http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/11/28/soeharto%E2%80%99s-politics-during-japanese-occupation.html
Soeharto's politics during the Japanese occupation Dicky Christanto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Sun, 11/28/2010 1:57 PM | Review & Outlook This book offers a rather unique perspective on Soeharto, the former president infamous for his militaristic leadership during his 32 years in office. Based on various do-cuments and books, including Soeharto's 1989 autobiography My Thoughts, Words and Deeds and interviews with Soeharto's former Japanese superiors and his fellow Indonesian officers, David Jenkins, an Australian journalist and writer, is trying to offer us insight into Soeharto's thoughts and strategies. Early on, the book tries to provide multiple perspectives. For instance, in November 1942, in the early years of the Japanese occupation, it is said that Soeharto, a former Dutch KNIL (Koninklijke Nederlands-Indische Leger) sergeant, was "jobless and in great confusion" when just across the street, the Japanese were offering security positions to locals. Soeharto was reluctant. He wanted to apply for the job but on the other hand he was afraid the Japanese would find out about his background as a former Dutch sergeant. Soeharto recalled that "he finally managed to make his way to the force without revealing his army background" (page 14). This is an important episode. Had the Japanese known that anyone previously worked for the Dutch, he or she would be sent to prison. But Jenkins doubts Soeharto's statement. His comparative data shows another fact that "a thorough yet tight screening method had been conducted by Keinpetai, an intelligence unit under the Japanese military, in recruiting local police candidates at that time" (page 14). Thus, it would be almost impossible for the Japanese to let such a potentially dangerous person join the force. Jenkins also supports his finding by interviewing Tsuchiya Kiso, a former Japanese army intelligence officer who knew Soeharto. Kiso tells him that "it was only in the beginning that the Japanese officers weren't aware of Soeharto's past as a Dutch sergeant" (page 15). This of course raises another question: why the Japanese decided to let Soeharto join the force? >From what I have read, the sole reason behind the Japanese occupation force's >decision in welcoming Soeharto to its ranks, first as a policeman then an army >officer, was simply because Soeharto was never considered a threat, but rather >an officer with great potential (page 32). Tsuchiya Kiso, who later recruited Soeharto to PETA, a local army battalion that was initially formed as a Japanese reserve army to fight US soldiers during World War II, acknowledged that he was fully aware of Soeharto's background as a Dutch sergeant but nevertheless decided to accept Soeharto because, "Our need for such a professional profile had made me go against the army headquarters' order to avoid recruiting any person affiliated with the Dutch" (page 83). Soeharto earned the Japanese's respect and trust. Second Lt. Nakamoto Yoshiyuki, Soeharto's former superior officer, said that all Soeharto's former Japanese trainers recalled the former president as "modest, clever and one who never lost control" (page 172). These Japanese officers apparently never realized that Soeharto, from the time he joined the police through his time as a soldier with PETA, had grown dissatisfied with the Japanese occupation, especially with its practice of romusha, in which thousands of people were enslaved and put into forced labor to construct railways, roads and buildings (page 191). Unlike Suprijadi, a fellow officer of PETA, who dared to confront the Japanese by organizing a local revolt in Blitar, East Java, in early 1945, Soeharto was at that time occupied with training a new PETA battalion also in Blitar when the Japanese occupation ended with Japan's surrender to the US forces on Aug. 15, 1945. Besides revealing Soeharto's dedicated career during the Japanese occupation, the book unveils some interesting facts that might have helped develop Soeharto's militaristic leadership skills. Soeharto, for example, is described to have inherited a great distrust of the Muslim hardliners and the communists on both the Japanese and Dutch sides because "the followers of these two ideologies have shown great militancy and often unpredictability" (page 48). The book also describes Soeharto as a person who showed a great interest in learning from the keinpetai's method of interrogation, which was famous for its cruelty (page 24). Another fact that has been unearthed is how the Japanese trainers successfully implanted the importance of showing solidarity especially toward subordinates through months of hard training. Later on during his military and political careers, Soeharto was known as a commander who offered great protections, both literally and figuratively speaking, to his subordinates who paid great respect and loyalty to him. Harsutedjo, the book's translator, says, "Soeharto's cronies will always consider him a hero since he is like a great protector of their corrupt behavior." Harsutedjo was once affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which was outlawed by Soeharto. Many of its activists, including Harsutedjo, were sent to prison without proper trial. The book also tells the readers how Soeharto maintained relations with those around him during the Japanese occupation. It is rather surprising to find out that Soeharto in his early presidential tenure, visited several of his former Japanese officers as a sign of respect (page 112). On the other side, it is also clearly described how Soeharto made enemies with some of his former colleagues at PETA. Soeharto for example, rejected the appointment of Pranoto Reksosamoedro, a military caretaker, by then president Sukarno after the abortive coup of the PKI. According to the book, the rejection was actually only a reaction or some might say Soeharto's revenge against Pranoto who had unveiled Soeharto's smuggling activities when he was a military commander in Central Java (page 119). Despite some minor weaknesses in the book - including some awkward expressions (probably the result of a poor translation) and in places very long explanations - this book will serve as good company to those interested in history. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ Post message: [email protected] Subscribe : [email protected] Unsubscribe : [email protected] List owner : [email protected] Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/Yahoo! 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