Jadi: "The Army is primarily concerned with its control and
responsibilities with regard to national unity and maintenance
of public order. "
Yang adalah tugas polisi.
Jadi: mari kita tuntut agar Indonesia bebas militer.
Kalau ada selisih atau sengketa perbatasan dengan negara tentangga bisa
diselesaikan melalui badan peradilan internasional...
On 30 Jan 2005, at 18:02, Humprey Samosir wrote:
> The Indonesian Defence forces consist of not only the regular
military services but also a much larger number of militia and the
special branch of national police. As a consequence, their available
military force appears quite large, until examined closely.
>
>
> The Army
> The Indonesian Defence forces are large, even by world
standards they are quite big. They have, according to the 2003
Dept. of Defence Almanac 276,000 personnel in uniform. However,
numbers are not everything. Of the 204,500 which are actually in
the Army (as against their Navy and Air Force), only approximately,
just over 31,000 are actually available as "mobile" forces in their
KOSTRAD (28,000), KOPASSUS (3,500) units. The other 173,000
are involved in "Territorial Defence" units which are dedicated to
defensive purposes and more appropriately could be called internal
security units, as well as being used on civil infrastructure projects.
> Therefore, unless the Indonesian high command was willing to run
the risk of the peripheral islands rising in rebellion or attempting
outright succession, it is highly unlikely that those units would be
withdrawn for use in any attempted hypothetical attack on Australia.
Indeed, considering the high importance placed by the Indonesian
Defence forces on national cohesion and their role in maintaining it,
one would be very surprised to see these units being withdrawn
from that role, re-equipped for normal military maneauvre
operations and trained in how to undertake them.
>
>
> Most of the equipment in use by the Indonesian army is quite
elderly (the one exception being their SAMs and their small-arms),
most being over 35 years old. Indeed, as the tables in the first post,
on the Indonesian Defence Forces indicate, there is a slight, but
perceptible steady decline in the numbers of AFVs in service in the
Indonesian Army. In the space of a few years, the numbers of AMX-
13 light tanks, for example has halved or even less.
> Such old equipment has serviceability problems, particularly the
equipment which was purchased from the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. In the case of the Soviet Union, the break with that
nation occurred even before the Suharto coup, so its obviously quite
old equipment and most data sources make the point that while
numbers quoted are relatively high, only approximately half are still
considered to be serviceable. With the break up of Yugoslavia one
must question as to whether or not any of the ex-Yugoslav weapons
would be still functioning at all.
>
>
> One source, the Defence almanac, does make the point that
some of the venerable, ex-Soviet PT-76 amphibious light tanks are
apparently to be upgraded to a standard referred to as PT-2000,
however I have been unable to discover any information on what
that entails (I'd suspect a new engine/gearbox at the very least and
more than likely a new gun, perhaps the French 90mm used in the
Indonesian Marines' AMX-10 PAC-90s). Even so, thats still a drop
in the ocean and it would only bring the PT-76s from being nearly
completely useless to marginally useful.
>
>
> Most of the other AFVs in use by the Indonesian military, with the
exception of the AMX-10s are just as ancient and one wonders
where the spare-parts for them is coming from, if they are to be
considered still in operation as in ARMED Ambarawa.
>
>
> The Army is also lacking in artillery, being for a force of its size,
rather under equipped as far as field artillery (weapons of 105mm
or less in calibre) and completely lacks any medium or heavy
artillery. It does though, have a large number of mortars of 81mm or
120mm calibre. This is of course understandable when one
considers the types of operations that the Army is primarily
engaged in (COIN and defence of the homeland), rather than
offensive operations.
> As mentioned, the Army's SAMs and small-arms are perhaps the
only two areas where quite modern equipment has been procured in
the last 10-15 years. The Rapier SAMs, are quite modern, only
being some 10 years old and represent a real threat to any
potential attacking aircraft, as do the RBS-70s. Their numbers
though, are relatively low and would only provide defences for either
a small number of high-value targets, or possible the army in the
field but not necessarily both.
>
>
> In the area of small-arms, the Indonesians have been following
military fashion and replacing their older, larger calibre weapons
firing 7.62x51mm NATO rounds with those firing 5.56x45mm
ammunition as standard of FNC (Senapan-Serbu). This has resulted
in the procurement of M16A1s and other similar weapons in
relatively large numbers.
>
>
> The Navy
> The Indonesian Navy, surprisingly for an archipelagic nation has
always been the "poor-man" of the three services. Its equipment
has been of low quality and is serviceability doubtful. This changed
though, in 1990 when the Science and Development Minister,
Mr.Habibie announced suddenly that he had negotiated a deal with
the German Government to purchase a large number of ex-East
German corvettes and landing craft.
> In doing so, he created virtually, an "instant fleet". However, the
choice of ships selected, left a lot to be desired, if as according to
some, he was choosing to create or enhance the supposed threat
against Australia. The Pattimura Class corvettes selected (ex-
Parchim class) were designed for operations in the narrow, shallow
seas of the Baltic. They lacked adequate air-Defence, electronic,
anti-surface, or even anti-submarine warfare equipment (having
been sold by the Germans sans-weapons meant that even the
rudimentary ones normally carried were missing). Once out of the
shallow, littoral waters of the Indonesian archipelago, their value
would be slight.
>
>
> If, on the otherhand, they had been designed not for offensive but
rather defensive and patrol duties, then their choice made good
sense except that the Indonesian navy is now facing, in 10-15 years
a block obsolescence problem when all these hulls need replacing
at once.
