"ndeboost" sudah jadi gila... Kebelet QS 4:82.
Lalu ngomog asal ngaco seperti dibawah ini.. --- In [email protected], <rambitese...@...> wrote: > > PS. > Saya teringat istilah ini: > "simatupang". > > --- In [email protected], "Jusfiq" <kesayangan.allah@> wrote: > > > > > > Benernya udah terlambat.. > > > > Udah ketahuan bahwa Islam itu cuman jelmaan salah satu sekte Nasrani, jadi > > ya nggk bisa di reformasi. > > > > Bisanya cuman ditinggalin, kayak kapal Titanic yang sedangkaram. > > > > PS. > > > > Saya teringat istilah ini: > > > > "The so-called Islamic reformers remind me of the salon orchestra, which - > > in a heroic display of giving the passengers the illusion of normalcy - > > continued to play on the deck of the Titanic until it went down. Likewise, > > the > > reformers are playing an alluring melody, but know full well that no one is > > listening anyway." > > > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/message/288058 > > > > -- > > > > > > Pursuing an Islamic metamorphosis > > > > The Muslim world faces a decline similar to that of medieval Europe; a > > potential rebirth requires a new consensus. > > Mohamed El-Moctar El-Shinqiti Last Modified: 17 Oct 2010 14:11 GMT > > > > Reformists should focus on the rule of law, rather than the legal tradition > > from which law is drawn [EPA] > > > > In his book, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, Dutch historian Johan Huizinga > > describes the decline of the medieval world as a process of "dying and > > rigidifying of a previously valid store of thought". > > > > The main thesis of Huizinga's book is that, by the fourteenth and fifteenth > > centuries, the cultural forms and norms on which medieval Europe was based > > became overused and exhausted. When any ideal becomes exhausted, it fails > > to be a source of inspiration; rather it becomes an artificial burden. > > > > From Huizinga's perspective, the European world of the late middle ages was > > a world of artificial vanity and self-deception, a ruin of a world that had > > died a long time before. > > > > I think that the abstract aspect of Huizinga's thesis on cultural forms is > > enlightening, and can be extended to explain transitional moments in other > > cultures, including contemporary Islamic culture. The cultural legacy > > modern Muslims inherited from their ancestors is exhausted, and - with lack > > of self-criticism - much of this legacy is becoming a burden rather than a > > source of inspiration. > > > > The Islamic world is going through a deep metamorphosis. The lessons of > > history from the American and French revolutions show that these kinds of > > transitive moments are sometimes bloody and painful. At this moment, > > Muslims need new ideas and ideals that transcend their divisions and heel > > their wounds. > > > > One of these deep wounds is the conflict between secularists and Islamists, > > and that is what we will explore here. > > > > State and religion > > > > At the heart of the crisis of Muslim societies today is the lack of > > consensus about the social contract on which society should be based, > > especially in terms of an agreed understanding for the relation between > > religion and state. > > > > Secularism can be seen from an institutional, legal or ideological angle. > > In the western experience, it is also important to distinguish between the > > Anglo-Saxon 'soft' secularism which basically means positive neutrality of > > the state towards religion, and the French 'hard' laïcité that goes beyond > > neutrality to negative intervention against religion. > > > > Institutional separation between religious and political organisations is > > not difficult to accept in the Islamic world. It is indeed in compatibility > > with the Islamic historical experience, where religion was never > > institutionalised as a political competitor with the state, the way it was > > in medieval Christianity. > > > > But ideological secularism the French way, and legal secularism that > > excludes Islam as a source of legislation, will never take root in Islamic > > culture. > > > > Historical potential > > > > Muslims cannot, however, continue ignoring new developments in the morality > > of all humanity regarding the religion-state relations. First, the > > foundation of the modern state is geographical, not faith-based. > > > > Second, the equality of all citizens in political rights is, theoretically > > at least, unquestionable in any respected modern state. Third, every nation > > needs to consider the laws and legislation of other nations. > > > > Fortunately for modern Muslims who are deeply rooted in their cultural > > heritage, there are potentials in their inherited culture that might help. > > First, Muslim societies have always been open to religious diversity. > > > > The unbroken existence of Christian minorities in the Middle East from the > > birth of Islam until today is a good illustration of this potential. > > Second, Islamic law is very flexible and open to perpetual interpretation > > and adaptation, and it is easy to incorporate most modern laws within the > > Islamic legal vision. > > > > Three players > > > > A closer look at the conflict over religion and state in the Islamic world > > reveals the existence of three players who have a stake in the outcome of > > this conflict. These players are the Muslim majorities, the non-Muslim > > minorities, and the non-practising Muslims. Each one of these players has > > its own set of concerns. > > > > The Muslim majorities see Islam as an essential part of inspiration in > > public life, and they don't want their value system to be compromised. They > > are also afraid of foreign manipulation of the minority's case. > > > > Some people