Hi Ian,
Interesting proposal; a few comments inline.
On 2006/04/11, at 1:37 PM, Ian Hickson wrote:
We could get around even this by requiring two additional headers --
Request-Nonce: 2957219521
...in the request, with a matching:
Response-Nonce: 2957219521
...in the response, which must match. This would cause issues with
caches, but would basically make it impossible to cause a server to
respond unless it actually wants to (we would prevent those two
headers
from being set as well).
This would effectively kill caching, and require two interactions for
every cross-site request.
I think the risk could be mitigated by for instance requiring a
control
file in a known location, even if it is nothing more than an on-off
switch for the access-control based feature.
Known locations don't work for multiple reasons:
- Caching means they can't be updated quickly for patching security
holes, especially on large sites (which ironically are the most
likely to be targetted).
So, give them Cache-Control: max-age: 300. Large sites will still
have a considerable benefit from caching, and be able to change their
policies within five minutes (or three minutes, or...). A site with
an urgent XSS security hole can also deny requests from a particular
referer... assuming, of course, that it can't be modified in XHR.
- They either don't handle common cases like university student sites
(cases that are critical given that this is where many new authors
start out -- it's in our interests to make it easy for new
authors to
use these technologies), or, they do handle them but are
ridiculously
over-complicated.
- In corporate environments they rely on the site admin being
available
to fix problems, which may often not be the case, both in large
companies spanning multiple time zones, and in small companies
where
the admin may not be at work.
True.
The right way to do this is with OPTIONS, but there's very poor Web
server support for it.
- They require an additional round-trip in even the simplest case
(this
is especially bad for the common case of getting an RSS file).
As does this proposal for non-GET methods -- which are many people's
primary use cases.
- They generate 404s that polute access logs.
If people are going to try to abuse a site that doesn't want to allow
XSS, it's going to show up in the logs somehow.
Known locations was a design mistake for robots.txt, it was a design
mistake for favicon.ico, and it was a design mistake for p3p.xml.
Let's
not make a fourth design mistake.
They are, but there isn't any other option on the table yet. This
proposal has some nice attributes, but it's very complex.
If it were me, I'd be inclined to put a known location in the WD
(say, /w3c/access-control) in order to get the TAG -- or anybody else
-- motivated to come up with a better solution. How about an Open
Source apache module and ISS plug-in to give users control of OPTIONS
responses?
2) Using GET as a preflight of the access control for other http
methods
seems potentially risky. Often, the server-side code for different
methods on the same resource will not be that closely related, and
indeed, it's possible for content authors not to even be aware that a
resource where they are granting access for GET also supports PUT or
DELETE or POST.
In practice that is fine, since you have to do extra work to make PUT,
DELETE or POST do anything.
However, we can adjust the proposal to require the server to
confirm that
it is saying it is ok to do a particular type of response, e.g. by
having
headers:
Request-Confirm-Method: POST
...requiring a response of:
Response-Confirm-Method: POST
...to be accepted.
By that time the side effects have already happened on the server
side. Many CGI tools (unfortunately) treat GET query args and POST
bodies as equivalent, so there will be situations where it's possible
to craft an attack against a server whereby a GET has side effects.
3) "Domain:" doesn't seem like the greatest name for something that
includes more than a DNS domain name, but I guess we can pretend it
means "security domain" or something.
I am not in any way attached to any of the names, I don't mind better
names, e.g. if we want Security-Domain: or whatever.
I personally like Referer-Domain, as it is similar to the existing
Referer header (in fact, duplicitous, but whatever).
WRT the Access-Control header, it should probably be Content-Access-
Control, as it's an entity header.
Cheers,
--
Mark Nottingham
[EMAIL PROTECTED]