On 27/05/2015 16:44, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
On 5/27/15 9:28 AM, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
On 5/27/15 9:12 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
On 27/05/15 15:58, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
On 5/27/15 7:21 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-17: No Objection
<snip/>
4.1: zero length password - I think you're wrong on that
one but it is arguable. This was a discuss until you told
me that 4013 prohibited 'em too so probably no point
in changing now if it's just my opinion.
There are situations where an empty password is ok (say
when I'm not "protecting" something but just want to know
what user's profile to use, e.g. for weather) and that is
supported in many systems (that hence won't be able to
exactly adopt this) and insisting on a non-empty password
could be more damaging than allowing a zero-length
password, whenever a user re-uses a password for something
for which no password is really needed (and which hence is
less likely to be well protected) and where that password
is also used to protect something of significantly higher
value. The zero-length password is also not an interesting
subset of the set of stupid passwords really so doesn't
deserve to be called out as such (and you say that in the
draft when you talk about length-1 passwords.) So I think
allowing zero length passwords is better overall, and more
consistent with implementations.
I see your point. Do you have a sense of what kind of systems today
allow zero-length passwords? Given that RFC 4013 prohibited
zero-length
passwords and that they provide no security whatsoever, I don't see a
compelling reason to modify the recommendation. However, as you say
this
document doesn't provide general guidance on password strengthy
anyway,
so I suppose I'd be fine with changing it to SHOULD NOT as long as we
provide some text about why zero-length passwords are acceptable in
some
existing systems.
I think most operating systems either allow empty passwords
or else try insist on what they think is "strong" or else
give some strength feedback to the user. Many CLI tools allow
for empty passwords in case they're used in a script and
the same goes for passwords needed by servers that might
ever need to restart without a human. (And yes in most cases
such tools provide a way to input a password from e.g. a
file, but that's often no more secure than no password
given how filesystem access control works.)
I'll leave it to you folks to decide if you think a SHOULD
NOT is ok or not, but I suspect you might want to check that
the WG are ok with that change from 4013.
Most definitely.
I suppose an alternative might be to just note some of
the issues above and say that in a bunch of cases an
application will have to accept as input either <empty-string>
or <password>. I guess that's what's done now in any case
and I'd be fine with handling it that way too if you prefer.
Ah, true. That seems preferable to me.
Agreed.
Let's see if Alexey and I can formulate some text...
How's this? (I haven't checked it with Alexey yet but he can reply here.)
OLD
Note: The prohibition on zero-length passwords is not a
recommendation regarding password strength (since a password of
only one byte is highly insecure), but is meant to prevent
applications from omitting a password entirely.
NEW
Note: Some existing systems allow an empty string in places where
a password would be expected (e.g., command-line tools that might
be called from an automated script, or servers that might need to
be restarted without human intervention). From the perspective of
this document (and RFC 4013 before it), these empty strings are
not passwords but are workarounds for the practical difficulty of
using passwords in certain scenarios. The prohibition on zero-
length passwords is not a recommendation regarding password
strength (since a password of only one byte is highly insecure),
but is meant to prevent applications from mistakenly omitting a
password entirely, since when internationalized characters are
accepted a non-empty sequence of characters can result in a zero-
length password after canonicalization.
Yes, this looks great. Thank you!
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