Lengkapnya: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-090111-1.html

The emergence of China's new J-XX [J-20] stealth fighter will have a profound 
strategic impact, for both the United States and its numerous Pacific Rim 
allies. There can be no doubt that it is proof positive of the absolute and 
complete failure of the current OSD driven plan for recapitalisation of the 
United States tactical fighter fleet, and the fleets of its allies. Like the 
Russian T-50 PAK-FA, the J-XX [J-20] is a "game changer" in the sense that the 
large scale deployment of operational production examples of these aircraft 
invalidates all of the key assumptions central to United States and allied air 
power and force structure planning and development, since the early 1990s.i. 

Whether the J-XX [J-20] is a proof of concept demonstrator, or a prototype for 
a volume production combat type, what the design demonstrates is that Chinese 
engineers have mastered advanced stealth shaping techniques. The design 
displays repeated application of United States developed shaping design rules 
used previously in the F-22 Raptor design, and in some portions of the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter design. An observer unfamiliar with the background of the 
J-XX [J-20] could be forgiven for mistaking the type for a Lockheed-Martin 
developed product.ii. 

The accuracy with which the Chengdu engineers replicated key shaping features 
could be explained by their reverse engineering the design rules from high 
resolution imagery of US aircraft. However, it also begs some very good 
questions as to whether this engineering was directly or indirectly aided by 
less overt means. Exploitation of engineering data acquired by the alleged 
penetration of United States contractor computer networks would provide equally 
good or better technical results.iii. 

Airframe shaping is absolutely critical in stealth design, and determines the 
bounds on the achievable Radar Cross Section performance of any design. If 
shaping is done poorly, the aft and lower fuselage design of the F-35 being a 
cardinal example, no amount of radar absorbent material or coating compatible 
with the weight and volume needs of fighter design will overcome the resulting 
performance problems. Conversely, if shaping is done right, the cardinal 
example being the B-2A Spirit, then progressive upgrades of the radar absorbent 
materials and/or coatings over the life of the design can be used to further 
improve its stealth.iv. 

By cleverly exploiting contemporary United States developed stealth fighter 
shaping design rules, Chengdu engineers were able to rapidly get an excellent 
basic shaping design with a minimum of risk and cost, and significant long term 
stealth performance growth potential, as Chinese absorbent material and 
coating, frequency selective radome, low signature antenna and engine nozzle 
technology mature over time. A derivative of the J-XX [J-20] built in 2025 
would thus have a much lower radar signature than a 2015 build of the same 
airframe.

The Capability Potential of the J-XX [J-20] Stealth Fighter 

While the introduction of robust stealth shaping is an unprecedented design 
feature for an indigenous Chinese fighter, another first is an airframe 
evidently designed for efficient supersonic cruise at high altitudes – the 
delta-canard configuration is not unlike that adopted by the Russians in the 
cancelled supercruising MiG MFI design. Supersonic cruise not only 
kinematically defeats most legacy fighters and Surface to Air Missiles, but 
confers additional launch range to Air-Air Missiles and smart bombs, provides 
an energy advantage when merging into close combat, and in a larger design like 
the J-XX [J-20], yields important productivity gains due to the ability to 
supercruise to and from targets. The latter can in many circumstances double 
the effective sortie rate of a bomber.vvi. 

In terms of gross sizing the J-XX [J-20] most closely resembles the smaller 
configurations proposed for the FB-22A "theatre bomber", which was to be a 
dedicated bomber and ISR airframe, intended to supercruise to targets at combat 
radii in excess of 1,000 nautical miles, a niche occupied by the TAC/SAC GD 
F/FB-111 family of aircraft during the Cold War. Claims that the Chengdu design 
is a "Sino-F-22A" make little sense, if the latter were true the aircraft would 
be considerably smaller. Unlike the FB-22 proposals, the J-XX [J-20] is clearly 
intended for air combat and using a canard-delta configuration will provide 
both efficient supersonic cruise, and good supersonic and transonic manoeuvre 
performance if fitted with engines of sufficient thrust rating.vii. 

