PKIoverheid votes YES. We’ve been following the discussion as it has unfolded. The definition of current methods 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.2.2.4.5, as currently worded in the BR, we have to agree, leaves much room for interpretation. However, we might be able to improve these methods, a process that will require time.
In this discussion there are CAs and browsers on the one side who are (possibly) proposing a more radical solution of termination of said validation methods per March 1 (enforced through browser program requirements), there is ballot 218 which proposes abolition of 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.2.2.4.5 per August 1, and there are parties who want to keep current methods in place, at least long enough for new and improved versions to be developed and deployed. The last option has the danger that a working group effort could go on for months and months without much progress, while the current methods stay in place. This ballot, with a firm deadline of August 1, puts a fixed end date on the current methods .1 and .5. We welcome possible working group discussions about a new or improved domain validation methods (possibly included in the broader discussion, see Dimitris’ response below) and is, in our view, this ballot is the best approach forward. It’s a combination of an achievable timeline for CAs to move away from 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.2.2.4.5 while also including a final date by which CAs must have changed to a different method. Kind regards, Jochem van den Berge Logius PKIoverheid Public Key Infrastructure for the Dutch government ........................................................................ Logius Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) Wilhelmina van Pruisenweg 52 | 2595 AN | The Hague PO Box 96810 | 2509 JE | The Hague ........................................................................ [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> http://www.logius.nl Van: Public [mailto:[email protected]] Namens Dimitris Zacharopoulos via Public Verzonden: donderdag 1 februari 2018 15:35 Aan: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Onderwerp: Re: [cabfpub] Voting begins: Ballot 218 version 2 All currently approved Domain Validation methods provide some level of assurance which is not easily quantifiable without calculating the risks (vulnerabilities, threats) of each method. If we had a methodology to quantify the assurance level of each method, we would be able to compare them. The discussion around methods 3.2.2.4.1 (1 and 2) and 3.2.2.4.5 demonstrated that these methods have lower assurance levels than the other methods, without providing conclusive evidence to support ultimate failure of #1 and #5. If we had that, probably all validations performed with methods #1 and #5 would have to be invalidated and re-done using other methods. This means that the forum considered these methods "acceptable" so far which means they provided a "reasonable" assurance level. The bar has been raised, but not in a measurable way. Intuitively, these methods were proved to be the "weakest" among the other methods, even though there are known vulnerabilities for almost all of them (including DNS/routes hijacking, etc). The validation working group should discuss more about the threats of each method (and how to formalize the level of assurance) in case a similar discussion about the other methods is brought forward. HARICA votes "abstain" to ballot 218. Dimitris. On 29/1/2018 11:51 μμ, Tim Hollebeek via Public wrote: I’m highly skeptical that discussing this for another month will change anybody’s minds. It has already been discussed for over a month, including at three validation working group meetings and once on the management call, with extensive discussion on this list as well. There have been a number of clever attempts to distract from the matter at hand. Everybody seems to agree that methods #1 and #5 as currently written are insufficient to validate certificates, and efforts to improve method #1 have all either been shown to be similarly weak, or have turned the validation method into one of the other existing validation methods. In fact, this demonstrates an obvious transition path for CAs currently using method #1: use method #2 or method #3. Since methods #1 and #5 do not sufficiently validate certificates, they should not be used, and six months should be more than enough time to cease using them. Here is the final version of the ballot, with voting times. A redlined document is attached (I encourage other proposers to post ballot redlines, even if it isn’t required). -Tim ----- Ballot 218 version 2: Remove validation methods #1 and #5 ----- Purpose of Ballot: Section 3.2.2.4 says that it “defines the permitted processes and procedures for validating the Applicant’s ownership or control of the domain.” Most of the validation methods actually do validate ownership and control, but two do not, and can be completed solely based on an applicant’s own assertions. Since these two validation methods do not meet the objectives of section 3.2.2.4, and are actively being used to avoid validating domain control or ownership, they should be removed, and the other methods that do validate domain control or ownership should be used. The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and endorsed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and Rich Smith of Comodo. -- MOTION BEGINS – This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based upon Version 1.5.4: In Section 1.6.1, in the definition of “Domain Contact”, after “in a DNS SOA record”, add “, or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar” In Section 3.2.2.4.1, add text at the end: “For certificates issued on or after August 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of certificates.” In Section 3.2.2.4.5, add text at the end: “For certificates issued on or after August 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of certificates.” After Section 3.2.2.4.10, add following two new subsections: “3.2.2.4.11 Any Other Method This method has been retired and MUST NOT be used. 3.2.2.4.12 Validating Applicant as a Domain Contact Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by validating the Applicant is the Domain Contact. This method may only be used if the CA is also the Domain Name Registrar, or an Affiliate of the Registrar, of the Base Domain Name. Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA MAY also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.“ In Section 4.2.1, after the paragraph that begins “After the change to any validation method”, add the following paragraph: “Validations completed using methods specified in Section 3.2.2.4.1 or Section 3.2.2.4.5 SHALL NOT be re-used on or after August 1, 2018.” -- MOTION ENDS – For the purposes of section 4.2.1, the new text added to 4.2.1 from this ballot is “specifically provided in a [this] ballot.” The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: Discussion (7+ days) Start Time: 2017-01-22 21:30:00 UTC End Time: 2017-01-29 21:50:00 UTC Vote for approval (7 days) Start Time: 2017-01-29 21:50:00 UTC End Time: 2017-02-05 21:50 UTC _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public Dit bericht kan informatie bevatten die niet voor u is bestemd. 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