Jeremy
Thanks. I want to make sure I understand the concerns.
I guess the question is whether one can bake all the security in that
is needed for various (possibly conflicting) use cases, including
those that do not presume user interaction. An argument for policy is
to decouple the mechanism from the decision criteria to get that
flexibility, while making sure the mechanism is secure. On the other
side I hear the concern that the mechanism cannot be as secure.
I note that the policy requirements document includes some use cases
Paddy contributed in an earlier email:
http://dev.w3.org/2009/dap/policy-reqs/#use-cases
So for example, how does one "bake in" these:
The weather.example.com Widget can connect to weather.example.com
without notifying the user, except when roaming.
Reliably identified Websites can send and receive SMS except to
premium rate numbers.
Do we need to go into more detail on these two (as examples)?
regards, Frederick
Frederick Hirsch
Nokia
On Nov 20, 2009, at 9:15 AM, ext Jeremy Orlow wrote:
These are reasons, but I think the greatest cause of our concern is
that we have not seen any examples of how policies can provide the
same level of security that baking security into the API from the
beginning can provide.
All too often the policy based approaches fall back on either asking
the user or simply denying access--both of which are not viable
solutions in most cases within the browser. If we take security
into account when designing the APIs we can often find creative
approaches that satisfy all of the requirements/use-cases while
providing an API that can be on by default.
On Fri, Nov 20, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Frederick Hirsch <frederick.hir...@nokia.com
> wrote:
My understanding from reading the thread is that the concern is with
complexity, increased attack surface due to mechanisms that can be
used in unanticipated ways or misconfigured, and management issues.
Thus though policy can state a simple approach, I'm not sure the
above concerns are addressed by that expression.
I think we need to work through the use cases, both for those that
do need a policy language and those that do not, then consider if
APIs have various methods as Robin suggested, or otherwise how it
will all fit together.
regards, Frederick (not as chair)
Frederick Hirsch
Nokia
On Nov 19, 2009, at 7:49 PM, ext Marcin Hanclik wrote:
Hi Jonas, Maciej,
It seems that the policy that you would accept would be:
<policy-set combine="deny-overrides">
<policy description="Default Policy for websites. Simply denying all
API that are covered by some device capability:) ">
<target>
<subject>
<subject-match attr="class" match="website" func="equal"/>
</subject>
</target>
<rule effect="deny">
<condition>
<resource-match attr="device-cap" func="regexp">/.+/</resource-
match>
</condition>
</rule>
</policy>
</policy-set>
Let's see how DAP will evolve then.
Thanks,
Marcin
________________________________________
From: Maciej Stachowiak [...@apple.com]
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2009 1:26 AM
To: Jonas Sicking
Cc: Marcin Hanclik; Adam Barth; Robin Berjon; public-device-a...@w3.org
; public-webapps WG
Subject: Re: Security evaluation of an example DAP policy
On Nov 19, 2009, at 4:23 PM, Jonas Sicking wrote:
On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 4:07 PM, Marcin Hanclik
<marcin.hanc...@access-company.com> wrote:
Hi Adam,
I think that
<resource-match attr="param:name" func="regexp">/(C|c):\\(.+)\\(.+)/
<resource-match />
should be
<resource-match attr="param:name" func="regexp">/(C|c):\\([^\\]+)\\.
+/<resource-match />
up to any further bug in the RE.
Sorry, my problem.
Anyway, the general comment is that the use case is under control
based on the current spec.
For what it's worth, I think any API that opened a dialog asking the
user "Do you want to give website X access to directory Y in your file
system" would not be an API we'd be willing to implement in firefox.
I.e. our security policy would be to always deny such a request (thus
making implementing the API useless for our users).
Ditto for Safari.
- Maciej
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