Role of Alleged CIA Asset in Mumbai Attacks Being Downplayed
 
Recent press reports on developments with regard to last month’s attacks in 
Mumbai, India indicate the role of Dawood Ibrahim, a wanted crime boss, 
terrorist, and drug trafficker, is being downplayed, possibly the result of a 
deal taking place behind the scenes between the governments of the US, 
Pakistan, and India, to have others involved in the Mumbai attacks turned over 
while quietly diverting attention from a man who some say could reveal 
embarrassing secrets about the CIA’s involvement in criminal enterprises.
 
December 10, 2008
 
by Jeremy R. Hammond
 
The role in the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last month of an underworld kingpin 
that heads an organization known as D-Company, has known ties to Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and who is alleged to have ties with the CIA 
is apparently being whitewashed, suggesting that his capture and handover to 
India might prove inconvenient for either the ISI or the CIA, or both.
 
It was Dawood Ibrahim who was initially characterized by press reports as being 
the mastermind behind the attacks. Now, that title of “mastermind” is being 
given to Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi by numerous media accounts reporting that 
Pakistan security forces have raided a training camp of the group 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which evidence has indicated was behind the attacks. 
Lakhvi was reportedly captured in the raid and is now in custody.
 
At the same time Ibrahim’s role is being downplayed, Lakhvi’s known role is 
being exaggerated. Initial reports described him as the training specialist for 
LeT, but the major media outlets like the New York Times and the London Times, 
citing government sources, have since promoted his status to that of commander 
of operations for the group.
 
The only terrorist from the Mumbai attacks to be captured alive, Azam Amir 
Kasab, characterized Ibrahim, not Lakhvi, as the mastermind of those attacks, 
according to earlier press accounts. 
 
Kasab reportedly told his interrogators that he and his fellow terrorists were 
trained under Lakhvi, also known as “Chacha”, at a camp in Pakistan. Indian 
officials also traced calls from a satellite phone used by the terrorists to 
Lakhvi.
 
But the phone had also been used to call Yusuf Muzammil, also known as Abu 
Yusuf, Abu Hurrera, and “Yahah”. And it has been Muzammil, not Lakhvi, who has 
previously been described as the military commander of LeT. It was an 
intercepted call to Muzammil on November 18 that put the Indian Navy and Coast 
Guard on high alert to be on the lookout for any foreign vessels from Pakistan 
entering Indian waters.
 
Kasab told his interrogators that his team had set out from Karachi, Pakistan, 
on a ship belonging to Dawood Ibrahim, the MV Alpha. They then hijacked an 
Indian fishing trawler, the Kuber, to pass through Indian territorial waters to 
elude the Navy and Coast Guard that were boarding and searching suspect ships. 
 
Although the MV Alpha was subsequently found and seized by the Indian Navy, 
there have been few, if any, developments about this aspect of the 
investigation in press accounts, such as whether it has been confirmed or not 
that the ship was owned by Ibrahim.
 
Upon arriving off the coast near the city, they were received by inflatable 
rubber dinghies that had been arranged by an associate of Ibrahim’s in Mumbai. 
 
The planning and execution of the attacks are indicative of the mastermind role 
not of either Lakhvi or Muzammil, but of Ibrahim, an Indian who is intimately 
familiar with the city. It was in Mumbai (formerly Bombay) that Ibrahim rose 
through the ranks of the underworld to become a major organized crime boss.
 
At least two other Indians were also connected to the attacks, Mukhtar Ahmed 
and Tausef Rahman. They were arrested for their role in obtaining SIM cards 
used in the cell phones of the terrorists. Ahmed, according to Indian 
officials, had in fact been recruited by a special counter-insurgency police 
task force as an undercover operative. His exact role is still being 
investigated.
 
 
One of the SIM cards used was possibly purchased from New Jersey. Investigators 
are looking into this potential link to the US, as well.
 
Dawood Ibrahim went from underworld kingpin to terrorist in 1993, when he was 
connected to a series of bombings in Bombay that resulted in 250 deaths. He is 
wanted by Interpol and was designated by the US as a global terrorist in 2003. 
 
It’s believed Ibrahim has been residing in Karachi, and Indian officials have 
accused Pakistan’s ISI of protecting him. 
 
