http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1105/fo7.htm
5 - 11 July 2012
Issue No. 1105 Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875
Egypt, Islamist state
The election of Mohamed Mursi as the country's new president and the recent
scenes in Tahrir Square show that Egypt is heading for an Islamist model,
writes Galal Nassar
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the opening days of the Egyptian revolution, I managed to keep a good
part of my attention focussed on the international reaction to the events in
Egypt and the rest of the Arab region. I was particularly interested in Western
reactions and those of the US in particular, in view of the tremors that the
Islamic Revolution in 1979 in Iran had sent through Western political and
security establishments. The irony is that as the events of the Egyptian
revolution unfolded, signals from the White House confirmed that the US
administration, as well as its predecessors and various governmental and
independent think tanks and research centres in the US, had long since
determined that the alternative to the dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen,
Syria and the other countries of the Arab Spring would be Islamist to the core.
Click to view caption
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Arab dictatorships succeeded in anything it was in suppressing and
eliminating all other possible secular alternatives, whether from the political
right or the left, leaving the field open to the Islamist movements. Over
recent decades, these movements have continued to work assiduously both below
and above ground in mosques and on university campuses, steadily increasing
their influence until they had built up a "society within a society" and
readying themselves for the outbreak of revolution against regimes under which
they were officially banned and for the opportunity to rise to power.
Various US agencies had apparently reached the conclusion that the only way
that the Islamists could reach power would be through revolution against the
existing regimes, these being determined never to allow political Islam a
margin for open and legitimate manoeuvre. Therefore, the contest between the
regimes and the Islamists was one that would have to end with a debilitating
blow, and the likelihood was that the regimes would be on the receiving end
because the rampant poverty, unemployment and corruption in place in the Arab
countries strengthened the hand of the Islamist forces, which built their power
on mounting popular wrath and the growing numbers of disaffected young people
and other discontented segments of society.
Washington and other Western capitals had also realised that the Islamists were
the only available alternative to assume power in the Arab countries following
the fall of the regimes. None of the other political parties or forces had a
grassroots base extensive enough to compete and leverage them into power
through free-and-fair elections. Moreover, the same Western analysts also
believed that the cycle of history had determined that Islamist rule was likely
to continue for many years before the political balance of power shifted and
the people succeeded in producing a political option that was strong enough to
compel the Islamists to share power with them, or that would become a viable
alternative in the event that the Islamists lost cohesion.
The course that the Egyptian revolution has taken over the past year and a half
offers clear proof that events are developing in accordance with the American
prognosis for the region. The scenes in Tahrir Square over the past few weeks
offer sufficient indication that Egypt is on its way to an Islamist government.
The culmination occurred on Friday, the "Friday of the Handover of Power" as
that day's "million-man" demonstration was dubbed, when all the non-Islamist
political forces withdrew from the square, giving the president-elect the
opportunity to address a crowd packed almost exclusively with Muslim
Brotherhood supporters and Salafis.
It was a crowning moment for the Islamists, and this was driven home by the
president-elect's determination to reconstruct the history of the Egyptian
people's struggle for independence and freedom in such a way as to
intrinsically link it with the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. The 1920s
thus became the "period of the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood" and the
1960s was the "period of the Brotherhood's struggle with the government of
president Abdel-Nasser," Mursi said by way of demarcating his chronology. He
then took pains to ensure that the majority of the audience in Cairo
University's main hall the following day was made up of representatives of the
Islamist movement and of prominent families of Muslim Brotherhood background.
One would have to be divorced from reality to contend that Egypt is not now on
the threshold of a period of Islamist rule, regardless of the assurances of
Islamist spokesmen and parliamentary representatives to the effect that they
will not seek to alter the identity of the Egyptian state. Moreover, excluding
extraordinary events, such as a military coup, an insurrectionist movement or a
civil war, the country is heading towards some sort of Islamist government now
that Mohamed Mursi has been declared the victor over his competitor Ahmed
Shafik, the last prime minister from the Mubarak era.
