http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/951/re51.htm
11 - 17 May 2009
Issue No. 951
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875
Iran 2009: choosing a future
With Iran going to the polls Friday, and at a critical time in its history, in
Tehran Mustafa El-Labbad charts the political landscape and key personalities
of the presidential elections in the Islamic Republic
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Click to view caption
A supporter of the leading reformist Iranian presidential candidate, Mir
Hussein Mousavi, hold green balloon, the symbolic colour of Mousavi's campaign
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Deciding factors
Iran's political landscape looms large in the run-up to presidential elections
Friday. Political divides are not sufficient to determine the lay of the land
among voters because of the relative ideological fluidity characterising the
political spectrum in the Islamic Republic. The regime in Iran permits for
certain margins in differences of opinion on political and economic issues, but
these margins stop short of divergence from the state's core ideology. All
official political movements and their leaders must ultimately be part of the
established order from which they derive their legitimacy. We should bear in
mind that all four candidates running in the presidential elections had to be
approved by the Guardian Council, half of whose members are appointed by the
supreme guide. One of the functions of this body is to screen nominees to
ensure their faith in state ideology and its core principle of velayat-e faqih,
or rule by the clergy. So whatever political differences exist between the
candidates they do not run deep enough to challenge the core values of the
state.
Thus, while voter behaviour will certainly be influenced by the candidates'
platforms, other factors need to be recalled in order to draw an accurate
electoral map. Perhaps the most important are the conventional distinction
between social classes, regional affiliation (urban versus rural), gender, and
generational divides.
To what extent class is a determinant of outcome in the polls is difficult to
say. This said; there appears to be a clear majority among the middle and upper
classes in Iran in favour of reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi. In large
measure this may be due to his record for economic and administrative
efficiency during his period of service as prime minister from 1981 to 1989.
This reputation weighs all the more against the backdrop of the economic
failures and soaring rates of inflation of the past four years, in spite of the
huge rise in oil revenues. Such developments have opened the presidential
incumbent to charges of incompetence in the management of the economy and
failure to deliver on his electoral promise to ensure that the country's oil
revenues are turned to concrete improvements in the standards of living of the
Iranian people. Even so, the Iranian poor, on the whole, remain loyal to
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in part because of his personal austerity and relatively
humble background, his renewed economic pledges and his ability to address the
general mindset of the urban and rural poor. The majority of the technocratic
and business classes will probably favour Mousavi. Nevertheless, a small
minority of this sector may not turn out to the polls at all, in protest
reflecting their desire to deregulate the Iranian market and to shift the basis
of the public sector driven economy towards a greater role for the private
sector.
The inhabitants of Iran's major cities, such as Tehran, Isfahan and Tabriz,
generally tend towards reformist candidates. This voting behaviour reflects a
preference for the cosmopolitan lifestyle -- cultural services (theatres,
cinemas, museums and bookstores) and consumer services -- combined with
conventional fears in urban society of conservative encroachment on personal
freedoms, as epitomised in Iran by the religious police. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Mousavi has a large urban following and that he has pledged to
abolish the moral police and to introduce major projects, such as high-speed
rail, in order to modernise inter-urban infrastructure. The rural populace, by
contrast, regards the conservative Ahmadinejad as their natural exponent and
the presidential incumbent, for his part, has taken pains over the past four
years to maintain close contact with his rural constituency, undertaking
frequent tours of far-flung provinces. In addition, his term has been marked by
major rural infrastructure projects, such as bridges and paving rural roads. He
has also ensured the direct distribution of financial aid to the needy rural
poor. Conscious of Ahmadinejad's strength in the countryside, Mousavi has
intensified his campaigns in the provinces in the hope of evening out the odds
in the rural vote.
Contrary to the stereotypical Western view of Iranian society, Iranian women
have and continue to have a significant voice in public affairs and, indeed, a
woman (Masoumeh Ebtekar) served as vice-president under former president
Mohamed Khatami. Naturally, the gender factor as a determinant of the elections
is not so clear-cut. Many prominent women have come out in favour of
Ahmadinejad. Still, the majority of the female vote is almost certain to come
out in favour of the two reformists, Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi, both of whose
wives (Zahra Rahnavard and Fatma Karrubi) have been campaigning vigorously
alongside their husbands in an unprecedented development in Iranian
presidential campaigns.
