My understanding from reading the thread is that the concern is with
complexity, increased attack surface due to mechanisms that can be
used in unanticipated ways or misconfigured, and management issues.
Thus though policy can state a simple approach, I'm not sure the above
concerns are addressed by that expression.
I think we need to work through the use cases, both for those that do
need a policy language and those that do not, then consider if APIs
have various methods as Robin suggested, or otherwise how it will all
fit together.
regards, Frederick (not as chair)
Frederick Hirsch
Nokia
On Nov 19, 2009, at 7:49 PM, ext Marcin Hanclik wrote:
Hi Jonas, Maciej,
It seems that the policy that you would accept would be:
<policy-set combine="deny-overrides">
<policy description="Default Policy for websites. Simply denying all
API that are covered by some device capability:) ">
<target>
<subject>
<subject-match attr="class" match="website" func="equal"/>
</subject>
</target>
<rule effect="deny">
<condition>
<resource-match attr="device-cap" func="regexp">/.+/</resource-
match>
</condition>
</rule>
</policy>
</policy-set>
Let's see how DAP will evolve then.
Thanks,
Marcin
________________________________________
From: Maciej Stachowiak [[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2009 1:26 AM
To: Jonas Sicking
Cc: Marcin Hanclik; Adam Barth; Robin Berjon; [email protected]
; public-webapps WG
Subject: Re: Security evaluation of an example DAP policy
On Nov 19, 2009, at 4:23 PM, Jonas Sicking wrote:
On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 4:07 PM, Marcin Hanclik
<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi Adam,
I think that
<resource-match attr="param:name" func="regexp">/(C|c):\\(.+)\\(.+)/
<resource-match />
should be
<resource-match attr="param:name" func="regexp">/(C|c):\\([^\\]+)\\.
+/<resource-match />
up to any further bug in the RE.
Sorry, my problem.
Anyway, the general comment is that the use case is under control
based on the current spec.
For what it's worth, I think any API that opened a dialog asking the
user "Do you want to give website X access to directory Y in your
file
system" would not be an API we'd be willing to implement in firefox.
I.e. our security policy would be to always deny such a request (thus
making implementing the API useless for our users).
Ditto for Safari.
- Maciej
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