Regardless of which model is now in store, it is obvious that the over
80-year-old Muslim Brotherhood, banned since 1952, felt that its time had come
with the 25 January Revolution. Here was an opportunity that the group was
determined to seize with all its might and not let go. It was encouraged by the
fact that the Islamist tide had also virtually overwhelmed the entire Arab
region and beyond, from Pakistan and Afghanistan, through Iran, Turkey and
Iran, and into Africa from Sudan to Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. Egypt is at the
hub of all this, and the Islamists here would have some strong potential allies
in Lebanon in Hizbullah and Palestine in Hamas.
Yet, what Islamist model will Egypt opt for, and what model will be suited to
Egypt? Will it be a model inspired by the Pakistani one, or by the Turkish or
Iranian ones? Will it look westward to the Tunisian or Moroccan models, or to
the Levant and the Palestinian or Lebanese versions? Or will it develop a model
of its own?
Under former president Hosni Mubarak, virtually all the intellectual, political
and cultural activities and influences of the liberal, Nasserist or socialist
left were systematically eliminated, while any semblance of public life was
crushed through repression, corruption and co-optation. That is a legacy that
could not be overcome in the mere 16 months since the revolution, despite the
remarkable rise in the level of freedom, notably in the freedoms of opinion and
expression and the right to form political parties, civil society associations
and syndicates. There has also been a revival in the Egyptian spirit, which for
decades had been tamed into submission or had been diverted by secondary issues
in order to distract the people from the struggle for rights and freedoms.
During this period, the Muslim Brotherhood may also have been marginalised, but
it also had the advantage of holding the religious card, which it capitalised
on at every turn. In addition to its well-known internal discipline, this helps
to explain why it suddenly emerged as the strongest and most cohesive popular
force after the revolution. From the moment that it seemed that the regime
would finally topple, the Brotherhood leadership was able fully to appreciate
the role of the army, and it was quick to court the generals making up the
ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) who had persuaded Mubarak to
step down.
For its part, the SCAF also soon began to realise that it might be possible to
work out a power-sharing accommodation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Whether
made public or concluded secretly, the purpose of this would be to keep the
situation from sliding further in the direction of the revolutionary forces for
change. The Brothers would keep the streets calm if they could be given the
opportunity to create an Islamist government in which they would have a large
share of control while the army would be able to retain the reins of power.
As was suggested in this newspaper in May 2011 in an article entitled "Who's at
the chessboard?" the army had in mind the so-called "Turkish model", albeit the
Turkish model as it stood before the Justice and Development Party took power
in Turkey just over a decade ago.
In this model, the army would have the final say on crucial issues, especially
those related to military affairs and foreign policy, while the Muslim
Brothers, together with their Salafi allies, would have a comfortable majority
in parliament. The Brothers would have nothing to lose from this arrangement.
Even as a junior partner to the army, they would acquire considerable
privileges and be able to expand their influence. The Brothers would also have
believed that they would be able to use their political, organisational and
proselytising capacities to gradually Islamise the army, or, at least, to
Islamise a sufficiently influential portion of it. Perhaps the same idea
occurred to some members of the army leadership, especially the more
conservative or traditional elements, who may have gone so far as to entertain
the possibility of militarising the Brotherhood, which would have made the
partnership more balanced.
At all events, from March through to the autumn of 2011 there were definite
indications of an explicit or tacit agreement between the army and the Muslim
Brotherhood. However, once the Muslim Brothers had won a parliamentary majority
in that autumn's elections their hunger for power grew. They no longer wanted a
share of the pie, or even a large chunk of it. They wanted the whole thing, and
they began to flex their demagogic muscles, which began to be increasingly
apparent as the presidential elections drew near. However, by this point many
Egyptians had begun to fear that the principles of the revolution were at risk
and that their aspirations for democracy were about to be sacrificed. This gave
rise to a new burst of energy among the pro-democratic civil forces that was
strong enough to compel the Muslim Brothers to rethink their strategy.