Ibrahim is known to be a major drug trafficker responsible for shipping 
narcotics into the United Kingdom and Western Europe. 
 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), most Afghan 
opium (or its derivative, heroin, which is increasingly being produced in the 
country before export) is smuggled through Iran and Turkey en route by land to 
Europe; but the percentage that goes to Pakistan seems to mostly find its way 
directly to the UK, either by plane or by ship.
 
Afghanistan is the world’s leading producer of opium, a trend that developed 
during the CIA-backed mujahedeen effort to oust the Soviet Union from the 
country, with the drug trade serving to help finance the war. 
 
The principle recipient of CIA-ISI funding was Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, one of the 
major drug lords. Hekmatyar has since joined with the Taliban in the insurgency 
effort to expel foreign forces from the country – not the Soviet Union, this 
time, but the US. 
 
A Taliban ban on the cultivation of opium poppies in 2000 resulted in the near 
total eradication of the crop. But since the US overthrow of the regime in 
2001, Afghanistan has once again become the world’s leading producer of opium, 
surpassing all previous records. 
 
While Hekmatyar chose to side with anti-government forces, a number of other 
warlords involved in the drug trade were members of the Northern Alliance to 
whom the CIA doled out cash in the US effort to overthrow the Taliban following 
the 9/11 attacks. 
 
One such warlord is Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was appointed Chief of Staff of 
the army under the government of Hamid Karzai, and who has been described in US 
intelligence’s own files as a “Tier One Warlord”.
 
That list includes a number of other high ranking officials within the 
Afghanistan government, including former defense minister and parliament member 
Marshal Mohammad Fahim, Interior Minister for Counter-Narcotics General 
Mohammad Daoud, and former governor of Helmand province (now by far the largest 
producer of opium) Sher Mohammed Akhundzada.
 
Although government officials parroted by the mainstream media tend to 
characterize the Afghan opium trade as being controlled by the Taliban, in fact 
the estimated drug profits of all anti-government elements (AGEs) is a mere 
fraction of the trade’s total estimated export value. The UNODC estimated the 
export value this year at $3.4 billion. Of that, AGEs profited between $250-470 
million, less than 14% of the total trade. Moreover, what fraction of that 
percentage has gone specifically to the Taliban as opposed to other AGEs is 
unknown.
 
Furthermore, while the Taliban profits from the production of opium through 
ushr, a 10% tax on all agricultural products, and possibly through a protection 
racket in which it receives compensation for providing security along smuggling 
routes, the UNODC has acknowledged that there is little indication that the 
Taliban itself is responsible for either the actual production or trafficking 
of the drug.
 
This is an inconvenient truth for the US, which has so far managed through its 
propaganda efforts to successfully obfuscate the truth about the Afghan drug 
trade and portray the Taliban as being almost wholly responsible.
 
A known drug trafficker, Dawood Ibrahim is naturally also involved in money 
laundering, which is perhaps where the role of gambling operations in Nepal 
comes into the picture. 
 
Yoichi Shimatsu, former editor of the Japan Times, wrote last month after the 
Mumbai attacks that Ibrahim had worked with the US to help finance the 
mujahedeen during the 1980s and that because he knows too much about the US’s 
“darker secrets” in the region, he could never be allowed to be turned over to 
India.
 
The recent promotion of Lakhvi to “mastermind” of the attacks while Ibrahim’s 
name disappears from media reports would seem to lend credence to Shimatsu’s 
assertion.
 
Investigative journalist Wayne Madsen similarly reported that according to 
intelligence sources, Dawood Ibrahim is a CIA asset, both as a veteran of the 
mujahedeen war and in a continuing connection with his casino and drug trade 
operations in Kathmandu, Nepal. A deal had been made earlier this year to have 
Pakistan hand Ibrahim over to India, but the CIA was fearful that this would 
lead to too many of its dirty secrets coming to light, including the criminal 
activities of high level personnel within the agency.
 
One theory on the Mumbai attacks is that it was backlash for this double-cross 
that was among other things intended to serve as a warning that any such 
arrangement could have further serious consequences.
 