The generation gap is also certain to play a key role in voting behaviour. Most
socio-political analysts in Iran suggest that the outlook of Iranian youth
today conflicts with the values and fundamental premises espoused by the
founding generations of the Iranian revolution. The "third generation" was born
after the revolution and the foundation of the Islamic Republic over 30 years
ago and has very limited or no memory of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. This
generation, aged between 16 (the minimum voting age) and 30, makes up more than
45 per cent of the entire electorate of around 48 million, of which between 60
and 65 per cent, or about 30 million, is expected to turn out to the polls
tomorrow. Of these, around six million youths will be eligible to vote for the
first time, according to official Iranian statistics.
Iran's youth differs from older generations in several respects. It is more
educated and more open to the West and the rest of the world, and is familiar
with the modern communications technology that connects the world. University
students, who have always played an important part in Iranian public life since
the revolution, have come to form the backbone of the reformist trend. Gender
and generation factors overlap among this block of voters, with females making
up a majority among the youth. It was students and the young, in general, which
swung the polls in favour of the reformist candidate Khatami in the 1997 and
2001 presidential elections. This same generation refrained from participating
in the 2005 elections, in protest against the government's failure to deliver
on its reform pledges.
Because of the age of both reform candidates today (Mousavi is 67 and Karrubi
72), and their lack of charisma compared to Khatami (who was 54 when he ran for
the first time), analysts predict that a large segment of youth may also
refrain from taking part in tomorrow's polls. Nevertheless, all candidates are
working assiduously to draw support from this key block of votes, often drawing
on the element of discontent that habitually characterises the young. And, in
view of Iran's current economic straits, Mousavi and Karrubi may be able to
attract a considerable anti-Ahmadinejad protest vote from the youth. Because of
the size of this voting block with respect to the overall electorate, the
generation gap factor will probably be the foremost determinant of the outcome
of the elections, with the gender factor following a close second. Still, it
remains to be seen whether Mousavi will be able to neutralise the rural vote
from which Ahmadinejad draws, and how the class factor affects voter
preferences in the cities, where the incumbent also has a strong base among the
urban poor.
The public mood in Iran is shifting, in tandem with both political developments
and larger social trends. Tomorrow's polls will give clear indication of the
direction of this shift.
Who's who?
As important as domestic issues and the personalities of the candidates will
be, the Iran-US relationship will determine the outcome of the Iranian
elections. The victory of one of the two frontrunners -- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or
Mir Hussein Mousavi -- will set the rudder for Iranian foreign policy strategy
in the forthcoming phase, regardless of their respective political and
ideological outlooks. Ahmadinejad winning will mean that Tehran does not yet
believe the time is right for dialogue with Washington over Iran's nuclear
ambitions and other regional issues. Instead, the government will seize what it
believes is the opportunity to broaden its influence and strengthen its hand
before sitting down at the negotiating table. A Mousavi victory will bring
talks with Washington closer to hand, in the hope of cementing Iran's gains in
the form of a deal that would usher in a new regional order securing Iran's
greater regional status and role.
In short, polls tomorrow will reveal how Iran will approach Washington and the
region in the coming months and perhaps years. Will they bring serious
negotiations or more rhetorical posturing?
Iranian voters will be choosing between four contenders: presidential incumbent
Ahmadinejad, former prime minister Mousavi, former parliament speaker Mehdi
Karrubi, and former head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Mohsen Rezai. Most
observers have ranked the candidates as either conservative or reformist,
placing Ahmadinejad and Rezai in the former camp and Mousavi and Karrubi in the
latter. In fact, the labels are more of a convenience than a truth, the Iranian
reformist movement having been effectively consigned to the past since the 2005
elections, at least.
Iranian presidential elections in the past have tended to pack surprises.