> What made more sense was the purchase, at the same time as
the corvettes, of 12 ex-East German LST (Landing Ship Tank)
amphibious warfare ships. However, as with the corvettes, block
obsolescence becomes a real worry, further down the track, while
their value is limited when its understood that a great deal of the
intra-island commerce depends upon the regular use of navy ships
such as these as ferries which of course means the national
economy would suffer if they were withdrawn for normal miliary
operations en masse.
>
>
> Air Force
> The air force, like the Navy and the Army is primarily equipped
with older generation equipment and because of the ongoing
political repercussions of the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia
has suffered serviceability problems and a general lack of spare
parts for the majority of its aircraft which are sourced from the USA.
> Indeed, as a consequence of those problems, Jakarta recently
announced cancellation of a followon order for further F-16A/Bs and
its replacement by one for several Su-30MKs from Russia instead.
>
>
> While these aircraft will introduce a quantum leap for the
Indonesian Air Force, it should be pointed out the small number on
order (only 12) plus their considerable increased sophistication over
anything that the Indonesians have operated in the past, would
indicate going by such experiences in other third world air forces
that both the serviceability and the usefulness of these aircraft will
be, at least in the initial stages, severely limited as the Indonesian
Air Force attempts to come to grips with their new mounts. They
are though, no strangers to Russian aircraft.
>
>
> Overall though, it is very obvious, going by the equipment chosen
and procured over the last two decades, that the Indonesian Air
Force is primarily configured for a defensive, rather than an
offensive role. Its main combat aircraft have tended to be small,
lightly-equipped fighters intended for visual dogfighting, with a
secondary role as fighter-bombers (F-5s and F-16s), backed by a
fairly large number of fighter-bombers and specialist COIN aircraft
(A-4s & OV-10s).
>
>
> The rotary-wing assets are though, quite large, but primarily in the
light to medium range, which is understandable when one considers
the terrain and types of operations which the Air Force undertakes
(ie., Jungle/COIN in direct support of the army). Just where are
they when Tsunami relief occured? A refreshing thought !
>
>
> Surprisingly, again for an archipelagic nation, Maritime
Reconnaissance has been until recently, relatively neglected by the
Indonesian Air Force, although the recently announced planned
acquisition of several CN-235 MPs, when coupled to the use of the
C-130 MP and the B737 Surveilers, this will be somewhat
addressed, although numbers are still quite low and indicate a
preference towards surface reconnaissance/warfare rather than
ASW.
> Not unsurprisingly, the Air Force has a large transport component,
although primarily oriented towards tactical rather than strategic
missions. The strategic assets that it does have, tend on the whole
to be quite old and in several cases, unusual or even odd choices
(such as the L-100-30 Hercules).
> It lacks any adequate in-flight refuelling aircraft beyond a few KC-
130 Hercules and its Boeing 737 "Surveiler" aircraft which have a
secondary use in such a role (although in doing in using them as
such, they would obviously not be available in their primary role as
maritime reconnaissance aircraft). In addition, the lack of adequate
AEW & C aircraft and ECM assets, would tend to indicate that the
Indonesians have a considerable amount of distance to go, if they
were contemplating an offensive effort against one of their
neighbours.
>
>
> Conclusion
> Overall, the force structures and equipment of the Indonesian
> Defence Forces indicate a defensive force which is not intended to
> undertake any long-range offensive operations of an extended
> nature. The Army is primarily concerned with its control and
> responsibilities with regard to national unity and maintenance of
> public order. This is reflected in its stated rationales as well
> as the way in which its structure has been built up and designed,
> as well as the equipment which has been purchased over the last
> few decades. The Air Force and the Navy, while possibly,
because of
> the nature of their services, having potentially much more
> offensive ability than the Army, have, just like the Army, by the
> nature of the equipment purchased and their structures, been
> subordinated to the Armys role within the social structure of the
> nation. Their equipment tends to be short-ranged, designed for
use
> in and around the environs of the Indonesian archipelago and
> obviously lacking in offensive ability. The small number of
> submarines currently in service and purchases recently announced,
> indicate a continuation of the present policy of confining
> interest to a "brown-water" littoral naval role, rather than
> seeking a "blue-water" one. The recently announced purchase of
> Su-30MK fighter-bombers by the Air Force, as already noted, the
> mere acquisition of equipment does not necessarily mean that the
> Indonesian Air Force will either know how to use these aircraft
> properly. Or be able to maintain such a relatively sophisticate
> aircraft after having concentrated for many years on older, much
> simpler ones. The low numbers also mean that their ability to
> seriously affect any conflict, even remotely possible, between
> say, Australia and Indonesia would be relatively low, particularly
> when faced by a much larger number of RAAF F/A-18s flown by
much
> better trained pilots equipped and trained in the full use of
> their mounts. Overall, I would be forced to objectively rate any
> possible threat by the Indonesian Defence Forces (ignoring the
> political dimension for the moment) as extremely low from a
> military viewpoint. They lack the ability to project power far
> enough beyond their borders to represent any real, credible
> threat, and in order to do so,TNI would be required to undertake
> not only a massive re-equipment program but also a massive
> re-training one, as well as reorienting their entire thinking
> towards undertaking offensive rather than primarily defensive
> operations.
>
>
>
> ps: this paperwork was presented at US Marine Warfare
Academy in 2004.
>
>
> Semper Fidelis,
> H.H Samosir
>
>
> Merenung dibawah Sathergate: 'Let there be Light'
> --- end ---
>
>
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