Although designated as a major international terrorist by the US, media reports 
in India have characterized the US’s past interest in seeing Ibrahim handed 
over as less than enthusiastic. Former Indian Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani 
wrote in his memoir, “My Country My Life”, that he made a great effort to get 
Pakistan to hand over Ibrahim, and met with then US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (now Secretary of State) 
to pressure Pakistan to do so. But he was informed by Powell that Pakistan 
would hand over Ibrahim only “with some strings attached” and that then 
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf would need more time before doing so. 
 
The handover, needless to say, never occurred. The Pakistan government has also 
publicly denied that Ibrahim is even in the country; a denial that was repeated 
following the recent Mumbai attacks.
 
Others suspected of involvement in the attacks and named among the 20 
individuals India wants Pakistan to turn over also have possible connections to 
the CIA, including Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the founder of LeT, and Maulana Masood 
Azhar, both veterans of the CIA-backed mujahedeen effort.
 
Azhar had been captured in 1994 and imprisoned in India for his role as leader 
of the Pakistani-based terrorist group Karkut-ul-Mujahidee n. He was released, 
however, in 1999 in exchange for hostages from the takeover of Indian Airlines 
Flight 814, which was hijacked during its flight from Kathmandu, Nepal to 
Delhi, India and redirected to Afghanistan. After Azhar’s release, he formed 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which was responsible for an attack on the Indian 
parliament in 2001 that led Pakistan and India to the brink of war. LeT was 
also blamed for the attack alongside JeM.
 
Both LeT and JeM have links to the ISI, which has used the groups as proxies in 
the conflict with India over the territory of Kashmir.
 
Hafiz Saeed travelled to Peshawar to join the mujahedeen cause during the 
Soviet-Afghan war. Peshawar served as the base of operations for the CIA, which 
worked closely with the ISI to finance, arm, and train the mujahedeen. It was 
in Peshawar that Saeed became the protégé of Abdullah Azzam, who founded an 
organization called Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) along with a Saudi individual 
named Osama bin Laden.
 
MAK worked alongside the CIA-ISI operations to recruit Arabs to the ranks of 
the mujahedeen. The ISI, acting as proxy for the CIA, chose mainly to channel 
its support to Afghans, such as Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. The U.S. claims the CIA 
had no relationship with MAK, but bin Laden’s operation, which later evolved 
into “al-Qaeda”, must certainly have been known to, and approved by, the CIA. 
 
But there are indications that the CIA’s relationship with MAK and al-Qaeda go 
well beyond having shared a common enemy and mutual interests in the 
Soviet-Afghan war. A number of al-Qaeda associates appear to have been 
protected individuals.
 
Branches of MAK existed elsewhere, including in the United States. The US 
Treasury Department lists one of MAK’s aliases as Al-Kifah. The Al-Kifah 
Refugee Center in Brooklyn, New York, served as a recruitment center during the 
1980s, but its operations did not end after the end of the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. Al-Kifah was also a recruitment center for efforts by extremist 
groups in the Balkans. 
 
Just as in Afghanistan, the US also had mutual interests with Bosnian Muslims 
and extremist groups acting in the Balkans. MAK had since evolved into al-Qaeda 
under Osama bin Laden, which had links to groups operating in Bosnia. Despite 
an arms embargo against such groups, they managed to obtain weapons and supply 
shipments in which the US at best looked the other way and at worst played an 
active role. 
 
The operations to arm al-Qaeda linked groups in Bosnia were carried under the 
watch of then director of the US European Command Intelligence Directorate Gen. 
Michael V. Hayden. Hayden subsequently served as the director of the National 
Security Agency from 1999 to 2005 and is currently the Director of Central 
Intelligence, or DCI, which is the head of the CIA.
 
A former official at the US consular office in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Michael 
Springman went public after 9/11 to explain how his office was used by the CIA 
to bring recruits to the US for training during the 1980s.
 
The Jeddah office is where most of the 9/11 hijackers obtained their visas to 
enter the US. 
 
Two other of the hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, were in fact 
known to the CIA and were being monitored. Despite being known al-Qaeda 
operatives, they were allowed to enter the US under their real names and 
neither the FBI nor the State Department were notified.
 
The US explains this as the result of the CIA losing the terrorists’ trail when 
they travelled to Thailand after an al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur. But this 
explanation does not stand up to scrutiny since it was known that they had 
obtained visas to enter the US. Thus, even if the CIA did in fact lose track of 
the terrorists, standard procedure should have dictated that the FBI and State 
Department be alerted.
 
