Economics focus: Policing the frontiers of finance
Apr 10th 2008
>From The Economist print edition 
>http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11016324 
 
Is foreign capital a luxury that poor countries can live without?
 
WHEN Hank Paulson, America’s treasury secretary, urged China to liberalise its 
capital markets earlier this month, he sensed a hardened reluctance in his 
hosts. “There’s no doubt that what is happening in the US markets is clearly 
giving the Chinese pause,” he said. America’s subprime meltdown is not, it 
seems, the best advertisement for unfettered finance elsewhere.
Against this backdrop, Dani Rodrik of Harvard University and Arvind Subramanian 
of the Peterson Institute, in Washington, DC, have published a timely 
reappraisal of financial globalisation.* They conclude that it is far from 
obvious that developing countries benefit much from opening up to global 
capital. In principle, the free flow of capital across borders makes funds 
available more cheaply to poor countries and, by lifting investment, boosts GDP 
and raises living standards. The trouble is, economists have struggled to 
establish a strong link between freer capital flows and speedier economic 
development.
That has not stopped researchers from looking, and many believe a tangible 
connection will soon be found. Perhaps the effect is not picked up in studies 
because capital flows are hard to measure accurately, argue the optimists. 
Messrs Rodrik and Subramanian are not convinced: measurement error bedevils 
many studies, but that has not barred researchers from establishing that 
policies to improve education or trade are good for growth.
Perhaps foreign capital helps indirectly—by disciplining policymakers or by 
promoting reforms that improve the financial system. The authors say it is 
possible to make the opposite argument and find indirect costs. Plausibly, 
lifting restrictions on capital flows could undermine the domestic financial 
system because spendthrift governments can tap a larger pool of funds abroad. 
Also, the well-off have less incentive to lobby for reforms at home if they are 
free to store their wealth overseas.
Perhaps, then, the gains from globalised finance are latent and will be 
unleashed once catalysing reforms are in place? Maybe they will. But the wish 
list of complementary measures is difficult to tick off. Economies might reap 
the benefits of foreign capital more fully if property rights were stronger, 
contracts were more enforceable, and if there were less corruption and 
financial cronyism. But the authors point out that if poor countries could 
carry out such ambitious reforms “they would no longer be poor” and financial 
globalisation would be “a clearly dispensable sideshow”. With so much else to 
do first, liberalising capital flows would not be an obvious policy priority.
Foreign capital ought to be good for countries that have profitable ventures 
that lack funding because of low savings at home. But Messrs Rodrik and 
Subramanian argue that for many countries, it is not low savings but a shortage 
of good investments that is the binding constraint. Weak property rights, 
poorly enforced contracts and the fear that profits will be siphoned away make 
it hard to conceive of ventures that might generate a reliable return. When 
investment opportunities are scarce, capital inflows simply displace domestic 
savings and encourage consumption.
Cheap exports, not cheap money
Whatever their misgivings about cosmopolitan capital, the authors do not deny 
that deeper financial markets in general help to foster prosperity. Even in 
economies short of good investment projects, a sturdier channel connecting 
domestic savers and borrowers will help growth. The more domestic savings can 
be put to work, the less need is there for foreign capital, and using local 
funds helps keep the exchange rate down and promotes export growth. By 
contrast, encouraging foreign capital to flood in can put upward pressure on 
the exchange rate, making exports less competitive. In some circumstances, 
capital controls may be justified if they keep the currency cheap and promote 
growth.
Why do the authors make such a strong case for export-led growth as a means to 
development in poor countries, even if it is at the expense of more open 
capital markets? First, they believe, exports are a force for institutional 
reform. A firm making clothes to sell abroad demands consistent state 
regulation, reliable transport links and enforceable contracts with suppliers 
to a degree that a barbershop serving the domestic market does not. Second, 
exporters foster skills, technology and expertise that can fruitfully spill 
over to other enterprises.
Messrs Rodrik and Subramanian conclude that with the benefits of liberalised 
finance under the microscope in rich countries, it is time for more subtle 
thinking about the global picture. “Depending on context and country,” they 
write, “the appropriate role of policy will be as often to stem the tide of 
capital flows as to encourage them.”
That bold conclusion leaves some troubling issues unresolved. As China’s 
experience suggests, keeping the exchange rate weak in support of export-led 
growth becomes harder to sustain over time. Nor is it easy to keep foreign 
capital out. Capital controls can be evaded by adjusting trade invoices: 
exporters can bring funds in secretly by over-invoicing for foreign sales. The 
authorities can use sterilised intervention to stop inflows pushing the 
exchange rate up, but this imposes its own costs on the economy—in terms of 
higher interest rates or a distorted allocation of credit.
It is possible too that over time capital inflows are becoming less risky and 
the collateral benefits more tangible. And more stable direct investments 
account for an increasing share of capital inflows. Countries will ultimately 
have to come to terms with global capital and the choice is not only whether to 
embrace or resist it. There is a third option: find ways to manage it. After 
all, few would now argue that financial progress should not be policed at all.
 




* Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian, “Why Did Financial Globalisation 
Disappoint?”, March 2008. 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Why_Did_FG_Disappoint_March_24_2008.pdf 

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