among these majorities believe that the issue of secularism is > > irrelevant. We have no church, they argue, and secularism, by definition, > > is "the separation between the state and the church". > > > > Some would even go as far as saying that Islam is a secular religion, and > > we are already secular, because we have no clergy who have a claim on being > > God's legate on earth. > > > > The non-Muslim minorities don't want to be treated as second class > > citizens, and they don't want their religious freedom restricted. They are > > not willing to accept less than equal rights and responsibilities in their > > land of birth. > > > > As for non-practising Muslims, Islam is acceptable as an individualistic > > observance, but not a social or political system. They believe the state > > should avoid legislation of morality, especially religious morality. > > > > Towards a compromise > > > > The three players in this Islamic metamorphosis need to come to a > > historical compromise that will save much time and energy, and help produce > > a swift transition of the Muslim societies to democracy and modernity. > > > > Non-Muslim minorities and non-practising Muslims need to accept the fact > > that Islamic law is too rich and too important to be discarded. The > > historical analogy with Western experience is misleading, since there was > > never a universally subscribed to "Christian law" that governed societies > > and states. Unlike the Islamic law that has been the law of many Muslim > > states and empires throughout the last 1400 years, the medieval Canon law > > was to govern the Church, not the state or the society at large. > > > > Muslim majorities need to accept that faith is no longer the basis for a > > social contract; geography is the new basis. > > > > They must also guarantee the political and legal equality of their > > non-Muslim and non-religious citizens. Any legalisation of discrimination > > against non-Muslim citizens in terms of constitutional and political rights > > is absurd. Unfortunately that is what we still have today in many Arab > > countriesincluding the very secular ones, where constitutions deprive > > non-Muslim citizens from running in presidential elections (good for them > > anyway, since the elections are never fair or transparent). > > > > Institutional secularism that prevents rulers from misusing religion, and > > guarantees freedom of conscience for all, should be accepted by all. > > Ideological secularism that chases religion away from public life should be > > rejected by all, because it is pure coercion. > > > > Legal secularism that ignores the centrality of Islamic laws is > > meaningless. However, a great reinterpretation and adaptation of Islamic > > laws is necessary to help this compromise take place. These laws are > > flexible, and there has never been a monopoly in interpreting them. > > > > Rule of law > > > > Those who complain about Islamic laws need to shift their discourse to a > > more positive and practical formula: what should matter for them should be > > equality before the law, more than the source of the law. > > > > As I told my friends at a Texas church a few years ago, I don't care if US > > law is drawn from a biblical source or a Roman source; what I care about is > > that the law does not discriminate against me as a Muslim. > > > > The three players in the debate over religion and politics in the Islamic > > world need to be focusing on the rule of law instead of fighting over what > > kind of law should rule. > > > > The Islamic world has suffered a lot from the lack of consensus on the > > social contract within Muslim societies. > > > > It is time to explore new roads towards this necessary consensus. Both > > Islamists and secularists share the responsibility to achieve common ground > > through mutual respect and compromise. > > > > A creative synthesis that is seen by Islamists as 'Islamic', and by > > secularists as 'secular', is very possible. After all Islam never accepted > > splitting the human personality into spiritual and material parts, and the > > Islamic ideal was never the self-absorbed asceticism, but the practical > > ethicality. > > > > Mohamed El-Moctar El-Shinqiti is an author in political history and history > > of religion. He is a research coordinator at the Qatar Foundation in Doha, > > Qatar. > > > > The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not > > necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy. > > Source: > > Al Jazeera > > Email Article > > Email Article > > Print Article > > Print Article > > Share article > > Share Article > > Send Feedback > > Send Feedback > > Topics in this article > > People > > > > * Johan Huizinga > > * El-Moctar El-Shinqiti > > > > > > Organisation > > > > * Qatar Foundation in Doha > > * Environmental Protection Agency > > > > Featured on Al Jazeera > > Taliban talks: folly or fortune? > > Reconciliatory negotiations may be ongoing between the Afghan government, > > the Taliban and, perhaps, the US. > > Pursuing an Islamic metamorphosis > > The Muslim world faces a decline similar to that of medieval Europe; a > > potential rebirth requires a new consensus. > > Solving Africa's hunger > > For the first time, African farmers are being consulted to help solve one > > of the continent's greatest concerns. > > DR Congo: Africa's sleeping giant? > > Al Jazeera investigates when the African country will wake up from its > > 'long sleep'. > > > ------------------------------------ Post message: [email protected] Subscribe : [email protected] Unsubscribe : [email protected] List owner : [email protected] Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/Yahoo! 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