The 9/11 Joint Inquiry and subsequent 9/11 Commission were apparently satisfied 
with the CIA’s explanation that it lost al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, and nobody was 
ever held accountable for the “mistake” of knowingly allowing two known 
al-Qaeda operatives on the terrorist watchlist to enter the United States 
unhindered.
 
Upon arriving in the US, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were assisted by an individual 
under FBI surveillance for his possible connections to terrorist groups and, 
furthermore, even lived in a house rented from an FBI informant. But the FBI 
claims that it didn’t know anything about the men, despite them using their 
real names and being listed in the phone book, because the CIA hadn’t informed 
them the two were in the country. The Joint Inquiry report described this as 
perhaps the single greatest missed opportunity to break up the 9/11 operation 
and prevent the attacks.
 
Additionally, it was in fact the CIA who not once, but at least on six separate 
occasions, approved a visa, including from the office in Jeddah, for or the 
entry of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, a.k.a. “the Blind Sheikh”, into the US, 
despite his known connection to terrorist acts in Egypt, including the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat, and despite having been on the State Department’s 
terrorist watchlist. This, too, was described as a series of “mistakes” after 
the government was forced to admit that it had occurred – an explanation that 
the New York Times, which reported this information in a series of articles, 
seemed to find perfectly satisfactory.
 
Many, however, find such incompetency and coincidence theories to be simply not 
credible, preferring instead alternative, oftentimes much more plausible, 
conspiracy theories.
 
The Blind Sheikh had also travelled to Peshawar during the mujahedeen effort, 
and was good friends with Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, the CIA’s top asset during the 
Soviet-Afghan war. He later became the spiritual head of the terrorist group 
that carried out the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, a plot which the 
FBI had known about in advance through two or more informants. 
 
One of the informants served as a bodyguard for the Blind Sheikh and was made 
responsible for obtaining materials to make the bomb with. Tape recordings he 
secretly made of conversations with his FBI handlers reveal that the original 
sting operation involved a plan to replace a chemical used in making the bomb 
with an inert simulant that would render it inoperative. But this plan was 
withdrawn by a supervisor at the FBI and the terrorist cell was allowed to go 
ahead and make a real bomb – which was then used to blow up the World Trade 
Center.
 
Another notable character connected to Al-Kifah training and recruitment 
efforts for al-Qaeda is Ali Mohammed. He also happened to be an in FBI 
informant, a CIA asset, and a member of the special forces in the US Army. It 
is Ali Mohammed whom some suspect of actually being the mastermind of the 1993 
WTC bombing. He was later charged in connection to the 1998 bombings of the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but has since seemingly disappeared off the 
map.
 
After the 9/11 attacks, the investigation into the financing of the attacks led 
to Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British national of Pakistani origin. According to 
Indian officials, a joint investigation with the FBI revealed evidence that it 
was at the direction of the head of the ISI, Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, that Omar 
Sheikh transferred $100,000 to lead hijacker Mohammed Atta in Florida.
 
Omar Sheikh, a known associate of Osama bin Laden, was captured and imprisoned 
in India for his role in the kidnapping of American and British nationals in 
1994. He was released in 1999 along with Maulana Massod Azhar in exchange for 
the hostages from Flight 814. According to former Pakistan president Pervez 
Musharraf, Omar Sheikh was also an agent of Britain’s spy agency, MI6, for whom 
he served in operations in the Balkans.
 
Omar Sheikh’s role in the 9/11 attacks has also been downplayed. Mention of him 
in the media instead focus on his role as the man responsible for the murder of 
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. He is currently being held in 
Pakistan on charges relating to Pearl’s murder.
 
After Mahmud Ahmed’s alleged role in the 9/11 attacks became known publicly, 
Musharraf quietly replaced him and the whole affair was hushed up in the US. 
When a reporter from a foreign news agency asked then National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice whether she was aware of the reports that the ISI chief had 
financed the hijackers and was in Washington meeting with high level officials 
at the time of the attacks, she denied having seen “that report” and protested 
that, “he was certainly not meeting with me.”
 
Interestingly, the White House website transcript of the press briefing 
censored the words “ISI chief” from the reporter’s question, despite the words 
clearly being audible in the video of the briefing.
 
