
terrorists”—Israel’s campaign in Lebanon, which has
faced unexpected difficulties and widespread
criticism, may, in the end, serve as a warning to the
White House about Iran. “If the most dominant military
force in the region—the Israel Defense Forces—can’t
pacify a country like Lebanon, with a population of
four million, you should think carefully about taking
that template to Iran, with strategic depth and a
population of seventy million,” Armitage said. “The
only thing that the bombing has achieved so far is to
unite the population against the Israelis.”

Several current and former officials involved in the
Middle East told me that Israel viewed the soldiers’
kidnapping as the opportune moment to begin its
planned military campaign against Hezbollah.
“Hezbollah, like clockwork, was instigating something
small every month or two,” the U.S. government
consultant with ties to Israel said. Two weeks
earlier, in late June, members of Hamas, the
Palestinian group, had tunnelled under the barrier
separating southern Gaza from Israel and captured an
Israeli soldier. Hamas also had lobbed a series of
rockets at Israeli towns near the border with Gaza. In
response, Israel had initiated an extensive bombing
campaign and reoccupied parts of Gaza.

The Pentagon consultant noted that there had also been
cross-border incidents involving Israel and Hezbollah,
in both directions, for some time. “They’ve been
sniping at each other,” he said. “Either side could
have pointed to some incident and said ‘We have to go
to war with these guys’—because they were already at
war.”

David Siegel, the spokesman at the Israeli Embassy in
Washington, said that the Israeli Air Force had not
been seeking a reason to attack Hezbollah. “We did not
plan the campaign. That decision was forced on us.”
There were ongoing alerts that Hezbollah “was pressing
to go on the attack,” Siegel said. “Hezbollah attacks
every two or three months,” but the kidnapping of the
soldiers raised the stakes.

In interviews, several Israeli academics, journalists,
and retired military and intelligence officers all
made one point: they believed that the Israeli
leadership, and not Washington, had decided that it
would go to war with Hezbollah. Opinion polls showed
that a broad spectrum of Israelis supported that
choice. “The neocons in Washington may be happy, but
Israel did not need to be pushed, because Israel has
been wanting to get rid of Hezbollah,” Yossi Melman, a
journalist for the newspaper Ha’aretz, who has written
several books about the Israeli intelligence
community, said. “By provoking Israel, Hezbollah
provided that opportunity.”

“We were facing a dilemma,” an Israeli official said.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert “had to decide whether to
go for a local response, which we always do, or for a
comprehensive response—to really take on Hezbollah
once and for all.” Olmert made his decision, the
official said, only after a series of Israeli rescue
efforts failed.

The U.S. government consultant with close ties to
Israel told me, however, that, from Israel’s
perspective, the decision to take strong action had
become inevitable weeks earlier, after the Israeli
Army’s signals intelligence group, known as Unit 8200,
picked up bellicose intercepts in late spring and
early summer, involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and Khaled
Meshal, the Hamas leader now living in Damascus.

One intercept was of a meeting in late May of the
Hamas political and military leadership, with Meshal
participating by telephone. “Hamas believed the call
from Damascus was scrambled, but Israel had broken the
code,” the consultant said. For almost a year before
its victory in the Palestinian elections in January,
Hamas had curtailed its terrorist activities. In the
late May intercepted conversation, the consultant told
me, the Hamas leadership said that “they got no
benefit from it, and were losing standing among the
Palestinian population.” The conclusion, he said, was
“ ‘Let’s go back into the terror business and then try
and wrestle concessions from the Israeli government.’
” The consultant told me that the U.S. and Israel
agreed that if the Hamas leadership did so, and if
Nasrallah backed them up, there should be “a
full-scale response.” In the next several weeks, when
Hamas began digging the tunnel into Israel, the
consultant said, Unit 8200 “picked up signals
intelligence involving Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah,
saying, in essence, that they wanted Hezbollah to
‘warm up’ the north.” In one intercept, the consultant
said, Nasrallah referred to Olmert and Defense
Minister Amir Peretz “as seeming to be weak,” in
comparison with the former Prime Ministers Ariel
Sharon and Ehud Barak, who had extensive military
experience, and said “he thought Israel would respond
in a small-scale, local way, as they had in the past.”

