Sdr Yap Hong Gie menulis (di milis tetangga): "Geopolitik Pejuang Integrasi versus Tentara Bayaran dimata PBB"
"Pada konflik bersenjata di Tim-Tim (1999), pejuang pro-Integrasi berhadapanan dengan milisi pro-Kemerdekaan. Saat ini, Eurico Guterres; menjalani hukuman 10 tahun penjara atas pelanggaran HAM berat. Pelanggaran HAM berat hanya berlaku bagi milisia negara dunia ketiga, sedangkan mercenary army AS. "Blackwater", yang menembaki penduduk sipil,kebal hukum; tidak terjamah hukum perang militer dan juga bukan masuk juridiksi AS." Catatan saya: Komentar pendek Hong Gie menarik, ada benarnya, ada salahnya.Pertama, Hong Gie mengacaubalaukan konsep "milisia". Kedua, Hong Gie ber- komentar sangat selektif (cuma Eurico). Ketiga, komentar Hong Gie berkaitan dengan ulah Blackwater-nya Amerika di Irak (dalam artikel yang disusulkannya - lihat bawah) memprotes mengapa Amerika tidak digugat pelanggaran HAM berat. Di sini dia benar, tapi berarti dia harus konsekuen: implikasinya, dalam hal Indonesia, adalah Hong Gie harus menggugat Soeharto. Pertama, soal "milisia". Inti konsep ini adalah kekuatan sipil yang dipersenjatai institusi militer dan berfungsi sebagai kekuatan "proxy" (alat pengganti). Tapi Hong Gie memutarbalik perkara sejarah. Eurico disebutnya "pejuang pro-integrasi", sedangkan lawannya disebut "milisi pro-kemerdekaan". Eurico adalah anggota milisia yang menjadi alat angkatan bersenjata negara (ini ditegaskan dokumen PBB), sedangkan kekuatan pro-kemerdekaan bukan "milisi", melainkan gerilya atau kekuatan sipil (tak bersenjata) yang bergerak klandestin. Gerilyanya adalah Falintil (di bawah CNRT) dan klandestin adalah kekuatan mahasiswa dan pelajar. Persis serupa dengan gerakan pro-kemerdekaan Indonesia. Mereka bukan milisi yang menjadi alat tentara, melainkan embryo tentara negara merdeka. Memutarbalik istilah bisa menjebak Hong Gie: akankah dia menyebut Laskar Hisbullah, Pemuda Sosialis, Tentara Pelajar dsb itu sebagai "milisia"? Kedua, Hong Gie memilih menyebut Eurico Guterres, tapi melupakan bos bosnya di Dili dan di Jakarta. Wah ini Anda menghina bangsa tetangga, bangsa Timor Leste. Dokumen pengamat, PBB mau pun sumber sumber lain, termasuk saya selaku saksi mata, menunjukkan ABRI sebagai bos dari para milisia TimTim tsb. Ketiga, Hong Gie menggugat mengapa Amerika, dalam drama Blackwater di Irak, menikmati impunitas, sedangkan Eurico tidak? Benar, Hong Gie, Amerika pun harus digugat. Tapi kita, saya dan Anda, pun harus konsekuen. Artinya bos bosnya Eurico pun harus digugat. Siapa penanggungjawab kekerasan di Timor Leste 1999? Pelajari baik baik dokumen dokumen dan kesaksian yang ada (kalau tak sabar nunggu buku saya), maka Anda akan tiba pada Mijnheer Wir (Menhan/Pangab), Jenderal Feisal Tanjung (Menko Polkam) dan mungkin juga, ini baru kemungkinan, Presiden B.J. Habibie. Hanya dalam hal Habibie saya harus mencatat beliau adalah tokoh Orde baru yang saya hormati karena beliau menghormati hak hak penentuan nasib sendiri bangsa lain, in casu bangsa Timor Leste, apa pun alasan politik Habibie waktu itu. Jadi, Hong Gie, silahkan gugat Presiden Amerika yang bertanggungjawab atas operasi Blackwater, tapi harus gugat juga mijnheer Wir, dan mijnheer Feisal. Akan lebih terpuji, terhormat, dan konsekuen apabila sdr. Yap Hong Gie menarik garis logis yang konsekuen, yaitu, bertanyalah: siapakah penanggungjawab Orde Baru yang menyulut petualangan di Timor Leste (sejak 1974) yang akhirnya berekor pada kekerasan 1999? Lhaa, siapa lagi Bung, kalau bukan Soeharto. Ini penting, bukan stereotip atau sloganistis. Banyak warga Tionghoa hanya bicara soal Tragedi Mei 1998, lupa tragedi lain. Seperti juga: banyak korban 1965 hanya bicara tragedi 1965-66, lupa, kurang peduli tragedi yang lain. Contohnya: banyak korban 1965 di dalam dan luar negeri kurang peduli soal TimTim (dengan 4 kekecualian penting: Emiel, Umar Said di Paris, Liem SL dan Carmel Budiardjo di London, yang sejak mula mengangkat soal TimTim). Banyak korban 1965 juga tenggelam dalam lautan nasionalisme NKRI yang militaristik. Kalau Anda tegur mereka soal ini, Anda akan di-cap "separatis". Padahal tragedi TimTim mempermalukan Indonesia, menghancurkan tradisi politik luar negeri bebas aktif di bawah Soekarno dan merusak solidaritas Asia-Afrika yang digembargemborkan kaum nasionalis dari kanan sampai kiri. Singkatnya: orang menjadi nasionalis(-militaristik), tapi gagal menjadi patriot. Anehnya, ketika saya menghadiri kremasi alm. Sobron Aidit, februari lalu di Paris, untuk menghormati almarhum yang saya anggap patriot dan sohib, seorang penyair tenar Amsterdam, Heri Latif, masih juga menyumpahi