On 2006/04/14, at 2:10 PM, Ian Hickson wrote:
BTW, would you consider these URIs to have different policies?
http://www.example.com/search?a=b
http://www.example.com/search?c=d
Yes. But if you're doing a POST, why not include the variables in the
entity body?
I was just wondering if each would have a separate policy,
independent of the method.
As to the variables, there's a difference between query args and body
content (despite how must CGI tools treat it); the query args form a
part of the identity of the resource, the body doesn't (but that's
neither here nor there for the purposes of this discussion).
As stated before, I'm not sure the existence of one hole justifies
the intentional opening of other holes.
It's not "one hole". Most of the Web works this way, always has.
I was referring to the ability to do a POST; obviously GET is
possible
through a variety of methods, but that's OK, because it's safe.
In that case I'm confused; you can't do a POST with a <script>
element.
Did you mean <form>?
Sorry, script + form for a non-user-initiated POST.
AIUI, the specific vulnerability is form.submit() being used cross-
site; or are there other ways to do a automated POST?
It's true that it's possible to muck around with script tags and HTML
forms to send an arbitrary POST without interaction (the "one hole"),
but the existence of one accidental attack vector isn't justification
for intentionally creating (and standardising) another bigger one
(not
just POST, but other methods as well).
Sure, that's why I'm proposing that non-GET requests should have the
pre-flight check.
OK; I wasn't sure if you were retracting that or not. It sounds like
the question is just how to do the pre-flight check. I'm not
necessarily against yours (it has some nice properties), but I'm not
sure it's the best way forward.
Thanks,
--
Mark Nottingham
[EMAIL PROTECTED]