Earlier this summer, before the Hezbollah kidnappings,
the U.S. government consultant said, several Israeli
officials visited Washington, separately, “to get a
green light for the bombing operation and to find out
how much the United States would bear.” The consultant
added, “Israel began with Cheney. It wanted to be sure
that it had his support and the support of his office
and the Middle East desk of the National Security
Council.” After that, “persuading Bush was never a
problem, and Condi Rice was on board,” the consultant
said.

The initial plan, as outlined by the Israelis, called
for a major bombing campaign in response to the next
Hezbollah provocation, according to the Middle East
expert with knowledge of U.S. and Israeli thinking.
Israel believed that, by targeting Lebanon’s
infrastructure, including highways, fuel depots, and
even the civilian runways at the main Beirut airport,
it could persuade Lebanon’s large Christian and Sunni
populations to turn against Hezbollah, according to
the former senior intelligence official. The airport,
highways, and bridges, among other things, have been
hit in the bombing campaign. The Israeli Air Force had
flown almost nine thousand missions as of last week.
(David Siegel, the Israeli spokesman, said that Israel
had targeted only sites connected to Hezbollah; the
bombing of bridges and roads was meant to prevent the
transport of weapons.)

The Israeli plan, according to the former senior
intelligence official, was “the mirror image of what
the United States has been planning for Iran.” (The
initial U.S. Air Force proposals for an air attack to
destroy Iran’s nuclear capacity, which included the
option of intense bombing of civilian infrastructure
targets inside Iran, have been resisted by the top
leadership of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps, according to current and former officials. They
argue that the Air Force plan will not work and will
inevitably lead, as in the Israeli war with Hezbollah,
to the insertion of troops on the ground.)

Uzi Arad, who served for more than two decades in the
Mossad, told me that to the best of his knowledge the
contacts between the Israeli and U.S. governments were
routine, and that, “in all my meetings and
conversations with government officials, never once
did I hear anyone refer to prior coördination with the
United States.” He was troubled by one issue—the speed
with which the Olmert government went to war. “For the
life of me, I’ve never seen a decision to go to war
taken so speedily,” he said. “We usually go through
long analyses.”

The key military planner was Lieutenant General Dan
Halutz, the I.D.F. chief of staff, who, during a
career in the Israeli Air Force, worked on contingency
planning for an air war with Iran. Olmert, a former
mayor of Jerusalem, and Peretz, a former labor leader,
could not match his experience and expertise.

In the early discussions with American officials, I
was told by the Middle East expert and the government
consultant, the Israelis repeatedly pointed to the war
in Kosovo as an example of what Israel would try to
achieve. The NATO forces commanded by U.S. Army
General Wesley Clark methodically bombed and strafed
not only military targets but tunnels, bridges, and
roads, in Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia, for
seventy-eight days before forcing Serbian forces to
withdraw from Kosovo. “Israel studied the Kosovo war
as its role model,” the government consultant said.
“The Israelis told Condi Rice, ‘You did it in about
seventy days, but we need half of that—thirty-five
days.’ ”

There are, of course, vast differences between Lebanon
and Kosovo. Clark, who retired from the military in
2000 and unsuccessfully ran as a Democrat for the
Presidency in 2004, took issue with the analogy: “If
it’s true that the Israeli campaign is based on the
American approach in Kosovo, then it missed the point.
Ours was to use force to obtain a diplomatic
objective—it was not about killing people.” Clark
noted in a 2001 book, “Waging Modern War,” that it was
the threat of a possible ground invasion as well as
the bombing that forced the Serbs to end the war. He
told me, “In my experience, air campaigns have to be
backed, ultimately, by the will and capability to
finish the job on the ground.”