saya sebagai "separatis" (padahal saya penggemar dan tetap nyobat dengan penyair satu ini). Nah, Hong Gie, sebagai teman, dengan cerita di atas, saya ingin mengusulkan sebuah peluang bagus yang muncul dengan posting Anda tsb, yaitu, jadilah patriot, gugatlah bos-nya Blackwater, gugatlah bos-bos- nya milisia sejenis Eurico, dan, last but most important, gugatlah Soeharto! Percayalah, kalau Anda lakukan semua itu, saya akan dukung Anda sepenuhnya! Salam, tetap sbg teman, sampai jumpa di Jakarta, Tossi AS --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Yap Hong Gie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Geopolitik Pejuang Integrasi versus Tentara Bayaran dimata PBB > > Pada konflik bersenjata di Tim-Tim (1999), pejuang pro-Integrasi > berhadapanan dengan milisi pro-Kemerdekaan. > Saat ini, Eurico Guterres; menjalani hukuman 10 tahun penjara atas > pelanggaran HAM berat. > > Pelanggaran HAM berat hanya berlaku bagi milisia negara dunia ketiga, > sedangkan mercenary army AS. "Blackwater", yang menembaki penduduk sipil, > kebal hukum; tidak terjamah hukum perang militer dan juga bukan masuk > juridiksi AS. > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > Strategic Forecasting, Inc. > GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT > 10.09.2007 > > The Geopolitical Foundations of Blackwater > By George Friedman > > For the past three weeks, Blackwater, a private security firm under contract > to the U.S. State Department, has been under intense scrutiny over its > operations in Iraq. The Blackwater controversy has highlighted the use of > civilians for what appears to be combat or near-combat missions in Iraq. > Moreover, it has raised two important questions: Who controls these private > forces and to whom are they accountable? > > The issue is neither unique to Blackwater nor to matters of combat. There > have long been questions about the role of Halliburton and its former > subsidiary, KBR, in providing support services to the military. The Iraq war > has been fought with fewer active-duty troops than might have been expected, > and a larger number of contractors relative to the number of troops. But how > was the decision made in the first place to use U.S. nongovernmental > personnel in a war zone? More important, how has that decision been > implemented? > > The United States has a long tradition of using private contractors in times > of war. For example, it augmented its naval power in the early 19th century > by contracting with privateers -- nongovernmental ships -- to carry out > missions at sea. During the battle for Wake Island in 1941, U.S. contractors > building an airstrip there were trapped by the Japanese fleet, and many > fought alongside Marines and naval personnel. During the Civil War, > civilians who accompanied the Union and Confederate armies carried out many > of the supply functions. So, on one level, there is absolutely nothing new > here. This has always been how the United States fights war. > > Nevertheless, since before the fall of the Soviet Union, a systematic shift > has been taking place in the way the U.S. force structure is designed. This > shift, which is rooted both in military policy and in the geopolitical > perception that future wars will be fought on a number of levels, made > private security contractors such as KBR and Blackwater inevitable. The > current situation is the result of three unique processes: the introduction > of the professional volunteer military, the change in force structure after > the Cold War, and finally the rethinking and redefinition of the term > "noncombatant" following the decision to include women in the military, but > bar them from direct combat roles. > > The introduction of the professional volunteer military caused a rethinking > of the role of the soldier, sailor, airman or Marine in the armed forces. > Volunteers were part of the military because they chose to be. Unlike > draftees, they had other options. During World War II and the first half of > the Cold War, the military was built around draftees who were going to serve > their required hitch and return to civilian life. Although many were not > highly trained, they were quite suited for support roles, from KP to > policing the grounds. After all, they already were on the payroll, and new > hires were always possible. > > In a volunteer army, the troops are expected to remain in the military much > longer. Their training is more expensive -- thus their value is higher. > Taking trained specialists who are serving at their own pleasure and forcing > them to do menial