Notably, they have been known to sweep into power relatively unknown
candidates, such as Khatami in 2001 and Ahmadinejad in 2005. This year,
however, the contest will take the form of a neck-to-neck race between the
presidential incumbent and Mousavi, while Karrubi and Rezai trail far behind in
spite of some respectable followings in the provinces.
MOHSEN REZAI: Rezai appears to be making a comeback after a long absence from
the upper ranks of the Iranian regime. His nomination seems like a kind of
rehabilitation of his good standing after former president Hashemi Rafsanjani
ousted him as head of the Revolutionary Guards in 1988, holding him responsible
for the outcome of the battles at the end of the Iran-Iraq war. If Rezai's
electoral prospects are relatively slim, his candidacy nevertheless presents a
two-fold challenge to Ahmadinejad. A fellow conservative with a strong standing
in the Revolutionary Guards and an impressive military record, even before the
revolution, he could split the conservative vote in the first round. In his
television debates during the campaign, Ahmadinejad hinted that he was opposed
by Sheikh Rafsanjani behind the scenes, and that Rezai had been fielded with
the particular aim of detracting voters from his own support base, even though
the former Revolutionary Guard chief had little prospect of making it to the
second round. Rezai, 55, is originally from the oil-rich predominantly Arab
province of Khuzestan. He is expected to come in fourth and last.
MEHDI KARRUBI: Sheikh Karrubi, chairman of the National Confidence Party (
Etemad-e-Melli ), has stayed on in the campaign fray in spite of appeals to him
from within the reformist camp to withdraw so as not to split the reformist
vote. This is the second time Karrubi has fielded himself against Ahmadinejad,
having placed third in the 2005 presidential elections. Karrubi was elected
twice as speaker of parliament, once from 1990 to 1992 and then again from 2000
to 2004, during the Khatami presidency. Born in 1937 in the province of
Lorestan south of Tehran, he belongs to the Lurs, or Lori, a Persian tribal
group that primarily inhabits southwest Iran.
Karrubi and his party have kept a cautious distance from the radical reformist
movements in Iran. In the current campaign, he has billed himself as a
reformist, but one committed to the principles of the revolution and the state.
He is essentially aiming at the Iranian centre with a slight inclination
towards the reformists, and his electoral platform reflects this. As a
gathering point for the spectrum of Iranian moderate forces, his campaign has
brought onboard politicians from the Khatami reformists, such as the former
director of the president's office under Khatami, Mohamed Ali Abtahi, and from
the Rafsanjani camp, such as former governor of Tehran Ghalam Hussein
Karbastashi. In a precedent in Iranian elections, Karrubi's wife, Fatma, is
also accompanying him on the campaign trail, symbolic of his intent to reach
out to women voters. His campaign slogan is "Change", although not inspired by
Obama but by the Quranic verse, "God will not change the condition of a people
until they change what is in their souls." (13:11)
Karrubi is a blend of the eternal US presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, the
splitter of the left-wing vote, and of Republican candidate John McCain,
because of his age and lack of charisma. His middle-of-the-road approach has
never won him a large enough following to score a major political victory,
perhaps in part because of his lacklustre policy pitches. In defence of his
refusal to stand down in favour of Mousavi, in spite of his low opinion poll
ratings, he argued that his continued candidacy will bring more reformists to
the polls and, hence, a larger vote against Ahmadinejad, which is a goal he
shares with Mousavi.
MIR HUSSEIN MOUSAVI: Mousavi, 67, has mounted an intelligent, tactically astute
campaign aimed primarily at ousting Ahmadinejad via the ballot box. He also has
some powerful backers, notably former president Khatami who has accompanied him
on the campaign trail, and former president Rafsanjani who is said to be the
chief engineer behind Mousavi's return to the political limelight. On the other
hand, he may have a powerful detractor in the person of the current Supreme
Guide Ali Khamenei with whom he had a falling out over economic policy in the
1980s when Khamenei was president and Mousavi prime minister.
In spite of his wealthy family background -- his father was a major tea
merchant -- Mousavi had advocated a public sector-driven economy whereas
Khamenei, who was from much humbler roots, favoured greater private sector
involvement. A major consequence of their standoff over economic policy was the
abolition of the premiership in the first constitutional reform in 1989, which
handed the president the powers of the prime minister. The last Iranian prime
minister Mousavi may be, but his successful management of the Iranian economy
during his country's eight-year long war with Iraq won him widespread popular
support.
