On 2015-02-16 09:34, Anne van Kesteren wrote:
On Sun, Feb 15, 2015 at 10:59 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloa...@gmail.com> wrote:
For the first point, Pinning with Overrides
(tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning) is a perfect
example of the wrong security model. The organizations I work with did
not drink the Web 2.0 koolaide, its its not acceptable to them that an
adversary can so easily break the secure channel.

What would you suggest instead?

For the second point, and as a security architect, I regularly reject
browser-based apps that operate on medium and high value data because
we can't place the security controls needed to handle the data. The
browser based apps are fine for low value data.

An example of the lack of security controls is device provisioning and
client authentication. We don't have protected or isolated storage,
browsers can't safely persist provisioning shared secrets, secret
material is extractable (even if marked non-extractable), browsers
can't handle client certificates, browsers are more than happy to
cough up a secret to any server with a certificate or public key (even
the wrong ones), ...

So you would like physical storage on disk to be segmented by eTLD+1
or some such?

As for the certificate issues, did you file bugs?

I think there definitely is interest in making the web suitable for
this over time. It would help if the requirements were documented

There are no universal and agreed-upon requirements for dealing with
client-certificates which is why this has been carried out in the past
through proprietary plugins.  These have now been outlawed (for good
reasons), but no replacement has been considered.

There were some efforts recently
which though were rejected by Mozilla, Google and Facebook.

And there we are...which I suggest a "short-cut":
which initially was pointed out by Ryan Sleevy:


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