labor over an extended period of time makes little sense > either from a utilization or morale point of view. The concept emerged that > the military's maintenance work should shift to civilians, and that in many > cases the work should be outsourced to contractors. This tendency was > reinforced during the Reagan administration, which, given its ideology, > supported privatization as a way to make the volunteer army work. The result > was a growth in the number of contractors taking over many of the duties > that had been performed by soldiers during the years of conscription. > > The second impetus was the end of the Cold War and a review carried out by > then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin under then-President Bill Clinton. The > core argument was that it was irrational to maintain a standing military as > large as had existed during the Cold War. Aspin argued for a more intensely > technological military, one that would be less dependent on ground troops. > The Air Force was key to this, while the Navy was downsized. The main > consideration, however, was the structure of the standing Army -- especially > when large-scale, high-intensity, long-term warfare no longer seemed a > likely scenario. > > The U.S. Army's active-duty component, in particular, was reduced. It was > assumed that in time of war, components of the Reserves and National Guard > would be mobilized, not so much to augment the standing military, but to > carry out a range of specialized roles. For example, Civil Affairs, which > has proven to be a critical specialization in Iraq and Afghanistan, was made > a primary responsibility of the Reserves and National Guard, as were many > engineering, military-intelligence and other specializations. > > This plan was built around certain geopolitical assumptions. The first was > that the United States would not be fighting peer powers. The second was > that it had learned from Vietnam not to get involved in open-ended > counterinsurgency operations, but to focus, as it did in Kuwait, on missions > that were clearly defined and executable with a main force. The last was > that wars would be short, use relatively few troops and be carried out in > conjunction with allies. From this it followed that regular forces, > augmented by Reserve/National Guard specialists called up for short terms, > could carry out national strategic requirements. > > The third impetus was the struggle to define military combat and noncombat > roles. Given the nature of the volunteer force, women were badly needed, yet > they were included in the armed forces under the assumption that they could > carry out any function apart from direct combat assignments. This caused a > forced -- and strained -- redefinition of these two roles. Intelligence > officers called to interrogate a prisoner on the battlefield were thought > not to be in a combat position. The same bomb, mortar or rocket fire that > killed a soldier might hit them too, but since they technically were not > charged with shooting back, they were not combat arms. Ironically, in Iraq, > one of the most dangerous tasks is traveling on the roads, though moving > supplies is not considered a combat mission. > > Under the privatization concept, civilians could be hired to carry out > noncombat functions. Under the redefinition of noncombat, the area open to > contractors covered a lot of territory. Moreover, under the redefinition of > the military in the 1990s, the size and structure of the Army in particular > was changed so dramatically that it could not carry out most of its > functions without the Reserve/Guard component -- and even with that > component, the Army was not large enough. Contractors were needed. > > Let us now add a fourth push: the CIA. During Vietnam, and again in > Afghanistan and Iraq, a good part of the war was prosecuted by CIA personnel > not in uniform and not answerable to the military chain of command. There > are arguments on both sides for this, but the fact is that U.S. wars -- > particularly highly politicized wars such as counterinsurgencies -- are > fought with parallel armies, some reporting to the Defense Department, > others to the CIA and other intelligence agencies. The battlefield is, if > not flooded, at least full of civilians operating outside of the chain of > command, and these civilian government employees are encouraged to hire > Iraqi or other nationals, as well as to augment their own capabilities with > private U.S. contractors. > > Blackwater works for the State Department in a capacity defined as > noncombat, protecting