Kosovo has been cited publicly by Israeli officials
and journalists since the war began. On August 6th,
Prime Minister Olmert, responding to European
condemnation of the deaths of Lebanese civilians,
said, “Where do they get the right to preach to
Israel? European countries attacked Kosovo and killed
ten thousand civilians. Ten thousand! And none of
these countries had to suffer before that from a
single rocket. I’m not saying it was wrong to
intervene in Kosovo. But please: don’t preach to us
about the treatment of civilians.” (Human Rights Watch
estimated the number of civilians killed in the NATO
bombing to be five hundred; the Yugoslav government
put the number between twelve hundred and five
thousand.)

Cheney’s office supported the Israeli plan, as did
Elliott Abrams, a deputy national-security adviser,
according to several former and current officials. (A
spokesman for the N.S.C. denied that Abrams had done
so.) They believed that Israel should move quickly in
its air war against Hezbollah. A former intelligence
officer said, “We told Israel, ‘Look, if you guys have
to go, we’re behind you all the way. But we think it
should be sooner rather than later—the longer you
wait, the less time we have to evaluate and plan for
Iran before Bush gets out of office.’ ”

Cheney’s point, the former senior intelligence
official said, was “What if the Israelis execute their
part of this first, and it’s really successful? It’d
be great. We can learn what to do in Iran by watching
what the Israelis do in Lebanon.”

The Pentagon consultant told me that intelligence
about Hezbollah and Iran is being mishandled by the
White House the same way intelligence had been when,
in 2002 and early 2003, the Administration was making
the case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.
“The big complaint now in the intelligence community
is that all of the important stuff is being sent
directly to the top—at the insistence of the White
House—and not being analyzed at all, or scarcely,” he
said. “It’s an awful policy and violates all of the
N.S.A.’s strictures, and if you complain about it
you’re out,” he said. “Cheney had a strong hand in
this.”

The long-term Administration goal was to help set up a
Sunni Arab coalition—including countries like Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt—that would join the United
States and Europe to pressure the ruling Shiite
mullahs in Iran. “But the thought behind that plan was
that Israel would defeat Hezbollah, not lose to it,”
the consultant with close ties to Israel said. Some
officials in Cheney’s office and at the N.S.C. had
become convinced, on the basis of private talks, that
those nations would moderate their public criticism of
Israel and blame Hezbollah for creating the crisis
that led to war. Although they did so at first, they
shifted their position in the wake of public protests
in their countries about the Israeli bombing. The
White House was clearly disappointed when, late last
month, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign
minister, came to Washington and, at a meeting with
Bush, called for the President to intervene
immediately to end the war. The Washington Post
reported that Washington had hoped to enlist moderate
Arab states “in an effort to pressure Syria and Iran
to rein in Hezbollah, but the Saudi move . . . seemed
to cloud that initiative.”

The surprising strength of Hezbollah’s resistance, and
its continuing ability to fire rockets into northern
Israel in the face of the constant Israeli bombing,
the Middle East expert told me, “is a massive setback
for those in the White House who want to use force in
Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create
internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set
back.”

Nonetheless, some officers serving with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff remain deeply concerned that the
Administration will have a far more positive
assessment of the air campaign than they should, the
former senior intelligence official said. “There is no
way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will draw the right
conclusion about this,” he said. “When the smoke
clears, they’ll say it was a success, and they’ll draw
reinforcement for their plan to attack Iran.”

In the White House, especially in the Vice-President’s
office, many officials believe that the military
campaign against Hezbollah is working and should be
carried forward. At the same time, the government
consultant said, some policymakers in the
Administration have concluded that the cost of the
bombing to Lebanese society is too high. “They are
telling Israel that it’s time to wind down the attacks
on infrastructure.”