The results of the first round of the presidential elections, in which the
Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) candidate did not do
nearly as well as it had anticipated and in which the non-Islamist candidates
combined fared better than the Islamist candidates combined, delivered a
powerful message. With Mursi and Shafik heading to the run-off, the Brotherhood
realised that there was another constituency that it had to appeal to, and it
now began to reformulate part of its project. At this point, the Brothers made
some astute moves. They signalled their willingness to work consensually with
the other political forces as part of a presidential council, announced plans
to "depersonalise" the presidency by transforming it into an institution, and
even declared that they would be ready to appoint a Coptic vice-president. In
short, they were moving towards the second Turkish model, in other words the
Justice and Development Party model of the past decade.
Meanwhile, the army had begun to sense the threat that the Muslim Brothers
posed. More precisely, it had begun to realise that it had made a grave mistake
last year. With the Muslim Brothers poised to take control of the executive as
well as the parliament, the SCAF feared that the country was staring the
spectre of the Iranian model that had followed the Iranian Revolution of 1979
in the face. In the Iranian case, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards managed to
sideline the other political forces that had launched and participated in the
revolution, asserting their exclusive control and consolidating the situation
by imposing a Shia theocracy on the country.
It is important to bear in mind that the Muslim Brotherhood is not a national
movement. It is a transnational movement, par excellence. It has branches
throughout the Islamic world, and it operates with a mentality not dissimilar
to Leninism. Therefore, the Brotherhood's control over Egypt, when combined
with the prospect of their solidarity with their "brethren" elsewhere, could
have enormous repercussions for the region and the world.
Until now, the SCAF has been more or less feeling its way forward, advancing a
step here and backing off a step there as it tries to check the Brotherhood's
advances.
However, we still cannot rule out the emergence of an "Algerian model" under
which the army steps in to settle the question of power after an Islamist win
in the polls. Regardless of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such a course of
action, it would not be one that lacked some supporters in Egypt, the region or
abroad. Indeed, the dissolution of the Islamist-dominated parliament and the
addendum to the Constitutional Declaration that the SCAF issued in June were
steps in this direction. One is reminded of the Pakistani model, in which the
army retains the upper hand over the affairs of that country. Washington
expressed its concern at these measures in Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood
and other forces have been vehement in their criticisms of them. However, they
still remain in effect.
All this does not mean that the Muslim Brothers have acquiesced to the current
situation. They are not about to let the seats of power, handed to them on a
silver platter, so to speak, slip out of their hands. Should their tactics
drive society to a clash between the Brotherhood and the army, the movement for
democratic change and all the participants who have remained committed to its
principles would be the first to suffer. After all, while these forces may have
spearheaded the revolution and defined the spirit of Tahrir Square, they have
not been the ones to reap its rewards.
The ballot box can sometimes be a tricky and unpredictable creature. So many
factors have come into play: ignorance and illiteracy; the long paucity of
civil liberties; the long-entrenched tradition of despotism; the dominance of
conservative forces; the heavy sway of money in the political sphere; the
weakness and fragility of the centrist, liberal and leftwing forces and their
inability or unwillingness to engage in battles of this magnitude; and the
opportunities the SCAF helped open to the Muslim Brotherhood and the
possibility that portions of the military are at least sympathetic to the
Muslim Brothers.
Whether Egypt is now looking at a Turkish model, whether pre- or post- the
Justice and Development Party, or at the Iranian, Moroccan, Pakistani or even
Algerian models, a bumpy period undoubtedly lies ahead. If a new round of
instability looms, this may induce many forces at home and abroad to take a
negative attitude towards the movement for change. Yet, the setback may be only
temporary. History does not march backwards. The past remains in the past, and
the future can only be brighter than that past, regardless of the challenges
and obstacles that need to be overcome.
Perhaps it boils down to the process of evolution and the gradual accumulation
of change and development. Things may progress more slowly than some might
wish. They may even flounder or take cruel and dangerous detours. But
ultimately history will forge its way ahead in its own way, whether via some
Islamist model or via another course.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------------------
Post message: [email protected]
Subscribe : [email protected]
Unsubscribe : [email protected]
List owner : [email protected]
Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/Yahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/
<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional
<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/join
(Yahoo! ID required)
<*> To change settings via email:
[email protected]
[email protected]
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
[email protected]
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