diplomats and other high-value personnel from > assassination. The Army, bogged down in its own operations, lacks the > manpower to perform this obviously valuable work. That means that Blackwater > and other contract workers are charged with carrying weapons and moving > around the battlefield, which is everywhere. They are heavily armed private > soldiers carrying out missions that are combat in all but name -- and they > are completely outside of the chain of command. > > Moreover, in order to be effective, they have to engage in protective > intelligence, looking for surveillance by enemy combatants and trying to > foresee potential threats. We suspect the CIA could be helpful in this > regard, but it would want information in return. In order to perform its > job, then, Blackwater entered the economy of intelligence -- information as > a commodity to be exchanged. It had to gather some intelligence in order to > trade some. As a result, the distinction between combat and support > completely broke down. > > The important point is that the U.S. military went to war with the Army the > country gave it. We recall no great objections to the downsizing of the > military in the 1990s, and no criticisms of the concepts that lay behind the > new force structure. The volunteer force, downsized because long- term > conflicts were not going to occur, supported by the Reserve/Guard and > backfilled by civilian contractors, was not a controversial issue. Only > tiresome cranks made waves, challenging the idea that wars would be sparse > and short. They objected to the redefinition of noncombat roles and said the > downsized force would be insufficient for the 21st century. > > Blackwater, KBR and all the rest are the direct result of the faulty > geopolitical assumptions and the force structure decisions that followed. > The primary responsibility rests with the American public, which made > best-case assumptions in a worst-case world. Even without Iraq, civilian > contractors would have proliferated on the battlefield. With Iraq, they > became an enormous force. Perhaps the single greatest strategic error of the > Bush administration was not fundamentally re-examining the assumptions about > the U.S. Army on Sept. 12, 2001. Clearly Donald Rumsfeld was of the view > that the Army was the problem, not the solution. He was not going to push > for a larger force and, therefore, as the war expanded, for fewer civilian > contractors. > > The central problem regarding private security contractors on the > battlefield is that their place in the chain of command is not defined. They > report to the State Department, not to the Army and Marines that own the > battlefield. But who do they take orders from and who defines their mission? > Do they operate under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or under some > other rule? They are warriors -- it is foolish to think otherwise -- but > they do not wear the uniform. The problem with Blackwater stems from having > multiple forces fighting for the same side on the same battlefield, with > completely different chains of command. Indeed, it is not clear the extent > to which the State Department has created a command structure for its > contractors, whether it is capable of doing so, or whether the contractors > have created their own chain of command. > > Blackwater is the logical outcome of a set of erroneous geopolitical > conclusions that predate these wars by more than a decade. The United States > will be fighting multidivisional, open-ended wars in multiple theaters, and > there will be counterinsurgencies. The force created in the 1990s is > insufficient, and thus the definition of noncombat specialty has become > meaningless. The Reserve/Guard component cannot fill the gap created by > strategic errors. The hiring of contractors makes sense and has precedence. > But the use of CIA personnel outside the military chain of command creates > enough stress. To have private contractors reporting outside the chain of > command to government entities not able to command them is the real problem. > > A failure that is rooted in the national consensus of the 1990s was > compounded by the Bush administration's failure to reshape the military for > the realities of the wars it wished to fight. But the final failure was to > follow the logic of the civilian contractors through to its end, but not > include them in the unified chain of command. In war, the key question must > be this: Who gives orders and who takes them? The battlefield is dangerous > enough without that question left hanging. >
