Yes – this is a conundrum that should be fixed. Issues with the mailing list could completely screw up a vote. Anyone controlling the mailing list could they effectively prevent voting if they decided to manage the mailing list in a way to prevent member messages from reaching the mailing list.
I don’t think the public archive should be/is controlling. None of the members check the archive to ensure their vote shows up on the list and the archives aren’t mentioned in the bylaws. I’m not sure what happens in the current situation. As Peter points, the bylaws say “Votes not submitted to the mailing list are not considered valid.” As this one was submitted to the mailing list, but rejected, it is valid? However, as Ryan pointed out “All votes take place via the Public Mail List”, which clearly did not happen. The penalty for votes that don’t take place via the public mailing list but are submitted to the public mailing list is not specified in the bylaws. What do other groups do in this circumstance? Jeremy From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Peter Bowen via Public Sent: Sunday, April 16, 2017 7:17 PM To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Bowen <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] ]RE: Ballot 194 - Effective Date of Ballot 193 Provisions is in the VOTING period (ends April 16) Regardless of this outcome, I think it makes sense to clarify that only votes recorded in archives of the public mailing list are counted in the future. We have open voting, so it is unfair to a proposition proponent or opponent if one side has information the other does not. Alternatively we could look into a sealed vote system to avoid this in the future. On Apr 16, 2017, at 6:07 PM, Kirk Hall via Public <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Ryan, it’s kind of unseemly for one browser to try to block the vote of another browser. Google were the only Forum member to vote no on this ballot – 20 CAs and 2 browsers voted yes. Clearly the consensus of the members is in favor of this ballot, and technically Microsoft cast its vote correctly, even if it was not forwarded by our server. I would suggest you reconsider following this line. From: Public [ <mailto:[email protected]> mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via Public Sent: Sunday, April 16, 2017 6:03 PM To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> Cc: Ryan Sleevi < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> Subject: [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabfpub] ]RE: Ballot 194 - Effective Date of Ballot 193 Provisions is in the VOTING period (ends April 16) To that end, this was a concern raised nearly a year ago when discussing what would become Ballot 174, with respect to Section 9.16.3 <https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-April/007468.html> https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-April/007468.html and <https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-April/007480.html> https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-April/007480.html There is certainly precedent within the Forum that "posted" shall mean available for access via the archives, as that can be objectively measured and quantified. I do not believe we can reasonably argue that "posted" shall mean sent to this address. It cannot be shown, for example, that Microsoft did not block the posting on their end, thereby preventing proper disclosure by preventing egress from their network. This is also not the first time in which the Chair has been the only recipient of a message, and which the interpretation has resulted in some concern. I will note Symantec's previous exclusions, posted only to Dean (in his role as the previous chair), created uncertainty and ambiguity with respect to whether they abided by the Bylaws. I would encourage you, for the avoidance of doubt and conflict, to reconsider your position, as I do not believe it is supported by the precedent, intent, or bylaws of the Forum. On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 8:57 PM, Peter Bowen via Public < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> wrote: Kirk, I suspect that the mailing list system rejected this email as Gordon is not subscribed to the public mailing list. The bylaws say: "Votes not submitted to the Public Mail List will not be considered valid, and will not be counted for any purpose.” The bylaws do not appear to contemplate what happens if the vote is _submitted_ to the mailing list but not accepted. In this case it was copied to the chair, so you alone saw it. If Gordon had not explicitly copied you, then it would not have been counted. As you were explicitly copied, you received it. Given that the bylaws say "All voting will take place via the Public Mail List”, and the mailing list archives allow verification of whether the email was posted, I am leaning towards the view that this is not a valid vote. However I can see how it is a grey area. Thanks, Peter On Apr 16, 2017, at 5:36 PM, Kirk Hall via Public < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> wrote: This is the vote from Microsoft. From: Gordon Bock [ <mailto:[email protected]> mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, April 13, 2017 8:46 AM To: Kirk Hall < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> Subject: RE: Ballot 194 - Effective Date of Ballot 193 Provisions is in the VOTING period (ends April 16) Microsoft votes ‘Yes’. Thanks, -Gordon From: Kirk Hall [ <mailto:[email protected]> mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Sunday, April 9, 2017 4:30 PM To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> Subject: Ballot 194 - Effective Date of Ballot 193 Provisions is in the VOTING period (ends April 16) Reminder: Ballot 194 - Effective Date of Ballot 193 Provisions is in the voting period (ends April 16) Ballot 194 – Effective Date of Ballot 193 Provisions Purpose of Ballot: Recent Ballot 193 reduced the maximum period for certificates and for reuse of vetting data for DV and OV certificates from 39 months to 825 days. The effective date for reducing the maximum validity period of certificates was specified as March 1, 2018, but no effective date was specified for when the reduction of the maximum period for reuse of vetting data becomes effective. It was the intention of the authors of Ballot 193 that the effective date for reducing the maximum period for reuse of vetting data under BR 4.2.1 would also be March 1, 2018. This ballot is intended to clarify that intention. The ballot also makes these changes retroactive to the effective date of Ballot 193 so there is no gap period. Ballot 193 is in the Review Period (which will end on April 22, 2017), and has not yet taken effect. Bylaw 2.3 states that Ballots should include a “redline or comparison showing the set of changes from the Final Guideline section(s) intended to become a Final Maintenance Guideline” and that “[s]uch redline or comparison shall be made against the Final Guideline section(s) as they exist at the time a ballot is proposed”. To avoid confusion, this Ballot will show the proposed changes to BR 4.2.1 will be presented two ways: (1) a comparison of the changes to BR 4.2.1 as it existed before Ballot 193 (which is as BR 4.2.1 exists at this time this ballot is proposed), and also (2) a comparison of