In technological strategy terms the combination of stealth and supercruise 
yields high lethality and survivability, supercruise yields high per-sortie 
productivity, and the sizing and thus combat radius of the airframe provide a 
basic design with the flexibility to be used effectively across the spectrum of 
roles covered by the Cold War design F/FB-111 and proposed FB-22 families of 
aircraft. The canard-delta airframe configuration if fully exploited yields 
sufficient agility to serve effectively in the spectrum of roles covered by the 
F-15C and F-22A. 

This design therefore provides the PLA-AF with an airframe which could be 
employed, subject to suitable avionic and weapons fit, across a range of 
strategically important roles: 
Long Range / Persistent Interceptor: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would be 
employed to deny access to the airspace within the footprint of the Second 
Island Chain, attacking opposing strike aircraft and their fighter escorts;
Long Range Air Combat and Escort Fighter: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would be 
employed offensively, to punch holes through opposing air defences by engaging 
and destroying defending fighter Combat Air Patrols, AWACS/AEW&C aircraft, and 
supporting aerial refuelling tankers;
Theatre Strike Fighter: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would attack surface 
targets, in the manner performed by the F/FB-111, F-15E and proposed FB-22, 
using guided conventional munitions or free fall nuclear bombs; the size of the 
aircraft would permit weapon bays large enough to carry 3,000 lb or larger 
bombs;
Long Range Theatre Reconnaissance Aircraft: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would 
be employed to collect radar, imagery and electronic intelligence, emulating 
aircraft such as the RF-111C/D, the RA-5C, and F-14/TARPS but with the 
advantage of stealth absent in legacy theatre reconnaissance types;
Electronic Attack Platform: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would be employed to 
suppress opposing radar and communications, using weapon bay carried support 
jamming equipment, in the manner of the EF-111A Raven;
Anti-Satellite Weapon Launch Platform: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would be 
employed to lift and loft an ASAT missile against an LEO SV, in the manner the 
US Air Force employed the F-15A and the Vought ASM-135A ASAT during the mid 
1980s.
The airframe self-evidently has the potential to be used in each of these 
niches, albeit with some niches occupied by specialised variants or subtypes. A 
single multirole variant could be employed across the first three roles without 
difficulty. The aircraft's size makes it a natural candidate for "lateral 
evolution" into other roles.viii. 

To what extent the PLA-AF and PLA-N air arm opt to exploit the potential of 
this design, or a derivative design, remains to be seen. Prudent strategic 
analysis however cannot rely on the notion that the PLA-AF and PLA-N air arm 
will not make full use of a potential capability the development of which has 
consumed without doubt considerable national treasure.

The Strategic Impact of the J-XX [J-20] Stealth Fighter 

At this time there is no air defence system in Asia, including the organic 
capabilities of the US Navy CVBGs, which can reliably stop a mature long range 
supercruising stealth fighter, be it an F-22A Raptor, or a mature production 
export T-50 PAK-FA, or J-XX [J-20]. 

Western built Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) rely primarily on S-band, 
and to a lesser extent, L-band and UHF-band acquisition radars for land based, 
and shipboard use. 

Airborne Early Warning capabilities are similarly constrained, the 
E-3/E-767/APY-2 AWACS (US Air Force, Japan) operating in the S-band, the E-737 
Wedgetail/MESA (South Korea, Australia) and G.550 CAEW / EL/M-2075 (Singapore) 
the L-band, and the E-2C/APS-145 (US Navy, Japan, Singapore) and E-2D/APY-9 (US 
Navy) in the UHF-band. 

While the L-band MESA and EL/M-2075, and UHF-band APY-9 will have significantly 
better detection performance against a J-XX [J-20] compared to an S-band radar 
such as the APY-2 or SPY-1 Aegis, it will be very much lower than that 
achievable against a non-stealthy conventional aerial target.ix. 

