On 5/27/15 7:21 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-17: No Objection
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COMMENT:
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- Unsurprisingly, the diff between this and RFC4013 isn't
useful, so I read from scratch. If I'm commenting on
something that was already true of 4013, just tell me and
that'll be fine.
Truly, the diff is so large that it's more sensible to read this
document anew.
- intro: given the unsolved i18n issues and the fact that
passwords are crap (security wise) would it be fair to ask
that you add a sentence here to encourage folks to not use
passwords at all but some better form of authentication,
when that's possible? (Which is sadly not nearly common
enough for user authentication.) Maybe something like:
"While this document specifies how to handle passwords
to the best of our current abilities, those designing and
implementing protocols would be much better off if they
can avoid any use of passwords. Using passwords means
having to deal with the inherent insecurity of passwords,
and of password verifier databases, and also the i18n
issues described here. Authentication schemes based on
digital signatures or other cryptographic mechanisms
are, where usable, far preferable."
Is it really the place of this document to discourage the use of
passwords? I'm all in favor of the sentiment, but it seems to me that a
BCP on the topic would have a lot more force and could claim IETF consensus.
- nitty nit: intro, 2nd last para on p3: once a password is
chosen, there are no more entropy changes so you cannot
maximise entropy *during* authentication. Maybe
s/during/for/ works though.
+1
- 3.2.2, bullet 3: I read this as saying to use the latest
Unicode default case folding and not to stick with v7.0
even if a new and in this sense different version is
published. This is just to check that that is what you
intended and that I've not misread the text.
We might do this:
OLD
(at the time of this writing, the algorithm is specified in
Chapter 3 of [Unicode7.0])
NEW
(at the time of this writing, the algorithm is specified in
Chapter 3 of [Unicode7.0], but the chapter number might change
in a future version of the Unicode Standard)
The idea behind including the Unicode7.0 reference was to enable the
reader to quickly find the relevant discussion as of today, but we know
that the exact pointer might change.
4.1: zero length password - I think you're wrong on that
one but it is arguable. This was a discuss until you told
me that 4013 prohibited 'em too so probably no point
in changing now if it's just my opinion.
There are situations where an empty password is ok (say
when I'm not "protecting" something but just want to know
what user's profile to use, e.g. for weather) and that is
supported in many systems (that hence won't be able to
exactly adopt this) and insisting on a non-empty password
could be more damaging than allowing a zero-length
password, whenever a user re-uses a password for something
for which no password is really needed (and which hence is
less likely to be well protected) and where that password
is also used to protect something of significantly higher
value. The zero-length password is also not an interesting
subset of the set of stupid passwords really so doesn't
deserve to be called out as such (and you say that in the
draft when you talk about length-1 passwords.) So I think
allowing zero length passwords is better overall, and more
consistent with implementations.
I see your point. Do you have a sense of what kind of systems today
allow zero-length passwords? Given that RFC 4013 prohibited zero-length
passwords and that they provide no security whatsoever, I don't see a
compelling reason to modify the recommendation. However, as you say this
document doesn't provide general guidance on password strengthy anyway,
so I suppose I'd be fine with changing it to SHOULD NOT as long as we
provide some text about why zero-length passwords are acceptable in some
existing systems.
Peter
--
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/
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