Similar divisions are emerging in Israel. David
Siegel, the Israeli spokesman, said that his country’s
leadership believed, as of early August, that the air
war had been successful, and had destroyed more than
seventy per cent of Hezbollah’s medium- and
long-range-missile launching capacity. “The problem is
short-range missiles, without launchers, that can be
shot from civilian areas and homes,” Siegel told me.
“The only way to resolve this is ground
operations—which is why Israel would be forced to
expand ground operations if the latest round of
diplomacy doesn’t work.” Last week, however, there was
evidence that the Israeli government was troubled by
the progress of the war. In an unusual move, Major
General Moshe Kaplinsky, Halutz’s deputy, was put in
charge of the operation, supplanting Major General Udi
Adam. The worry in Israel is that Nasrallah might
escalate the crisis by firing missiles at Tel Aviv.
“There is a big debate over how much damage Israel
should inflict to prevent it,” the consultant said.
“If Nasrallah hits Tel Aviv, what should Israel do?
Its goal is to deter more attacks by telling Nasrallah
that it will destroy his country if he doesn’t stop,
and to remind the Arab world that Israel can set it
back twenty years. We’re no longer playing by the same
rules.”

A European intelligence officer told me, “The Israelis
have been caught in a psychological trap. In earlier
years, they had the belief that they could solve their
problems with toughness. But now, with Islamic
martyrdom, things have changed, and they need
different answers. How do you scare people who love
martyrdom?” The problem with trying to eliminate
Hezbollah, the intelligence officer said, is the
group’s ties to the Shiite population in southern
Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern
suburbs, where it operates schools, hospitals, a radio
station, and various charities.

A high-level American military planner told me, “We
have a lot of vulnerability in the region, and we’ve
talked about some of the effects of an Iranian or
Hezbollah attack on the Saudi regime and on the oil
infrastructure.” There is special concern inside the
Pentagon, he added, about the oil-producing nations
north of the Strait of Hormuz. “We have to anticipate
the unintended consequences,” he told me. “Will we be
able to absorb a barrel of oil at one hundred dollars?
There is this almost comical thinking that you can do
it all from the air, even when you’re up against an
irregular enemy with a dug-in capability. You’re not
going to be successful unless you have a ground
presence, but the political leadership never considers
the worst case. These guys only want to hear the best
case.”

There is evidence that the Iranians were expecting the
war against Hezbollah. Vali Nasr, an expert on Shiite
Muslims and Iran, who is a fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations and also teaches at the Naval
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, said,
“Every negative American move against Hezbollah was
seen by Iran as part of a larger campaign against it.
And Iran began to prepare for the showdown by
supplying more sophisticated weapons to
Hezbollah—anti-ship and anti-tank missiles—and
training its fighters in their use. And now Hezbollah
is testing Iran’s new weapons. Iran sees the Bush
Administration as trying to marginalize its regional
role, so it fomented trouble.”

Nasr, an Iranian-American who recently published a
study of the Sunni-Shiite divide, entitled “The Shia
Revival,” also said that the Iranian leadership
believes that Washington’s ultimate political goal is
to get some international force to act as a buffer—to
physically separate Syria and Lebanon in an effort to
isolate and disarm Hezbollah, whose main supply route
is through Syria. “Military action cannot bring about
the desired political result,” Nasr said. The
popularity of Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a
virulent critic of Israel, is greatest in his own
country. If the U.S. were to attack Iran’s nuclear
facilities, Nasr said, “you may end up turning
Ahmadinejad into another Nasrallah—the rock star of
the Arab street.”

Donald Rumsfeld, who is one of the Bush
Administration’s most outspoken, and powerful,
officials, has said very little publicly about the
crisis in Lebanon. His relative quiet, compared to his
aggressive visibility in the run-up to the Iraq war,
has prompted a debate in Washington about where he
stands on the issue.

Some current and former intelligence officials who
were interviewed for this article believe that
Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and Cheney about the
American role in the war between Israel and Hezbollah.
The U.S. government consultant with close ties to
Israel said that “there was a feeling that Rumsfeld
was jaded in his approach to the Israeli war.” He
added, “Air power and the use of a few Special Forces
had worked in Afghanistan, and he tried to do it again
in Iraq. It was the same idea, but it didn’t work. He
thought that Hezbollah was too dug in and the Israeli
attack plan would not work, and the last thing he
wanted was another war on his shift that would put the
American forces in Iraq in greater jeopardy.”