As a result of the introduction of robust stealth capability, the coverage 
footprint of United States and allied IADS in the WestPac will be severely 
reduced, no differently than that of the Warsaw Pact IADS when confronted by 
the F-117A Nighthawk from 1985 onward. The result of this will be large holes 
in IADS coverage, or to use the colourful late Cold War description, "the gaps 
between fence pickets become very wide". 

Engagement radars employed for Surface-Air Missile defences, such as the 
Patriot MPQ-53/65 and Aegis SPG-62, and most fighter multimode radars operate 
in the C/X-band, and some in the Ku-band. Semiactive and TVM missile seekers 
mostly operate in the native C/X-band of the fire control system, while active 
radar seekers mostly operate in the Ku-band or above. The effectiveness of all 
of these systems will be severely impaired when confronting a mature variant of 
the J-XX [J-20]. Intercepting the Chengdu fighter is apt to present the very 
same challenges confronted in intercepts flown against the F-22A Raptor, both 
in terms of acquisition by radar, guidance of missiles and kinematic intercept 
by aircraft or missile. 

In the Western world, most intellectual and development effort in air defence 
radar and missiles since 1991 has been concentrated into two discrete areas, 
specifically to provide TMD (Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence) capabilities at 
the upper end, and C-RAM (Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar) capabilities at the 
lower end. Capabilities to intercept and destroy high performance low 
observable aircraft and guided munitions have received little if any attention. 

Conversely, Russia has since 1991 invested most of its intellectual and 
material effort in air defence radar and missile development into two very 
different areas. At the upper tier, counter-stealth radars exploiting VHF-band 
technology have been developed and some exported, while at the lower end, the 
focus has been firmly on providing C-PGM (Counter-PGM) capabilities to defeat 
Western smart munitions. China has followed the Russian lead in IADS capability 
development, with indigenous and imported Russian technology.x. 

In strategic terms, at the most basic level, a mature production J-XX [J-20] 
effectively obsoletes nearly all of the IADS infrastructure and systems, air 
defence fighter fleets and weapons inventories deployed and operated by the 
United States and its Pacific Rim allies, in a fashion no different to the 
immediate obsolescence inflicted by the F-117A / B-2A / F-22A upon globally 
deployed Soviet era IADS, fighters and systems. 

In any conflict involving China, a well sized fleet of mature production J-XX 
[J-20] would have significant freedom of action to attack and destroy aerial 
and surface targets throughout the geography of the Second Island Chain. 
Pre-emptive strikes such as those flown in previous conflicts by US Air Force 
B-2A and F-117A stealth aircraft, intended to cripple and thus paralyse IADS 
and C3I systems, would present a genuine and very serious risk in any standoff 
or escalated contingency. 

Moreover, with a robust payload of satellite/inertial guided bombs, a multirole 
or strike derivative production J-XX [J-20] would have significant capability 
to shut down United States and allied airfields across the Second Island Chain, 
in a manner no different to that envisaged by the US Air Force as a prime role 
for the GBU-39/53 Small Diameter Bomb armed F-22A Raptor – and proposed FB-22. 
No differently, US Navy CVBGs are at significant risk, adding to the risks 
posed by the DF-21D ASBM.xi. 

Unlike ballistic missile terminal stages which present terminal guidance 
challenges in accuracy, and warhead mass limitations, guided bombs delivered by 
aircraft can be extremely precise and have large warheads, with significant 
capability to penetrate reinforced concrete, or warship hulls, and high 
explosive filler payloads of up to many hundreds of kilograms.xii. 

As the PLA-AF and PLA-N have access to over 200 airfields, most semi-hardened, 
some well hardened, and a few super-hardened and deep underground, dispersal 
and continuous relocation of a J-XX [J-20] fleet is a feasible deployment 
strategy, and one which presents genuine difficulties in countering with 
pre-emptive air or cruise missile strikes.xiii. 