the changes to BR 4.2.1 as it will exist after the Review Period for Ballot 193 is completed (assuming no Exclusion Notices are filed). The following motion has been proposed by Chris Bailey of Entrust Datacard and endorsed by Ben Wilson of DigiCert, and Wayne Thayer of GoDaddy to introduce new Final Maintenance Guidelines for the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" (Baseline Requirements) and the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates" (EV Guidelines). -- MOTION BEGINS -- Ballot Section 1 BR 4.2.1 is amended to read as follows: [Ballot amendments shown against BR 4.2.1 as it currently exists without the changes adopted in Ballot 193] BR 4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions The certificate request MAY include all factual information about the Applicant to be included in the Certificate, and such additional information as is necessary for the CA to obtain from the Applicant in order to comply with these Requirements and the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. In cases where the certificate request does not contain all the necessary information about the Applicant, the CA SHALL obtain the remaining information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, independent, third‐party data source, confirm it with the Applicant. The CA SHALL establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant. Applicant information MUST include, but not be limited to, at least one Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or IP address to be included in the Certificate’s SubjectAltName extension. Section 6.3.2 limits the validity period of Subscriber Certificates. The CA MAY use the documents and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify certificate information, provided that: the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under Section 3.2 no more than thirty‐nine (39) months prior to issuing the Certificate. (1) Prior to March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under Section 3.2 no more than 39 months prior to issuing the Certificate; and (2) On or after March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under Section 3.2 no more than 825 days prior to issuing the Certificate. The CA SHALL develop, maintain, and implement documented procedures that identify and require additional verification activity for High Risk Certificate Requests prior to the Certificate’s approval, as reasonably necessary to ensure that such requests are properly verified under these Requirements. If a Delegated Third Party fulfills any of the CA’s obligations under this section, the CA SHALL verify that the process used by the Delegated Third Party to identify and further verify High Risk Certificate Requests provides at least the same level of assurance as the CA’s own processes. [Ballot amendments shown against BR 4.2.1 as it existed after Ballot 193 was approved] BR 4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions The certificate request MAY include all factual information about the Applicant to be included in the Certificate, and such additional information as is necessary for the CA to obtain from the Applicant in order to comply with these Requirements and the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. In cases where the certificate request does not contain all the necessary information about the Applicant, the CA SHALL obtain the remaining information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, independent, third‐party data source, confirm it with the Applicant. The CA SHALL establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant. Applicant information MUST include, but not be limited to, at least one Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or IP address to be included in the Certificate’s SubjectAltName extension. Section 6.3.2 limits the validity period of Subscriber Certificates. The CA MAY use the documents and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify certificate information, provided that: the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under Section 3.2 no more than 825 days prior to issuing the Certificate. (1) Prior to March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under Section 3.2 no more than 39 months prior to issuing the Certificate; and (2) On or after March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under Section 3.2 no more than 825 days prior to issuing the Certificate. The CA SHALL develop, maintain, and implement documented procedures that identify and require additional verification activity for High Risk Certificate Requests prior to the Certificate’s approval, as reasonably necessary to ensure that such requests are properly verified under these Requirements. If a Delegated Third Party fulfills any of the CA’s obligations under this section, the CA SHALL verify that the process used by the Delegated Third Party to identify and further verify High Risk Certificate Requests provides at least the same level of assurance as the CA’s own processes. Ballot Section 2 The provisions of Ballot Section 1 will be effective retroactive to the effective date of Ballot 193. --Motion Ends-- The procedure for approval of this Final Maintenance Guideline ballot is as follows (exact start and end times may be adjusted to comply with applicable Bylaws and IPR Agreement): BALLOT 194 Status: Final Maintenance Guideline Start time (22:00 UTC) End time (22:00 UTC) Discussion (7 to 14 days) April 2, 2017 April 9, 2017 Vote for approval (7 days) April 9, 2017 April 16, 2017 If vote approves ballot: Review Period (Chair to send Review Notice) (30 days). If Exclusion Notice(s) filed, ballot approval is rescinded and PAG to be created. If no Exclusion Notices filed, ballot becomes effective at end of Review Period. Upon filing of Review Notice by Chair 30 days after filing of Review Notice by Chair >From Bylaw 2.3: If the Draft Guideline Ballot is proposing a Final Maintenance >Guideline, such ballot will include a redline or comparison showing the set of >changes from the Final Guideline section(s) intended to become a Final >Maintenance Guideline, and need not include a copy of the full set of >guidelines. Such redline or comparison shall be made against the Final >Guideline section(s) as they exist at the time a ballot is proposed, and need >not take into consideration other ballots that may be proposed subsequently, >except as provided in Bylaw Section 2.3(j). Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public list. A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting members are listed here: <https://cabforum.org/members/> https://cabforum.org/members/ In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Quorum is shown on CA/Browser Forum wiki. Under Bylaw 2.2(g), at least the required quorum number must participate in the ballot for the ballot to be valid, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining. _______________________________________________ Public mailing list <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public _______________________________________________ Public mailing list <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public _______________________________________________ Public mailing list <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
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