Observers agree that Mousavi came out with flying colours in his television
debate against the incumbent, a first in Iranian presidential elections. He
honed in on Ahmadinejad's weak points, especially his handling of the economy
and his fiery foreign policy rhetoric that isolated Iran internationally. He
has charged that Ahmadinejad failed to fulfil his 2005 campaign promise to "put
the revenues from oil on Iranian dining tables" and he described the current
president's handling of the economy as a "failure". While he, too (like all the
candidates), believes in Iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
he criticised Ahmadinejad's reckless way of handling the uranium enrichment
question. He has vowed to improve Iran's image in the West and while he sees
the new tone set by Obama as a positive opening for this, he nevertheless hopes
to see action from the White House and not just words. On the Arab-Israeli
conflict, he called for a public referendum among Jews, Christians and Muslims
over a one-state or two-state solution to the Palestinian cause. It has been
suggested that this stance is intended to pave the way for talks with the US by
establishing his open-mindedness and distancing himself from the Ahmadinejad
rigid hardliner approach to relations with Washington.
As with Karrubi, Mousavi's wife, Zahra Rahnavard, is also campaigning alongside
her husband. As was the case with Khatami, Mousavi has a large following among
women as well as artists and intellectuals. He has called for the abolition of
the "religious police" who ensure, among other things, that women meet Islamic
dress codes. His campaign has also been sophisticated in its use of modern
communications technology. Mousavi has a page on Facebook, a website, and his
staff use mobile text messaging to reach out to voters. Yet, as smooth and
efficient as his campaign may be, Mousavi does not have the charisma of former
president Khatami or current US President Barack Obama, who will have a
decisive impact on the 10th Iranian presidential elections.
MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD: The incumbent, Ahmadinejad, embodies the
political-economic alliance between the religious and military establishments.
His ideological staunchness and tough talk have won him widespread popularity
in the Iranian countryside, among the urban poor and among the Revolutionary
Guards and Volunteer Militia, which is several millions strong. Ahmadinejad
also has the support of the supreme guide. As popular as he is, the fact that
he represents the major articulations of the country's political and economic
powers is by far his most powerful asset. According to his opponents, at least,
his supporters have had unfair access to state propaganda facilities by virtue
of the fact that he is power.
At 52, the youngest of the four candidates belongs to the fundamentalist
conservative wing at the far right of the Iranian political spectrum. His
campaign has focussed on his personal austerity and integrity, in contrast to
earlier presidents whom Ahmadinejad has accused of being corrupt. In the 2005
elections, he shocked the country by coming up from behind in the last four
hours of polling as the result of the massive turnout of the Republican Guard
and Volunteer Militia in his favour. Some observers estimate that the
Republican Guard controls some 20 per cent of the country's economy, which, in
itself, is a huge socio-economic weight. In addition to having secured the
support of the supreme guide, Ahmadinejad has also forged strong connections
with a large segment of the religious establishment in Iran, notably Ayatollah
Mohamed Taqi Misbah Yazdi.
In his campaign, Ahmadinejad is trying to win over some segments of
marginalised youth, while consolidating his bases of support among the rural
and urban poor, another large voting block but not sufficient to secure him
victory. If Mousavi succeeds in stimulating a large voter turnout among the
youth and in rivalling Ahmadinejad in the countryside he will have garnered an
even larger voting block than the incumbent, ensuring that he will at least
make it to the second round if he does not win the first round hands down. If
Ahmadinejad loses in these elections he will be the first president in the
history of the Islamic Republic to have served only a single term.
THE BIG CHOICE: Numerous clashes in the streets recently reflect how frayed
nerves are during this anxious transitional period for Iran, whose fate seems
caught in the balance between further militarisation and a collision course
with the West under Ahmadinejad or renewed openness to the world and an entente
with the West under Mousavi. The results of the polls tomorrow will tell which
way the political scales will tilt.
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