A Western diplomat said that he understood that
Rumsfeld did not know all the intricacies of the war
plan. “He is angry and worried about his troops” in
Iraq, the diplomat said. Rumsfeld served in the White
House during the last year of the war in Vietnam, from
which American troops withdrew in 1975, “and he did
not want to see something like this having an impact
in Iraq.” Rumsfeld’s concern, the diplomat added, was
that an expansion of the war into Iran could put the
American troops in Iraq at greater risk of attacks by
pro-Iranian Shiite militias.

At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on August
3rd, Rumsfeld was less than enthusiastic about the
war’s implications for the American troops in Iraq.
Asked whether the Administration was mindful of the
war’s impact on Iraq, he testified that, in his
meetings with Bush and Condoleezza Rice, “there is a
sensitivity to the desire to not have our country or
our interests or our forces put at greater risk as a
result of what’s taking place between Israel and
Hezbollah. . . . There are a variety of risks that we
face in that region, and it’s a difficult and delicate
situation.”

The Pentagon consultant dismissed talk of a split at
the top of the Administration, however, and said
simply, “Rummy is on the team. He’d love to see
Hezbollah degraded, but he also is a voice for less
bombing and more innovative Israeli ground
operations.” The former senior intelligence official
similarly depicted Rumsfeld as being “delighted that
Israel is our stalking horse.”

There are also questions about the status of
Condoleezza Rice. Her initial support for the Israeli
air war against Hezbollah has reportedly been tempered
by dismay at the effects of the attacks on Lebanon.
The Pentagon consultant said that in early August she
began privately “agitating” inside the Administration
for permission to begin direct diplomatic talks with
Syria—so far, without much success. Last week, the
Times reported that Rice had directed an Embassy
official in Damascus to meet with the Syrian foreign
minister, though the meeting apparently yielded no
results. The Times also reported that Rice viewed
herself as “trying to be not only a peacemaker abroad
but also a mediator among contending parties” within
the Administration. The article pointed to a divide
between career diplomats in the State Department and
“conservatives in the government,” including Cheney
and Abrams, “who were pushing for strong American
support for Israel.”

The Western diplomat told me his embassy believes that
Abrams has emerged as a key policymaker on Iran, and
on the current Hezbollah-Israeli crisis, and that
Rice’s role has been relatively diminished. Rice did
not want to make her most recent diplomatic trip to
the Middle East, the diplomat said. “She only wanted
to go if she thought there was a real chance to get a
ceasefire.”

Bush’s strongest supporter in Europe continues to be
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, but many in Blair’s
own Foreign Office, as a former diplomat said, believe
that he has “gone out on a particular limb on
this”—especially by accepting Bush’s refusal to seek
an immediate and total ceasefire between Israel and
Hezbollah. “Blair stands alone on this,” the former
diplomat said. “He knows he’s a lame duck who’s on the
way out, but he buys it”—the Bush policy. “He drinks
the White House Kool-Aid as much as anybody in
Washington.” The crisis will really start at the end
of August, the diplomat added, “when the
Iranians”—under a United Nations deadline to stop
uranium enrichment—“will say no.”

Even those who continue to support Israel’s war
against Hezbollah agree that it is failing to achieve
one of its main goals—to rally the Lebanese against
Hezbollah. “Strategic bombing has been a failed
military concept for ninety years, and yet air forces
all over the world keep on doing it,” John Arquilla, a
defense analyst at the Naval Postgraduate School, told
me. Arquilla has been campaigning for more than a
decade, with growing success, to change the way
America fights terrorism. “The warfare of today is not
mass on mass,” he said. “You have to hunt like a
network to defeat a network. Israel focussed on
bombing against Hezbollah, and, when that did not
work, it became more aggressive on the ground. The
definition of insanity is continuing to do the same
thing and expecting a different result.”

------------------------------------------
Joyo Indonesia News Service
------------------------------------------


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