The 9/11 Commission also acted to whitewash Mahmud Ahmed’s alleged role in the 
attacks. Despite the question of the ISI chief’s involvement being included on 
a list of items for the Commission to investigate from families of the victims 
of the attacks, the Commission’s report made no mention of it, either to 
confirm or deny the information, which, despite having received zero coverage 
in the US major media (with the one exception of a citation of a report from 
the Times of India in a blog on the Wall Street Journal’s opinion website), was 
widely reported internationally (as well as in US alternative media).
 
Rather, the 9/11 Commission simply acted as though such reports didn’t exist. 
Despite Bob Graham, one of the chairs of the earlier Congressional Joint 
Inquiry, publicly stating that he was surprised by the evidence of foreign 
government involvement (he added that this information would not be made public 
for another twenty or thirty years when it would be due for release to the 
national archives), the 9/11 Commission report arrived at the opposite 
conclusion, saying there was no evidence of any such involvement and, moreover, 
that the question of who financed the attacks was “of little practical 
significance”.
 
Another former head of the ISI is now being privately accused by the US of 
involvement with the group responsible for the Mumbai attacks, according to 
reports citing a document listing former ISI chief Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul and four 
other former heads of Pakistan’s intelligence agency as being involved in 
supporting terrorist networks. The individuals named have been recommended to 
the UN Security Council to be named as international terrorists, according to 
Pakistan’s The News.
 
The document has been provided to the Pakistan government and also accuses Gul, 
who was head of the ISI from 1987-1989, of providing assistance to criminal 
groups in Kabul, as well as to groups responsible for recruiting and training 
militants to attack US-led forces in Afghanistan, including the Taliban. 
 
Hamid Gul responded to the reports by calling the allegations hilarious. The US 
denied that it had made any such recommendations to the UN. 
 
But the US has similarly accused the ISI of involvement in the bombing of 
India’s embassy in Kabul last July. This was unusual not because of the 
allegation of an ISI connection to terrorism but because it was in such stark 
contrast with US attempts to publicly portray Pakistan as a staunch ally in its 
“war on terrorism” when the country was under the dictatorship of Pervez 
Musharraf. 
 
The US attitude toward Pakistan shifted once an elected government came to 
power that has been more willing to side with the overwhelming belief among the 
public that it is the “war on terrorism” itself that has exacerbated the 
problem of extremist militant groups and led to further terrorist attacks 
within the country, such as the assassination of former prime minister Benazir 
Bhutto last year or the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in September. While the 
world’s attention has been focused on the attacks in Mumbai, a bomb blast in 
Peshawar last week killed 21 and injured 90.
 
While the purported US document names Gul and others as terrorist supporters, 
another report, from Indian intelligence, indicates that the terrorists who 
carried out the attacks in Mumbai were among 500 trained by instructors from 
the Pakistan military, according to the Sunday edition of The Times. This 
training of the 10 known Mumbai terrorists would have taken place prior to 
their recent preparation for these specific attacks by the LeT training 
specialist Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.
 
But while Lakhvi, Muzammil, and Hafiz Saeed have continued to be named in 
connection with last month’s attacks in Mumbai, the name of Dawood Ibrahim 
seems to be either disappearing altogether or his originally designated role as 
the accused mastermind of the attacks being credited now instead to Lakhvi in 
media accounts.
 
Whether this is a deliberate effort to downplay Ibrahim’s role in the attacks 
so as not to have to force Pakistan to turn him over because of embarrassing 
revelations pertaining to the CIA’s involvement with known terrorists and drug 
traffickers that development could possibly produce isn’t certain. But what is 
certain is that the CIA has had a long history of involvement with such 
characters and that the US has a track record of attempting to keep information 
about the nature of such involvement in the dark or to cover it up once it 
reaches the light of public scrutiny.
 
Related: The Mumbai Attacks: More than Meets the Eye
 
Jeremy R. Hammond is the editor of Foreign Policy Journal, a website dedicated 
to providing news, critical analysis, and opinion commentary on U.S. foreign 
policy from outside of the standard framework offered by government officials 
and the mainstream corporate media, particularly with regard to the "war on 
terrorism" and events in the Middle East. He has also written for numerous 
other online publications. You can contact him by clicking here. 
 

© 2008 Foreign Policy Journal
















      

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