The supersonic cruise capability and large fuel capacity of the J-XX [J-20] 
would permit it to be based deeper inside China's territory, compared to older 
types, further complicating efforts to close down or destroy airfields from 
which the J-XX [J-20] may be operating, as significant penetration into China's 
increasingly dense and sophisticated IADS would be required to hit such sites. 
As the J-XX [J-20] will have close to twice the productivity, in sortie rates 
achievable compared to conventional non-supercruise types, basing the aircraft 
deeper inside the IADS would not impair productivity in the manner it would for 
subsonic cruising types. 

In terms of China's ability to manufacture and deploy significant numbers of 
the J-XX [J-20] it is worth observing that in terms of raw "bang for buck" 
China's defence industry is outperforming the United States' industry by a 
robust margin. The oft quoted comparisons between the United States and PRC 
defence budgets produce a misleading picture of the relative scale of 
investments, especially in terms of equipment recapitalisation. Chinese 
aggregate defence budgets as cited reflect primarily capital equipment 
acquisition and support costs, while many infrastructure and personnel costs 
are born by regional governments. United States budgets tend to carry a 
significant fraction of operational costs which have been unusually high over 
the last decade due to the ongoing global conflict with Islamo-fascist 
insurgent movements. 

The woeful inefficiency of many portions of the United States defence industry, 
and procurement bureaucracy, is best exemplified by the fact that the 
underperforming single engine F-35 is now more expensive than the larger and 
much better twin engine F-22 Raptor, in terms of Unit Procurement Costs. Many 
other United States programs display similar symptoms, with overpriced and 
frequently underperforming products. China has a much healthier manufacturing 
industry than the United States, and a larger pool of highly skilled personnel, 
in a job market where personnel costs are tightly controlled. China's ability 
to rapidly develop both the sophisticated J-XX [J-20] and complex KJ-2000 AWACS 
over the last decade, with little prior depth in the basic technologies 
involved, shows an efficient and effective R&D environment, and supporting 
manufacturing base. 

The Chengdu J-XX [J-20] thus represents a techno-strategic coup by China, and 
if deployed in large numbers in a mature configuration, a genuine strategic 
coup against the United States and its Pacific Rim allies. The development of 
the Chengdu J-XX [J-20] represents an excellent case study of a well thought 
out "symmetrical techno-strategic response" to the United States' deployment of 
stealthy combat aircraft, which no differently to the United States' play in 
the late Cold War and post Cold War period, elicits a disproportionate response 
in materiel investment to effectively counter. 

The only US design with the kinematic performance, stealth performance and 
sensor capability to be able to confront the J-20 [J-XX] with viable combat 
lethality and survivability is the F-22A Raptor, or rather, evolved and 
enhanced variants of the existing configuration of this aircraft. 

The US Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is outclassed in every respect, and would be 
as ineffective against a mature J-XX [J-20] as it is against the F-22A Raptor. 

All variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter would be equally so outclassed, 
assuming this failed project even progresses to any kind of actual production. 

All US Air Force, US Navy and allied legacy fighters are outclassed in much the 
same manner, and are ineffective kinematically and in sensor capability against 
this class of threat system. 

The extant IADS technology base of the US Army and Navy and their sister 
services in Pacific Rim allied nations will be largely ineffective, requiring 
the replacement of most if not all acquisition radars with VHF-band AESA 
technology replacements designed to defeat S/X/Ku-band stealth capabilities. 

>From the perspectives of both technological strategy and military grand 
>strategy, the J-XX [J-20] is the final nail in the coffin of the utterly 
>failed "Gates recapitalisation plan" for United States and allied tactical 
>fighter fleets. Apologists for the "Gates fighter recapitalisation plan" will 
>no doubt concoct a plethora of reasons as to why the J-XX [J-20] should be 
>ignored, as they did exactly one year ago when the Russians unveiled the T-50 
>PAK-FA stealth fighter. 

The material reality is simple. If the United States does not reverse course in 
its tactical air fleet and air defence recapitalisation planning, the United 
States will lose the Pacific Rim to China, with all of the practical and grand 
strategic consequences which follow from that.



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