One thing that hasn’t been discussed is the use of the OCSP no-check extension.
Ben Wilson, JD, CISA, CISSP VP Compliance +1 801 701 9678 From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, May 10, 2017 2:58 PM To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Wilson <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Profiling OCSP & CRLs I'm not trying to disagree here, but I'm trying to find out how we can best specify reasonable expectations. That is, there's a lot - a *lot* - that can go wrong with 1 year OCSP responders/CRLs. So if we're going to allow them, we need CAs to think about the technical risks and make proactive suggestions on how best to codify that. Because just a blanket "1 year responder" can go very wrong On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 4:40 PM, Ben Wilson via Public <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: I agree that a one-year validity for OCSP Responders / CRLs is a reasonable timeframe for off-line CAs. Ben Wilson, JD, CISA, CISSP VP Compliance +1 801 701 9678 <tel:(801)%20701-9678> From: Public [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Doug Beattie via Public Sent: Wednesday, May 10, 2017 11:15 AM To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Cc: Doug Beattie <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Profiling OCSP & CRLs There are CAs that are kept off-line other than roots, so perhaps the requirement should apply to all “off-line” CAs, assuming we can come to agreement on what that means. Doug From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Peter Bowen via Public Sent: Wednesday, May 10, 2017 1:09 PM To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Cc: Peter Bowen <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Profiling OCSP & CRLs Ryan, This seems reasonable when you are dealing with an online CA. When you are dealing with a root CA, it is currently reasonable to only bring it online once a year to update the CRL, as that is the required frequency. For many offline CAs it is quite a production to use the HSM, so I think the maximum duration of delegated responder certificates signed by root CAs should be at least a year. Thanks, Peter On May 8, 2017, at 4:51 PM, Ryan Sleevi via Public <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: I think 30 days is what we should target as the upper-bound, so would that be suggesting that we should target 15 days as a SHOULD with 30 as a MUST? Or were you suggesting 30 as a SHOULD, 45 as a MUST, which in practice means... well, 45? :) On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 12:57 PM, Curt Spann <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Hi Ryan, Regarding delegated OCSP responder certificate validity, if 30 days is a desired goal (or a similar timeframe), I would recommend 45 days to allow the renewal to occur every 30 days, with a 15 day buffer for operational issues. Basically, for whatever target validity period we should add some buffer time. Cheers, Curt On Apr 25, 2017, at 4:53 PM, Ryan Sleevi via Public <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Hi folks, In response to various investigations about OCSP performance, operation, and trying to figure out how we can move to a world of more ubiquitous OCSP stapling, one of the things that comes up is that OCSP responses are very much like the pre-BR wild-west of certificates. I've tried to capture a starting point for discussion at https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/2/files?diff=split . I've tried to annotate the changes, and the reason for the changes, so that people can understand them, their goals, and the implications. While I'd like to get this to the point of a Ballot, it's not quite there yet. In particular, it doesn't state Effective Dates, because I want to get a sense of the challenges that each bit may pose :) If people find this approach useful, I'd like to also reform the CRL profile in a similar fashion. There's also a lot of ways to express these requirements. I considered using a table approach, which I suspect some of our ETSI-audited CA members will be familiar with, and which I find useful, but I thought it best to keep the initial discussions simple and textual, and then we can make it pretty once we're happy with the substance. _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
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